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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal as provided in Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)0) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Appellant's appeal and his brief raise the following issues for review by this 
Court: 
1. Did the trial court err in finding that the presumption of paternity in favor 
of Petitioner had been rebutted and that custody of Zachary was to be determined solely 
on the basis of the child's best interests? 
Standard of Review - Great deference is given to the trial court's findings 
of fact in divorce cases and appellate courts will not overturn them unless they are clearly 
erroneous. See generally Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 1999 UT App 130 f 8, 977, P.2d 
1226, 1228; see also State ex rel M. W., 970 P.2d 284, 291 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) "Under 
the well-established standard of review for child custody proceedings, we do not set aside 
the trial court's factual findings unless clearly erroneous... A finding is clearly erroneous 
if it is against the great weight of the evidence or if we are otherwise definitely and firmly 
convinced that a mistake has been made." 
2. Did the trial court err in denying Petitioner's motion for summary judgment 
seeking a declaration that he is the father of Zachary based upon the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel? 
Standard of Review - A trial court's grant or denial of a motion for 
summary judgment is viewed for correctness. No deference is accorded to a trial court's 
1 
conclusions of law. Malibu Investment Co, v. Sparks, 2000 UT 30, H 12, 996 P.2d 1043, 
1047. 
3. Did the trial court commit reversible error in finding that it would be in the 
best interests of Nicholas, the child of Petitioner and Respondent, and of Zachary, the 
child of Respondent and Intervenor, that primary physical custody of Nicholas be 
awarded to Respondent and primary physical custody of Zachary be awarded to 
Respondent and Intervenor? 
Standard of Review - An appellate court will overturn the trial court's 
findings of fact only if they are clearly erroneous and so flagrantly unjust as to be an 
abuse of discretion. Thomas v. Thomas, 1999 UT App. 239, ^  3, 987 P.2d 603, 606. 
4. Did the trial court commit reversible error in determining that Intervenor 
had standing to intervene in this case? 
Standard of Review - Whether an individual has standing to request relief 
in a civil action will be reviewed for correctness with minimal discretion and with 
deference to the trial court. See Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Wilkinson, 946 P.2d 372, 373-
374 (Utah 1997). ("As to the standard of review the question of whether a given 
individual or association has standing to request a particular relief is primarily a question 
of law, although there may be factual findings that bear on the issue. We will review 
such factual determinations made by a trial court with deference.") 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Statutes and rules which are of central importance to this appeal are as follows: 
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) ("Briefs") provides: 
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The argument shall contain the contentions and the reasons of the 
Appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the ground 
for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations 
to the authorities, statues, and parts of the record relied on. A party 
challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that 
supports the challenged finding. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10 (1998 & 2004 Supp.) ("Custody of Children in Case of 
Separation or Divorce - Custody Consideration") provides in relevant part: 
(1) If a husband and wife having minor children are separated, or 
their marriage is declared void or dissolved, the court shall make an 
order for the future care and custody of the minor children as it 
considers appropriate. 
(a) In determining any form of custody, the court shall consider 
the best interests of the child and, among other factors the court finds 
relevant, the following: 
(i) the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of 
each of the parties; 
(ii) which parent is most likely to act in the best interest of 
the child, including allowing the child frequent and continuing 
contact with the non-custodial parent; and 
(iii) those factors outlined in § 30-3-10.2. 
(2) In awarding custody, the court shall consider, among other 
factors the court finds relevant, which parent is most likely to act in 
the best interests of the child, including allowing the child frequent 
and continuing contact with the non-custodial parent as the court 
finds appropriate. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.1 (1998 & 2004 Supp.) ("Definitions - Joint Legal 
Custody - Joint Physical Custody") provides in relevant part: 
As used in this chapter: 
(2) "Joint physical custody": 
(c) may require that a primary physical residence for the child be 
designated; and 
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(d) does not prohibit the court from specifying one parent as the 
primary caretaker and one home as the primary residence of the 
child. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.2 (1998 & 2004 Supp.) ("Joint Custody Order -
Factors for Court Determination - Public Assistance") provides in relevant part: 
(2) In determining whether the best interest of a child will be served 
by ordering joint legal or physical custody, the court shall consider 
the following factors: 
(e) the geographical proximity of the homes of the parents; 
(j) any other factors the court finds relevant. 
(3) The determination of the best interest of the child shall be by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.3 (1998 & 2004 Supp.) ("Terms of the Joint Legal 
Custody Order") provides in relevant part: 
(2) An order of joint legal custody shall provide terms the court 
determines appropriate, which may include specifying: 
(a) either the county of residence of the child, until altered by 
further order of the court, or the custodian who has the sole legal 
right to determine the residence of the child[.] 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45a-10 (2002) ("Effect of genetic test results") 
provides in relevant part: 
(1) Genetic test results shall be admissible as evidence of paternity 
without the need for foundation testimony or other proof of 
authenticity or accuracy if: 
(a) of a type generally acknowledged as reliable by accreditation 
bodies designated by the federal Secretary of Health and Human 
Services; 
(b) performed by a laboratory approved by such an accreditation 
body; and 
4 
(c) not objected to with particularity and in writing with 15 days 
after the written test results being sent to the parties. 
(3) (a) A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if 
genetic testing results in a paternity index of at least 150. 
(4) If a presumption of paternity established under Subsection (1) is 
not rebutted by a second genetic test under Subsection (2), the court 
shall issue an order establishing paternity. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45a-10.5 (2002) ("Parent time rights of father") 
provides in relevant part: 
(1) If the court determines that the alleged father is the father, it may 
upon its own motion or upon motion of the father, order parent-time 
rights in accordance with Sections 30-3-32 through 30-3-37 as it 
considers appropriate under the circumstances. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
This case concerns the rights of two fathers in the two sons, Nicholas and Zachary, 
whom they fathered by the same woman, Appellee, Kimberly Y. Thanos (hereinafter 
referred to as "Respondent"). Both boys were born during Respondent's marriage to 
Appellant Kelly F. Pearson (hereinafter referred to as "Petitioner"); however, the second 
child, Zachary, was fathered by Pete D. Thanos ("Intervenor"). After Petitioner filed his 
Complaint for Divorce and Custody Order, Intervenor filed a motion for leave to 
intervene in the divorce case. Over Petitioner's strenuous objection the assigned trial 
judge, Judge Tyrone E. Medley of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, 
granted Intervenor's motion. Pursuant to the stipulation of the parties, Dr. Jill D. 
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Sanders, a clinical psychologist, was appointed to prepare a custody evaluation. Dr. 
Sanders completed her evaluation and submitted her report on November 3, 2003. 
On April 1, 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8, 2004 the case was tried before Judge Medley. On 
May 11, 2004 Judge Medley published his written findings of fact and conclusions of law 
which, in essence, found that it would be in the best interests of the children if 
Respondent were awarded primary physical custody of Nicholas, and Respondent and 
Intervenor were awarded primary physical custody of Zachary. The Court's conclusions 
were incorporated into a Supplement Decree of Divorce on July 12, 2004. (The Decree 
was designated as being "supplemental" because the case previously had been bifurcated 
in order to terminate the marriage of Petitioner and Respondent. The court entered a 
Decree of Divorce Terminating Marriage on June 25, 2002.) The Supplemental Decree 
of Divorce dealt with all other issues in the divorce case except the termination of the 
parties' marriage. (Hereinafter the Supplemental Decree of Divorce shall be referred to as 
the "Decree".) 
Although Petitioner's Notice of Appeal indicates that the appeal is taken from "the 
entire judgment", it focuses only on the right of Intervenor to intervene in the case and on 
the award of custody of Nicholas and Zachary. 
Copies of the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the 
Supplemental Decree of Divorce (R. 2503-2514), the Child Custody Evaluation and the 
custody evaluator's "Schoolcraft" evaluation, together with a supplement to it, are 
attached to this brief as addenda at tabs "A", "B", "C", "D" and "E". 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Petitioner and Respondent were married in Salt Lake City, Utah on August 
17, 1992. (R. 2532 at 387:19, 388:24.) During their marriage they had a son, Nicholas, 
who was born on July 6, 1997. (R. 2434; Finding no. 1, R. 2435.) 
2. A second child was born during the marriage on September 14, 1999. 
Approximately four months after Respondent became pregnant with the second child 
(later named "Zachary") she informed Petitioner that Intervenor was Zachary's father. 
(Finding no. 2, R. 2435; R. 2535 at 1050:17-20; R. 2532 at 433:1-9.) 
3. Following Respondent's disclosure of the source of her pregnancy 
Petitioner asked Respondent if she "would be willing to stay?" He said that he would 
like her to stay and would "like to at least try to make this work." (R. 2535 at 1052:18-
22.) A day later, after thinking about Petitioner's proposal that they not separate 
Respondent told Petitioner that she would stay and try to make the marriage work if he 
would not punish her and the unborn child for her indiscretion. (R. 2535 at 1056:4-22.) 
4. Petitioner and Respondent also discussed the role which Intervenor would 
play in the raising of Zachary. Petitioner responded, "I will do whatever I can to help 
him have as much of a role as he wants with the baby." (R. 2535 at 1056:25 to 1057:6.) 
5. A few days after the Pearson's initial discussion concerning Respondent's 
pregnancy Petitioner read to her a list of questions and rules which he had drafted. The 
rules which he announced set restrictions on Respondent's communications with 
Intervenor and her relationship with him. Respondent did not agree to the rules. (R. 
2535 at 1058:6-12, 22.) 
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6. Prior to the birth of Zachary Respondent went to her pediatrician's office 
for an ultrasound. Petitioner attended the ultrasound session with Respondent. 
Following the ultrasound it became clear that Petitioner was very upset. Respondent 
asked him about his feelings. He said, "You know, it is the first time that it's hit me, that 
I just looked at that - 1 saw the child, the baby, and there is none of me there. There are 
none of my features; there is none of me." In reply Respondent said to him, "I don't 
think this is going to work." (R. 2535 at 1061:15-24; 1062:7-9.) 
7. When it became apparent that Petitioner was struggling to forgive 
Respondent, she suggested that they participate in marital counseling. Petitioner refused 
saying that the problem was with Respondent and that he had no need for counseling. (R. 
2535 at 1064:2-19.) 
8. Soon after Zachary's birth Petitioner knew that Respondent frequently 
spoke to Intervenor. He suspected she was not committed to continuing the marriage. 
(R. 2532 at 437:4-19.) 
9. During the period of time between the births of Nicholas and Zachary 
Petitioner and Respondent spent approximately equal amounts of time with Nicholas. 
(R. 2535 at 1043:14-16.) During the first ten weeks after his birth Respondent had full-
time maternity leave and spent that time with Nicholas. She had three additional weeks 
of part-time maternity leave and spent her time off the job with him, as well. Typically 
Respondent took care of Nicholas at night and in the morning until she went to work; 
Petitioner took care of the child during the day and Respondent took over the childcare 
duties when she returned from work around 6:00 p.m. Respondent was the primary 
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caregiver on Saturdays and the Pearsons shared the time with Nicholas on Sundays. 
(R. 2535 at 1034-1043.) 
10. After the birth of Zachary Respondent spent her eight weeks of full-time 
maternity and two weeks of part-time leave with the child. (R. 2535 at 1066:15-23.) At 
the end of that time, approximately December 1, 1999, Petitioner and Respondent used a 
nanny during the day while they were at work. (Id. at 1067:15 to 1068:19.) Respondent 
worked a forty-five hour week. (Id. at 1069:8-14.) During this time Petitioner would 
leave for work later and come home earlier than Respondent. As a consequence he 
tended to spend slightly more time during the week with Zachary than Respondent; 
however, both participated in the raising of the boys during this period of time. (Id. at 
1070:10 to 1072:23.) 
11. Petitioner and Respondent separated in May 2000, approximately eight 
months after the birth of Zachary. (R. 2533 at 581:18-21; R. 2533 at 452:9-11.) 
12. At the time of Zachary's conception and birth Intervenor was married to 
another woman, who died from cancer in December 2000. Intervenor did not inform his 
prior wife of Zachary's birth because he did not want to further damage her already 
fragile health or cause her further emotional trauma and because he wished to remain 
with her to assist her with the final months of her life. (Finding no. 6, R. 2436-37.) 
13. Petitioner filed his Complaint for Divorce and Custody Order in this case 
on December 27, 2000. (R. 1-5.) Respondent filed her Answer and Counterclaim on 
January 23, 2001. (R. 17-26.) Also on January 23, 2001 Intervenor filed his Verified 
Motion for Intervention. (R. 37-41.) On March 28, 2001 the trial court entered an Order 
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on Motion for Order to Show Cause, Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint for Divorce, 
and Motion for Temporary Relief which, inter alia, granted joint legal and physical 
custody of Nicholas and Zachary to Petitioner and Respondent. Under the Order 
Petitioner and Respondent were to have an equal amount of parent time with the boys. 
(R. 133-138, T|t 1 and 2.) 
14. Shortly after the filing of Intervenor's motion to intervene the Thanoses and 
Petitioner met several times with a mediator. The mediator, in turn involved a therapist, 
Dr. Jay Thomas, in three sessions of the mediation. (R. 2533 at 651:3 to 652:5; R. 2535 
at 925:4 to 926:25.) 
15. On August 29, 2001 Petitioner and Respondent stipulated to the 
appointment of Dr. Jill Sanders as a custody evaluator. (R. 249-250.) By an order dated 
September 6, 2001 the court ordered the appointment of Dr. Sanders. (R. 251-252.) Dr. 
Sanders is a well-known and well-respected custody evaluator who received her PhD in 
clinical psychology from the University of Utah in 1987. (R. 2534 at 672:3-6.) (Her 
professional resume was received in evidence by the trial court as Intervenor's Exhibit I-
1.) She has performed custody evaluations in the State of Utah since 1983 or 1984 and 
has focused on that area of her practice since 1989 or 1990. (Id. at 674:13-16.) She has 
performed approximately 200 to 250 custody or parenting capacity evaluations. (Id. at 
675:2-6.) She has testified in Utah courts approximately fifty times. (Id. at 765:17-21.) 
16. Following the hearing on Intervenor's Motion to Intervene, by an Order 
dated March 7, 2002 the trial court expanded the assignment of Dr. Sanders to include the 
analysis of certain factors described State In re J. W.F., 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990) 
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(commonly referred to as the "Schoolcraft Case") concerning the factors to be considered 
by the court in ruling on a motion to intervene. (R. 728-273.) Dr. Sanders produced that 
report on May 13, 2002. (Intervenor's Exhibit 1-2; attached to this brief as Addendum 
Tab "C".) (Hereinafter the Evaluation Report of May 13, 2003 shall be referred to as the 
"Schoolcraft Report".) Thereafter, by a letter dated August 26, 2002, Dr. Sanders 
supplemented her Schoolcraft Report by providing additional information requested by 
Petitioner's attorney. (Intervenor's Exhibit 1-4; attached to this brief as Addendum Tab 
"D".) 
17. By an Order Granting Intervention of Peter Thanos dated November 7, 
2002, the trial court granted leave to Mr. Thanos to intervene in this case. (R. 971-972.) 
Later, by a certain Intervenor's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment (R. 989-991) Mr. 
Thanos sought a declaration by the court that he is the biological and natural father of 
Zachary. Intervenor's motion was supported by a Verified Memorandum In Support Of 
Motion For Partial Summary Judgment. To that Memorandum Intervenor attached a 
report prepared by the DNA Diagnostic Laboratory of the University of Utah which 
certified that his probability of paternity of Zachary was 99.9999% and the Paternity 
Index was 98,011. (R. 992-999.) 
18. Intervenor also presented evidence to the court that Petitioner and 
Respondent admitted that Intervenor is the child of Intervenor. (See Complaint for 
Divorce, and Custody Order, R. 1-5, |^ ["Peter D. Thanos is the natural father of 
Zachary"] and Affidavit of Kimberlee Y. Pearson in Support of Motion for Order to 
Show Cause, R. 27-31 [identifying Intervenor as the father of Zachary].) 
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19. Petitioner replied to Intervenor's Motion and Verified Memorandum by 
objecting to the admissibility of the DNA test on legal grounds, but not to the accuracy of 
the test. (Objection To Admissibility Of Genetic Test Results And Motion To Strike 
dated November 27, 2002. (R. 1298-1300).) Petitioner also filed a Motion For Summary 
Judgment and a Memorandum Opposing Intervenor's Motion And Supporting 
Petitioner's Motion. (R. 1302-1326; 1361-1363.) 
20. On May 5, 2003 the trial court granted Intervenor's motion for summary 
judgment and denied that of Petitioner. (R. 1745-1749.) By separate findings of fact and 
conclusions of law the court adopted the conclusions of Dr. Sanders contained in her 
Schoolcraft Report and found, inter alia, that "from a developmental and psychological 
prospective, Zachary's functioning was not inherently disrupted by Intervenor, Pete 
Thanos' involvement"... but, on the contrary, "was not only not disruptive, but 
necessary to Zachary's normal and positive development." (R. 1723, 1741, Finding no. 
18.) The court declared Intervenor to be the "biological and natural father of Zachary 
Andrew Pearson." (R. 1746.) 
21. On June 7, 2002 the Court granted Respondent's motion to bifurcate the 
case. (R. 848-851.) By a Decree of Divorce Terminating Marriage dated June 21, 2002, 
the Court ended the marriage of Respondent and Petitioner. (R. 855-856.) On July 1, 
2002 Respondent and Intervenor were married. (Finding no. 7, R. 2437.) As of the date 
of the trial Petitioner had not remarried. (R. 2533 at 521:22-23.) 
22. On July 13, 2003 a daughter, Madelaine, was born to Mr. and Mrs. Thanos. 
(Finding no. 8, R. 2437.) 
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23. Nicholas and Zachary are strongly attached to Madelaine. Nicholas likes to 
feed her and hold her. He enjoys the role of a nurturer for her. Zachary likes to play with 
her. When the children get ready for bed they all wrestle together. Madelaine loves the 
boys and interacts with them. (R. 2535 at 1077:4 to 1078:24.) 
24. When Respondent picked Zachary up from his preschool he frequently 
said, "Mommy, I need to show all the kids Maddy." He would then try to introduce her 
to all of his schoolmates. (R. 2535 at 1079:5-11.) Nicholas likes to write stories for 
Madelaine. He prepared a book (Respondent's Exhibit 14) entitled "My Sister By Nick" 
for his preschool class. (R. 2535 at 1079:12 to 1081:19.) In viewing the relationship of 
Nicholas and Zachary with their sister the custody evaluator concluded, "These children 
[Nicholas and Zachary] are very best friends and it is likely that their sister will join their 
unusually strong relationship. They should not be separated." (Petitioner's Exhibit P-5 
at 9, If 3.) Similarly, the trial court found that "[t]here is a substantial benefit of keeping 
these siblings together." (Finding no. 34.b., R. 2449.) 
25. As a result of the court's interim order granting equal parent time to 
Petitioner and Respondent, it became necessary for Respondent to divide her time 
between her Salt Lake home and her Portland home in order to maximize the amount of 
time she could spend with Nicholas and Zachary. (R. 2536 at 1073 to 1075:13.) 
26. The expenses associated with her frequent travel between the two cities, 
and the maintaining of two residences cost her and Intervenor approximately $3,500 per 
month. (R. 2535 at 11-16.) 
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27. To help Nicholas and Zachary feel comfortable when they were living in 
the Portland home Respondent and Intervenor gave the boys a high-ceilinged front 
bedroom with a walk-in closet. They provided beds which were identical to those which 
the boys had in Salt Lake, including nearly identical sheets and identical comforters. The 
boys had duplicate toys in both residences. (R. 2535 at 1101:21 to 1103:1.) They have 
made friends in Portland. The Thanoses' home is located in a neighborhood which had 
several families with small children and a nearby school of known quality. {Id. at 1103:3 
to 1106:24.) In Portland the boys participate in outings to the beach, sailing, hiking in 
nearby forests and other outdoor activities. (R. 1107:3 to 1109:9.) They are happy and 
comfortable in their Portland home. After reviewing these and other facts concerning the 
Portland home, the court-appointed custody evaluator in this case found: 
The children consider Oregon to be one of their homes and are very 
comfortable in that environment. Currently single and working from 
his home, Kelly is the most portable of the three parents. I am 
convinced that these parents will be able to create a good life for 
themselves and their children in Oregon and urge that Kelly relocate 
to Oregon in time for Nicholas to begin the second half of his school 
year there. 
(Petitioner's Exhibit P-5 at 12.) 
28. Petitioner is able to work from his home in Utah. He could just as easily be 
employed in Oregon at the same job that he performs in Utah because of the nature of his 
employment. (R. 2533 at 559:19-23.) By contrast, Intervenor would have a difficult time 
in Utah finding comparable work and, if he did, would likely take a pay cut. (R. 2533 at 
643:10 to 645:11.) When he last looked for work in Utah Intervenor determined that his 
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reduction in pay, if he were to come to Utah, might be as great as 50%. (R. 2533 at 
643:13-25.) 
29. Intervenor's present employment position is secure. (R. 2533 at 645:17 to 
646:20.) Petitioner's present employment is much more tenuous. At the time of trial his 
job was equally divided between two tasks. One of those tasks had the potential for long-
term work. He testified that the other task was likely to end within a few months and 
admitted that his employment was "not necessarily secure." (R. 2532 at 420:1-10.) He 
also admitted that he would have to make a "job transition" in his career and that his 
company had reduced its work force from 47,000 to 28,000 employees during the prior 
four years. {Id.) It was unlikely that he would be able to find a job which would allow 
him to continue to work at home. (R. 2532 at 422:1-5.) He also conceded that if he were 
to lose his job he would likely have to live with his parents or siblings. (Id. at 422:7-14.) 
He acknowledged that he had considered moving to Portland and to the "Bay area". 
(R. 2532 at 430:19-24; 432:13-21.) 
30. After the completion of her Schoolcraft Report, in June 2002, Dr. Sanders 
began preparing her custody evaluation. (R. 2534 at 699:21-24.) In preparing that report 
she interviewed Petitioner, Respondent and Intervenor, as well as, two former nannies, 
Intervenor's therapist, Intervenor's adult son, two friends of Petitioner and Respondent 
and Dr. Jay Thomas, a psychologist who participated in the mediation and consulted with 
the Thanoses. (Child Custody Evaluation, Petitioner's Exhibit P-5 at 1.) Dr. Sanders 
conducted "multiple individual interviews with Petitioner, Respondent and Intervenor. 
(Id.) She observed Nicholas and Zachary in the presence of Respondent, Petitioner and 
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Intervenor during four different observation periods before her report was prepared and 
three times after its preparation. (R. 2534 at 692:13-23.) She tested the parties using two 
different psychological tests and had them fill out a "parenting questionnaire". 
(Petitioner's Exhibit P-5 at 1.) 
31. Dr. Sanders provided all of the information required in C.J. A. Rule 4-903. 
(R. 2534 at 707:18-20.) She also complied with guidelines for the preparation of custody 
evaluations promulgated by the American Psychological Association and The 
Association Of Family And Conciliatory Courts. (Id. at 745:23 to 746:17.) 
32. As mandated by Rule 4-903 Dr. Sanders considered the factor of "biology" 
(referred to as "kinship" in Rule 4-903), but found it to be no more important than any 
other factors required to be considered under Rule 4-903. {Id. at 707 at 6-17.) 
33. Dr. Sanders found the issue of "attachment" - which she described as "the 
relationship that develops between the child and the parent" - to be very important in her 
evaluation. (Id. at 708:5-7, 712 at 12-14.) (Rule 4-903 uses the word "bonding" which, 
according to Dr. Sanders, is a term of art referring to "the ability of a parent to bond to a 
child, typically during the early infancy period.") (Id. at 707:23 to 708:4.) 
34. Dr. Sanders completed her report on November 3, 2003. (Petitioner's 
Exhibit P-5:cover page.) In it she recommended that Petitioner and Respondent be 
named as joint legal custodians of Nicholas, and that Respondent and Intervenor be 
named joint legal custodians of Zachary. (Id. at 12.) She did not specifically recommend 
the awarding of physical custody, be it as sole or joint custody, but did recommend what 
she called an "access schedule" which evenly divided parent time with Nicholas on the 
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same basis required by the interim order. (Id. at 12,1fl| 2.a., b., c. and d.) As to Zachary 
Dr. Sanders recommended that he spend five nights with Petitioner per week and that 
holidays be rotated between Petitioner, on the one hand, and Respondent and Intervenor, 
on the other, in the same manner as with Nicholas. (Id. at 13: ffif 2.c. and d.) Dr. Sanders 
also voiced her "strong recommendation" that Petitioner relocate to Oregon. (Id. at 12:^ } 
2 (introductory %).) 
35. At trial Dr. Sanders testified concerning the preparation of the child custody 
evaluation and reconfirmed her recommendations, she stated that she had also conducted 
post-evaluation observations of the children. (R. 2534 at 749:7-19.) 
36. The trial in this case was held on April 1, 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8, 2004. The case 
was tried before Judge Tyrone E. Medley. Judge Medley published his findings of facts 
and conclusions of law on May 11, 2004 (R. 2434-2469). His findings adopted the 
findings of Dr. Sanders. In particular, he accepted and followed Dr. Sanders' 
recommendations with regard to joint legal custody and parent time as being in the best 
interest of the children. He also found that it would be in the best interests of the children 
if Respondent were to be awarded primary legal custody of Nicholas and if Respondent 
and Intervenor were to be awarded primary legal custody of Zachary. (Findings nos. 43, 
46 and 47, R. 2456, 2458.) 
37. The court directed Respondent and Intervenor to submit a draft of a 
proposed decree. It signed that decree, over the objection of Petitioner, on July 12, 2004. 
(R. 2503-2513.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The central issue in this case, and the one from which all other issues flow, is 
whether the Petitioner, Mr. Pearson, or the Respondent and the Intervenor, Mr. and Mrs. 
Thanos, should be awarded the primary physical custody of Nicholas and Zachary. 
Because at the time of trial Petitioner lived in Salt Lake City, Utah, and the Thanoses 
lived in Portland, Oregon, it was not possible for the trial court to adopt a third 
alternative: the awarding of joint and mathematically equal physical custody. As to that 
fundamental issue - Who should have primary physical custody of the boys? - the trial 
court found for the Thanoses. The court's decision on that issue was made in the exercise 
of that broad discretion which is granted to trial courts in deciding what is in the best 
interests of children who are the subject of custody battles. That decision should not be 
overturned by this court because it is neither clearly erroneous nor flagrantly unjust. 
Petitioner adopts the expedient approach of attacking the trial court's decision to 
allow Mr. Thanos to intervene in this case. His attack seeks to divert the court's attention 
from the fact that he cannot demonstrate that the trial court's findings concerning the best 
interests of the children were clearly erroneous and flagrantly unjust. Even Petitioner's 
attempted diversion must be rejected because the presumption of paternity in favor of 
Petitioner has been rebutted by overwhelming and uncontradicted evidence. 
Flawed, too, are petitioner's arguments concerning the application of the doctrines 
of parental presumption and promissory estoppel. Those arguments are based upon a 
misunderstanding of the governing legal principles by Petitioner but, more importantly 
because those legal principles must ultimately give way to a determination of what is in 
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the best interests of the children. On that issue the trial court's ruling is unequivocal and 
unassailable. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE GRANTING OF INTERVENOR'S MOTION TO INTERVENE IS 
WELL-SUPPORTED BY ESTABLISHED LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND THE 
EVIDENCE. 
A. Schoolcraft Analysis 
Respondent and Intervenor agree that Utah recognizes the ancient tradition of 
protection of a presumption of legitimacy of children born during a marriage. The 
doctrine, known as the "Lord Mansfield's Rule", was recognized in the case of Lopes v. 
Lopes, 518 P.2d 687 (Utah 1974). The rule of law of that case is simply that "spouses 
themselves may not give testimony which would tend to illegitimatize the child." Id. at 
689. That somewhat vague standard was modified by the case of Teece v. Teecef 715 
P.2d 106 (Utah 1986), which held that the Lord Mansfield's Rule had been "substantially 
eroded by the enactment of § 78-25-18 of the Code which expressly mandates that the 
trial utilize blood tests to assist in making determinations of paternity." Id. at 714. The 
Court, in Teece, stated that: 
Nothing in the Rule, which bars testimony from either parent that 
would illegitimatize their child, prohibits the introduction of the 
result of blood or tissue typing tests or of the testimony from 
witnesses other than the putative fathers on the issue of paternity. 
Id. at 107, citing Hales v. Hales, 656 P.2d 423 (Utah, 1982). 
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The Teece decision ameliorates the inflexibility of the Lord Mansfield's Rule by 
allowing a court to receive evidence of paternity in the form of test results or the 
testimony of third parties. 
The Rule is further modified and eroded by the language of Utah Code Ann. § 78-
45a-1 (2002), which states as follows: 
The father of the child that is or may be born outside of marriage is 
liable to the same extent as the father of a child born within 
marriage, whether or not the child is born alive, for the reasonable 
expenses of the mother's pregnancy and confinement and for the 
education, necessary support, and any funeral expenses for the child. 
For purposes of child support collection, a child born outside of 
marriage includes a child born to a married woman by a man other 
than her husband if that paternity has been established. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Further, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45a-10, which addresses the effects of genetic test 
results, states as follows: 
(1) genetic test results shall be admissible as evidence of paternity 
without the need for a foundation of testimony or other proof of 
authenticity or accuracy if: 
(a) a type of generally acknowledged as reliable by 
accreditation bodies designated by the Federal Secretary of 
Health and Human Services; 
(b) performed by a laboratory approved by such an 
accreditation body; 
(c) not objected to with particularity and in writing within 
fifteen days after the written test result being sent to the 
parties . . . 
(2)(b) unless a party objects to particularity and in writing within 
fifteen days after the written test results are sent to the last known 
address of that party on file under § 78-45(a)-2, testimony received 
under subsection (2)(a) shall be received in affidavit form. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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In the case at bar, Intervenor filed an affidavit on August 1, 2001 asserting his 
paternity and attaching conclusive paternity test results in compliance with Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-45a-10 (2002). There was no objection or rebuttal filed by petitioner or any 
other party subsequent to the filing of the notice and the DNA results within the 15 day 
period, as prescribed by statute. As stated in Utah Code Ann. § 78-45a-10(3)(a), "A man 
is presumed to be the natural father of a child of genetic resting result in a paternity index 
of at least 150." Id. The paternity index for the Intervenor was 98,011 and the 
probability was 99.999%, as compared to an unrelated Caucasian male. Pursuant to Utah 
law this evidence is (1) admissible in that it is not testimonial evidence and comports 
with the holding in Teece, supra, and (2) conclusive proof that the Intervenor is the 
natural father. 
In addition to financial obligations, Utah statutes afford rights of parent time to an 
unmarried father. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45a-10.5 states as follows: 
Visitation rights of father. If the court determines that the alleged 
father is the father it may upon its own motion or upon motion of the 
father order visitation rights in accordance with sections 30-3-32 
through 30-3-37, as it considered appropriate under the 
circumstances. 
The Intervenor clearly had legal rights that would have been affected by the 
outcome of the litigation between the Petitioner and Respondent. Neither of the parties in 
the divorce were adequately positioned in a legal context to protect the interests of the 
Intervenor. 
To resolve the dispute between the Teece holding, which gives the court a method 
to evaluate other evidence disputing paternity, and the Lopes holding, which supports the 
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Lord Mansfield's Rule's general policy considerations, in the Schoolcraft Case the Utah 
Supreme Court addressed the issue of who should be included in the class of persons 
permitted to challenge the presumption of paternity. In that case a petition was filed on 
December 13, 1985 in juvenile court by the State of Utah alleging neglect and 
abandonment by Michael Ford, the natural father of the minor child, J.W.F., and by Linda 
Schoolcraft, the mother. The guardian ad litem representing the minor child was granted 
standing to participate in those proceedings. The trial court found that J.W.F was 
neglected and abandoned. As a result he was placed in the custody of the Division of 
Child and Family Services. Winfield Schoolcraft and Linda Schoolcraft had been 
married and lived together for approximately eight months after their marriage. Seven 
months to one year after the parties separated Linda Schoolcraft gave birth to the minor 
child, J.W.F., in the State of Utah on November 5, 1985. Mr. Schoolcraft filed the 
petition for custody in juvenile court on August 28, 1986 stating that he was the father of 
the child and was living with the child's mother at the time of conception. The guardian 
ad litem filed a petition alleging that Winfield had no rights to J.W.F. based upon the fact 
that Michael Ford was the natural parent of J.W.F. and that Winfield Schoolcraft was not 
the biological father, or alternatively, that he was unfit or had abandoned the child. 
Following a hearing the trial court terminated Michael Ford's and Linda Schoolcraft's 
parental rights. 
At trial the court found that Schoolcraft was not the biological father of J.W.F and 
that he had no right to custody. Since Schoolcraft was not the natural father of the child, 
he had no standing to claim custody. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's 
22 
decision, which included upholding the lower court's decision to grant the guardian ad 
litem standing to participate in the case. The Utah Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
review that decision. 
The Court held that the Court of Appeal's decision to allow the guardian ad litem 
standing was appropriate, as the guardian was an indispensable party to those 
proceedings and had an interest to protect the minor child. Id. at 713. Schoolcraft argued 
the opposite, stating that the court should have followed a strict reading of Lopes and 
Holder v. Holder, 9 Utah 2d 163, 340 P.2d 761 (1959) in preserving the sanctity of 
marriage and that the wife and husband should not be allowed to contest the legitimacy of 
the child, because such a challenge ultimately would have resulted in a decision that 
Schoolcraft was J.W.F.'s father. 
The Supreme Court found the Court of Appeals' analysis to be "too mechanistic 
and, consequently, is insufficiently sensitive to the legitimate policy consideration 
Schoolcraft raises." Id. at 713. Citing Lopes and Holder the court stated, "In 
determining who can challenge the presumption of legitimacy, a paramount consideration 
should be preserving the stability of the marriage and protecting children from disruptive 
and unnecessary attacks on their paternity". This analysis led the Court to conclude that 
whether an individual can challenge the presumption of legitimacy should depend, not on 
the legal status alone, but on a case-by-case determination of whether the above stated 
policies would be undermined by permitting the challenge. In note 1 the Court stated: 
Three cases dealing with standing to challenge a child's legitimacy 
are consistent with this approach. In Teece v. Teece, 715 P.2d 106 
(Utah 1986), Roods v. Roods, 645 P.2d 640 (1982), and Lopes v. 
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Lopes, 30 Utah 2d 393, 518 P.2d 687 (1974), the court allowed both 
the husband and wife to challenge the presumption of legitimacy, but 
in each of these cases, no reason existed to deny them standing 
because the stability of the marriage had already been shaken. 
Id. at 713. 
Schoolcraft and the three cases cited in footnote 1 provide examples of unstable 
fractured marriages. It was clear from the facts in the Schoolcraft Case that the marriage, 
in that instance was a marriage "in name only". Similarly, in the case at bar, at the time 
of the Intervenor's challenge and request that he be granted standing, the Petitioner and 
Respondent remained husband and wife in name only, because there was a pending 
divorce action and Intervenor and Respondent were engaged in an ongoing romantic 
relationship. By the time of trial a bifurcated Decree of Divorce had been granted and 
Intervenor and Respondent had married. 
In Lopes the natural father of Theodore Lopes initiated divorce proceedings 
against the defendant Shana G. Lopes. The finding of the trial court was as follows: 
"That during the marriage there has been one child born of the Defendant, Shana Lopes." 
518 P.2d at 688. Clearly, in Lopes, given the initiation of divorce proceedings, the 
marriage had been sufficiently shaken. 
In Teece the husband and wife married in 1973. The child was born in 1981. 
Subsequent to the child's birth, the mother initiated divorce proceedings. The child had 
been born during an eight year marriage, and the parties did not initiate divorce 
proceedings until after the birth of the child. The court in Schoolcraft again cited this as a 
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case in which the marital status of the parties had become sufficiently shaken to meet the 
first factor of the Schoolcraft analysis. 
The third case referenced in Schoolcraft is Roods v. Roods, 645 P.2d 640 (1982), a 
case in which the husband and wife had been married in 1973 and divorced in June 1976. 
A few months prior to the divorce the wife became pregnant. The child was born in 
December 1976. Id. at 641. Prior to the child's birth in August 1976, the mother had 
married a man named Craig Green, whose surname was given to the child and who had 
supported the child while Mr. Green was married to the mother. The providing of 
support enabled Mr. Green to claim the child as a dependent for tax purposes. The mother 
and Mr. Green were divorced in 1978. As with this case, the husband and wife in the 
Roods case were also married during the time of conception and birth of the minor child 
and the child was supported by Mr. Green and resided with the child as his own; 
however, subsequent to the birth of that child, the parties began having trouble with their 
marriage and had filed for divorce. The Court in Schoolcraft cited this case as an 
example of a marriage of sufficient instability that no offense would be given to its policy 
consideration of "preserving the stability of the marriage." See Schoolcraft, 799 P.2d at 
713. 
Petitioner cannot distinguish between the facts of the above-referenced cases and 
the instant case. The applicable standard to apply pursuant to Schoolcraft is whether 
there is a stable, intact marriage, not whether the marriage had been dissolved or whether 
the "partners to the marriage jointly reared children together and continue to do so," as 
Petitioner argues. (Brief of App. at 26.) Further, pursuant to the decision in Schoolcraft, 
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the trial court must examine the facts of each case, on a case-by-case basis to determine if 
there was a functional, intact marriage. The trial did that in this case. 
The length of time that the minor child, Zachary, actually spent within a two-
parent household was only approximately 8 months and even during that time period the 
marriage was not stable. It is not relevant how long the parties remained married after, or 
how long the marriage existed prior to, the separation. Further, the stability of the 
parent/child relationships that are formed during the marriage are addressed in the 
Schoolcraft analysis by considering the question of protecting children from disruptive 
and unnecessary attacks on their paternity and considering the best interests of the child. 
It is clear, that the first requisite factor of the Schoolcraft analysis has been met in this 
case and that the trial court was correct in finding that the marriage of the Petitioner and 
Respondent was not an intact marriage and had been sufficiently shaken to disregard the 
presumption of paternity. (Finding no. 21, Addendum 1, R.2443-2444.) 
Petitioner argues that the court of Florida appeals case S.D. v. A.G. andJ.G., 764 
So. 2d 807 (Fla. Ct. App. 2000) supports his position. However, in the context of the 
direction provided in Schoolcraft, the phraseology used by the court that "although 
divorce may separate and strain a family with children, divorce does not end the 
important child-rearing functions of a family," certainly does not mean that marital strain 
cannot be sufficiently present to warrant intervention of a necessary party in divorce and 
custody proceedings; nor does that case assist the Court in this instance, given the 
particular and important facts present, which include the forming of a unitary family by 
Respondent and Intervenor. 
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In S.D. v. A.G. andJ.G., both parties in the divorce action opposed the 
intervention of the putative father who was seeking leave to intervene. Id. at 808. The 
court acknowledged that Florida case law states that a "putative father has no right to 
initiate a paternity action concerning the child of an intact marriage, if both the married 
woman and her husband objectT Id. at 809, citing LA v. H.H., 710 So. 2d 162 (Fla. 2d 
DCA 1988) (emphasis added). The Florida courts distinguish between cases where 
putative fathers are attempting to intervene and such intervention is resisted by both the 
woman and her legal husband, and those cases where one or both legal parents welcome 
the intervention of the putative father. 
The court in S.D. v. A.G. andJ.G. emphasize this point in the conclusion of its 
decision in stating, "We are probably suggesting that the traditional role of the family 
unit should not be interfered with by government or second guessed by judges absent 
some extraordinary circumstances, particularly when the legal parents object and show 
serious interest in fulfilling their child rearing functions." Id. at 810. 
The case at bar differs dramatically from the case of S.D. v. A.G. andJ.G. In this 
case the Respondent not only welcomed the Intervenor's intervention and involvement in 
the child's life, but actually married the Intervenor subsequent to the bifurcated decree of 
divorce being granted. (Finding no. 7, R. 2437.) 
Petitioner has cited to California cases which are not factually on point or 
controlling. Petitioner relies upon the use of In re Marriage of Freeman, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
439 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996), in support of his position that the intervention of Intervenor 
Pete Thanos was clear error. (Brief of Pet. at 24.) However, that case actually supports 
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the trial court's decision. In the Freeman case the legal father tried to avoid paying child 
support for a child that was believed to be fathered by another man during the course of 
the marriage. Paternity tests were submitted to the court proving that the putative father 
was indeed the natural father of the child in question. The legal father challenged the 
strict reading of the California paternity statute in the lower court arguing that because he 
was sterile, the statute presumptively precluded the court from making a finding of 
paternity and from ordering him to pay child support. Id. at 443. The due process 
argument that would be applicable to the case at bar and which the Petitioner quotes in 
his brief at page 24 were not even addressed by the appellate court in that case, because it 
was raised for the first time on appeal. The court stated, "Here, if John [legal father and 
appellant] desired a ruling on his due process claim, he had ample opportunity to request 
one from the trial court before entering into the stipulated judgment...In sum, we reject 
John's constitutional challenges to the conclusive presumption [of legitimacy] because 
John abandoned his due process claim..." Id. at 449. 
Furthermore, the court in that case joined the putative father as a party in 
dissolution action of the legal father and mother of the child {Id. at 443) and made a 
finding that the natural mother had presented evidence to show that during the marriage, 
the legal father had always treated the minor child as his own child. Id. The court's 
decision does not indicate that the biological father of the child, despite being joined as a 
party to the action, wanted to be responsible for the support of the child in question or 
that he ever sought to take custody or have any parental rights to the child in question. 
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To the contrary, the legal father sought to have those ties severed and to have the state 
look to the biological father for child support. Id. at 448. 
The Petitioner also ignores the important distinguishing facts between this case 
and the case of Susan H. v. Jack S.9 30 Cal. App. 4th 1435 (1994). Relevant facts of that 
case are as follows: 
Susan H. married John A. on May 5, 1985. In September of 1987, 
Susan H. became pregnant and gave birth on June 23, 1988, to 
Michael, the minor who is the subject of the present paternity action. 
Susan H. and John A. lived apart from each other from approximately 
September 1989 to April 1990. At all other times they resided 
together during their marriage until September 8, 1991, when Michael 
was over three years old, and Susan H. and John A. permanently 
separated. 
When Michael was approximately four years old, Susan H. 
commenced a marital dissolution. Susan H. and John A. both alleged 
that Michael was a child of their marriage. They stipulated to an order 
awarding primary physical custody of the child to Susan H. and 
secondary physical custody to John A. The court also directed John 
A. to pay Susan H. family support. 
Susan H. filed the paternity action seeking to establish that another 
man, Jack S., was Michael's father. Susan H. did not join Jack S. as a 
party to the dissolution proceeding, nor did she name John A. as a 
party in the paternity action. Susan H. also did not seek to consolidate 
or coordinate the two actions, but prosecuted both actions 
concurrently, asserting John A.'s paternity in the dissolution 
proceeding and Jack S.fs paternity in the paternity action. 
Id. at 1437-38. 
The Susan H. case is completely distinct from the case at bar in that the child in 
the case was over four years of age and already the subject of a final order of custody and 
parent time when the biological father was brought into the child's life and the litigation. 
Furthermore, the biological father did not want to be involved in the child's life and 
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resisted the paternity suit brought by the mother. Id. at 1438. Given these facts, the court 
had little choice but to order that the legal father maintain custody, especially in view of 
the fact that the alternative was to permit a virtual stranger to become the father of the 
child. 
Petitioner states "[T]he facts of this case require the court to consider a marriage in 
which the partners to the marriage jointly reared children together and continue to do so, 
though the marriage is dissolved." (Brief of Pet. at 26.) The court did, in fact, consider 
the fact that Petitioner and Respondent jointly parented the child for a period of 
approximately eight months and shared a custodial arrangement after separation. It also 
considered the fact that the Petitioner and Respondent's marriage had terminated and that 
the Respondent and Intervenor were then married and in an intact family. The policy 
considerations discussed by the Petitioner at pp. 24-26 of his Brief, actually support the 
conclusion that Zachary should reside with the Intervenor and Respondent rather than 
with the Petitioner, because the Intervenor and Respondent have an intact family 
relationship and are the natural parents of the minor child. The Petitioner wholly ignores 
the psychological impact it would have upon Zachary were he to reside with the 
Petitioner and only visit with his mother who is living with, and is married to, his natural 
father, the Intervenor. 
The court-appointed custody evaluator, Dr. Jill. Sanders, was the evaluator who 
was suggested by the Petitioner and mutually agreed to by both parties. Dr. Sanders 
indicated at the time of trial that there was a difference in this custody evaluation, as 
opposed to the normal custody evaluation where there are just two parties and perhaps a 
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stepparent involved. Dr. Sanders testified that while it was not unusual to have more than 
two parties to evaluate, such as in the case of stepparents, in this case the Intervenor was 
more than just a stepparent, but, also, the biological parent of the child (R. 2534 at 701:9-
14.) Dr. Sanders' written custody evaluation was admitted into evidence at the time of 
trial. That evaluation, received as Petitioner's Exhibit P-5, is attached hereto at Tab "E" 
of the Addendum. That report clearly recites the Rule 4-903 considerations (see pp. 9-10 
of the Report). One of the factors considered by Dr. Sanders is listed on page 10 of her 
report is as follows: 
Kinship, including, in extraordinary circumstances, step parent 
status: Pete and Kimberly are Zachary's biological parents. Kelly 
and Kimberly are Nicholas' biological parents. Kelly is Zachary's 
psychological father at present. Nicholas and Zachary have a very 
strong attachment to Pete. 
The Petitioner largely ignores these unusual fact-based circumstances in his Brief 
and incorrectly focuses on policies which may pertain to a more traditional two parent 
family home and secure intact marital relationship, neither of which exist in the case at 
bar. 
Dr. Sanders had previously prepared the requested Schoolcraft report, Addendum 
Tab C, and the supplement to Schoolcraft report, Addendum Tab D, both of which 
addressed the two-prong analysis of Schoolcraft, though the supplemental report was 
focused on the second prong: the protection of children from disruptive and unnecessary 
attacks on their paternity. (The Petitioner had requested further clarification from Dr. 
Sanders with regard to the Schoolcraft evaluation and the court permitted the Petitioner to 
supplement his concerns and address the court with a letter outlining his concerns and 
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further requests of Dr. Sanders.) Based upon that motion and Petitioner's letter, the trial 
court directed Dr. Sanders to make an analysis, to wit: "The impact on the child of a 
disruption in Zachary's relationship with Petitioner and Zachary's ability to understand 
his biological relationship." (Finding no. 8, R. 2442.) 
In response, Dr. Sanders' supplemental report, dated August 26, 2002, found that 
the primary disruption in Zachary's relationship with Petitioner occurred at the parties' 
separation and that by age 18 months, Zachary had firmly established a loving, secure 
and relatively predictable relationship with Petitioner, Respondent and Intervenor. Dr. 
Sanders indicated that there was no inherent reason why Intervenor's presence as another 
loving care giver should have any further disruptive impact. (Finding no. 19, R. 2442-
2443.) 
In her supplemental Schoolcraft report Dr. Sanders stated that Zachary had not lost 
his relationship with Petitioner nor was there any basis to believe that further disruption 
to the relationship between Zachary and Petitioner was intrinsically linked to the 
Intervenor's presence in Zachary's life. Dr. Sanders also, noted that Zachary has a loving 
relationship with Petitioner and with Intervenor. (Petitioner's Exh. P-7 [Tab D] at 2.) 
The court adopted Dr. Sanders' conclusions on this issue in its Finding no. 20. (R. 2443.) 
While the Petitioner had relied upon hired experts, the court found that the 
testimony of Dr. Douglas Goldsmith was of little assistance or weight, as Dr. Goldsmith 
had not met with the Respondent, Intervenor or children nor had he conducted an 
evaluation. The court found that Dr. Goldsmith's testimony was generic and not case-
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specific and that he misunderstood Dr. Sanders' opinions regarding the importance of 
biological relationships to children. (Finding no. 36, R. 2453.) 
The trial court's Schoolcraft analysis was thorough, was applied correctly to the 
facts of this case, and supports the ultimate conclusions of law and order of the court. 
B. Response to Constitutional Analysis. 
Petitioner argues in his Point LB. that there has been a violation of due process 
and in support of that argument cites Part I § 7 of the Utah Constitution. Simultaneously, 
Petitioner has relied upon the Schoolcraft Case in arguing that Intervenor should not have 
been granted leave to intervene. It is clear, however, by virtue of the trial court's careful 
analysis of the facts of this case employing a Schoolcraft analysis, that Petitioner was 
afforded due process. 
It is beyond dispute that Petitioner had his "day in court." There was a full 
hearing on Intervenor's motion to intervene, together with an interim "Schoolcraft 
evaluation" by the court-appointed custody evaluator. The trial court's order granting 
Intervenor's motion was then brought before this court by way of an interlocutory appeal. 
The trial court heard many days of trial testimony, including the testimony of various 
expert witnesses regarding what was in the best interest of Zachary, given his relationship 
with the various adults in his life. 
Due process, as required by the Utah and United States Constitutions, requires that 
a deprivation of someone's rights shall not be ordered without his having been given a 
full and fair opportunity to have the issue litigated or some other equivalent process being 
undertaken to ensure that his rights are not deprived. Petitioner himself states on page 32 
33 
in his Brief, in quoting In re Castillo, 632 P.2d 855, 856 (Utah 1981), that a parent has a 
fundamental right protected by the constitution to sustain a relationship with his child. 
Id, This right has been mischaracterized by Petitioner as being enjoyed only by a 
presumed parent under Lord Mansfield's Rule. 
Controlling and constitutionally accepted authority supports the principle that in 
certain circumstances a biological parent's right is preeminent or has priority over that of 
a presumptive legal parent. This is the essence of the Schoolcraft analysis; but the 
presumptive right to be recognized as a legal parent is a rebutable presumption. 
The Petitioner is misguided in his reliance on cases such as G.F.C v. S.G. and 
D.G., 686 So. 2d 1382, 1385 (Fla. Ct. App. 1997). These cases are not controlling 
authority in this state and are not helpful in the context in which they are being used: to 
support the proposition that a husband is a presumptive father where the child is bom to 
an intact marriage, absent any other adjudication of paternity in favor of the biological 
father. A mere establishing of biological fatherhood without a coexistent establishment 
of a developed relationship will not allow a biological father to overcome the legal 
fathers' presumption of legitimacy. An adjudication of paternity exists in this case and no 
intact marriage exists; consequently Petitioner's reliance on G.F.C. is misplaced. 
On its facts the G.F.C. case is distinguishable from the facts of this case in other 
respects, as well: 
G.F.C. appeals the trial court's order dismissing his petition to 
establish paternity. G.F.C. contends that pursuant to section 
742.011, Florida Statutes (1995), he has the right to challenge 
the paternity of a child born during an existing marriage. We 
disagree and affirm. 
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At the time of conception, the mother and her husband were 
living together and they have continued to live together since 
the birth of the child. At the time of birth, the husband's name 
was placed on the birth certificate as the child's father and he 
has at all times acknowledged the child to be his own. To this 
end, the husband also filed an affidavit acknowledging 
paternity. 
G.F.C. petitioned the trial court to adjudicate him the 
biological and legal father of the child. The petition alleged 
that G.F.C. was the biological father of the child but 
contained no allegations that the mother's husband was 
deficient in carrying out the responsibilities of a father or that 
G.F.C. had an established relationship with the child. 
Id. at 1383. 
The factors that are to be considered in an analysis under Schoolcraft, as 
discussed, supra, would lead to a similar conclusion to that the court in G.F.C. v. S.G. 
and D.G. arrived at in protecting the intact family. The natural mother and putative 
father had at all times been living together with the child in question in an intact 
marriage. Id. at 1383. G.F.C. made out no allegation indicating that the mother's 
husband was deficient in his responsibilities to the child. G.F.C. did not demonstrate that 
the minor child had established any kind of relationship with him. Id. Per the 
Schoolcraft analysis, Utah courts would likely also have found the natural father's 
intervention to be a "disruptive and unnecessary" attack on a child's paternity, in addition 
to being an assault on a clearly intact marriage. See Lopes, 518 P.2d at 689; Holder, 340 
P.2dat763. 
Petitioner has also cited the case of In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982) for the 
principle that "[t]he rights of parents are at their apex for parents who are married. Some 
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variation exists amongst unwed fathers." Id. at 1374. The application of this rule of law 
and constitutional analysis, actually strengthens the argument that the rights of the 
Intervenor and the Respondent in Zachary should be protected and that it was a sound 
decision for this court to grant intervention, given that Intervenor and Respondent are 
married to one another, as well as being his biological parents. 
Furthermore, Petitioner's reliance on In reJ.P. 648 P.2d at 1374, is flawed, given 
the fact that in that case the court was analyzing the constitutionality of a statute that 
allowed the juvenile court to terminate a mother's parental right using only a "best 
interests" standard, without first determining that there has been abandonment, abuse, or 
neglect. Id. at 1374-78. It was not a case involving two or more parties, wherein one is a 
legal parent and another parent a biological parent coincident with strained marital 
relationships. The facts of that case are not remotely similar to the case at bar. 
While it is true that parental rights are a fundamental liberty interest, recognizing 
that status does not mean that it is irrefutable, unrebuttable, or subject to nuance. Further, 
those same rights apply to natural parents as well as legal parents. Upon careful 
consideration of the facts of each case, both rights are afforded different levels of 
protection, as analyzed against the controlling case law of Schoolcraft. 
In the case of Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) a minor child, 
Victoria D., the natural child of Carol and Gerald D., was born during the term of Carol 
and Gerald D.'s marriage in California. Subsequent paternity testing revealed that 
Michael H., with whom Carol had had an affair, was the biological father of the child. 
During the first three years of her life, Victoria lived with the mother and spent time with 
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both Michael H. and Gerald D. Subsequent to June 1984, Carol and Gerald D. lived 
exclusively together, having reconciled their marriage. The biological father, Michael H., 
filed a paternity action against the natural mother and Gerald D., whose marriage was, in 
fact, an intact marriage. The Court, citing to the California Evidentiary Code, 
commented in the introduction of it's decision in the Michael H. v. Gerald D. case as 
follows: 
[A] child born to a married woman living with her husband is 
presumed to be a child of the marriage... the presumption of 
legitimacy may be rebutted only by the husband or wife, and then 
only in limited circumstances. 
Id. at 113. 
The facts of this case are distinguishable from those of Michael H. in at least two 
respects: (1) the case at bar has no intact marriage; (2) this case involves no similar 
statute. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Michael H., both in the dissent and plurality, 
focused on the "unitary family" as being of paramount concern in regard to whether or 
not the biological parent has a liberty interest that is being impinged. Id. at 135. The 
plurality stated: 
Under the circumstances of the case before us, Michael was given a 
fair opportunity to show that he is Victoria's natural father, that he 
developed a relationship with her, and that her interest would be 
served in granting him visitation rights.... 
[A]fter its rather shaky start, the marriage between Carol and Gerald 
developed a stability that now provides Victoria with a loving and 
harmonious family home. 
M a t 135-136. 
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The facts of Michael H. in which the parents after a "rather shaky start" reconciled 
and continued with an intact family are factually dissimilar and wholly inapplicable to 
this case. Due process has been afforded Petitioner in this case as he has had multiple 
experts, custody evaluators, and a request for an interlocutory appeal, as well as several 
hearings and a multi-day trial. 
The Petitioner's reliance on policy protections discussed in non-controlling 
authority such as In reD.B.S., 888 P.2d 875 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995) is, again, misguided, 
given the factual differences. Unlike the facts of In re D.B.S., the Intervenor in this case 
provided support, did not wait four years to assert his legal rights or agree to "stay out of 
the picture." Id. at 884. 
The case of Dawn D. v. Superior Court of Riverside County, 17 Cal. 4th 932 (Cal. 
1998) supports this Court's permitting of intervention. There, the natural mother and her 
husband prevented the biological father from bringing his minor child into his home. The 
biological father argued that he had the constitutional right to establish such a 
relationship. The court rejected this assertion finding that the biological father had never 
established any social relationship with the child and as such, the state was well within 
it's rights in creating a statute which would bar the biological father from ever 
establishing such a relationship. Further, the case of Dawn D. was not one in which there 
was a divorce action pending. 
Particular facts surrounding any denial of parental access are critical. In a case 
from California, Craig L. v. Sandy 5., 125 Cal. App. 4th 36 (Cal. Ct. App., 2004), the 
38 
biological father and mother had a brief sexual encounter while the mother was still 
married in an intact relationship. The product of the encounter was a minor child, 
Jeffrey, who neither party was aware was anything other than the natural child to the 
mother and her husband until a routine blood test taken immediately after delivery of the 
child in the hospital proved that the putative legal father could not be the natural father. 
The legal father and mother briefly separated due to the shock of this discovery, but 
thereafter began living together again as husband and wife. The biological father and his 
wife agreed to participate as fully as possible in the minor child's upbringing. The 
biological father made support payments to mother and legal father. When the child was 
a few months old he began to visit one overnight stay each week with the biological 
father and his wife. The biological father further alleged that he held Jeffrey out to his 
family and friends as his son. Id. at 44. When the mother and legal father began to resist 
the biological father's presence in their child's life, the biological father filed a petition to 
establish paternity and to maintain visitation rights under the terms of California Family 
Code section 7611, subdivision (d) the same statute that was relied upon in the case of 
Dawn Z)., supra, to prevent the biological father from asserting any rights to his child. Id. 
at 935. 
In Craig L. v. Sandy S.9 the court analyzed the case of Dawn D. It compared the 
facts that were before it to the facts of Dawn D. and found the following: 
Craig's claim is of course markedly different than the claim 
considered in Dawn D. Most importantly, unlike the biological 
father in Dawn D., Craig alleges facts which would give rise to the 
presumption provided by section 7611, subdivision (d). He alleges 
not only a great deal of physical contact with Jeffrey but a 
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meaningful relationship with Jeffrey. As we discuss more fully 
below that relationship not only supports a statutory right under 
section 7611, subdivision (d), but an interest which may well be 
subject to protection under the due process clause of the United 
States Constitution.,.Thus Craig's claim under section 7611, 
subdivision (d), is not barred by either the conclusive presumption 
of section 7540 or the holding in Dawn D. 
Id. at 47 (emphasis added). 
Petitioner has also cited, as support for his appeal, the case of In re J. W.T., 872 
S.W. 2d 189, 195 (Tex. 1994). That case provided a constitutional analysis of the Texas 
paternity statutes in an action brought by a natural parent against parents of an intact 
marriage. Again, this case is inapplicable, as there was no analysis of the impact of 
fractured marriages, but a focus, once again, on an intact marriage. 
The trial court in the case at bar fully analyzed whether there was an intact 
marriage. It was not necessary for the court to extend the analysis beyond the finding 
that at the time of trial the Petitioner and Respondent were "separated and later 
divorced." (Finding no. 7, R. 2437.) (At the time the Intervenor's motion to intervene 
was granted by Judge Medley in November, 2002, the Petitioner and Respondent had 
been separated over two years.) Further, Judge Medley had the benefit of the careful 
analysis of Dr. Sanders, which focused on the Schoolcraft factors. (Tabs C and D.) 
Given that high level of judicial scrutiny, it is incredible that Petitioner would now come 
before this court and allege: 
The trial court erred in concluding, without analysis, that Intervenor 
had constitutionally protected rights as Zachary's biological father, 
and in failing to recognize the Petitioner's constitutionally protected 
right to retain his legal relationship with Zachary intact. Because of 
the trial courts erroneous views, it conducted the Schoolcraft 
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analysis in an analytically flawed way, being overly solicitous of 
Intervenor 's biological connection with Zachary. 
(Brief of Pet. at 46) (emphasis added.) 
Judge Medley's analysis and findings are certainly not "overly solicitous/' given 
his careful consideration of the Schoolcraft factors and the separate Schoolcraft report 
conducted by Dr. Sanders. In light of the guidance provided to the trial court in the 
Schoolcraft case, as adhered to by the trial court, the granting of Intervener's motion to 
intervene was not only proper, but required. The trial court's order should not be 
disturbed. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS PERMISSIBLE DISCRETION 
IN DETERMINING THAT EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL IS INAPPLICABLE 
TO THIS CASE AND THAT CUSTODY OF ZACHARY SHOULD BE 
AWARDED TO RESPONDENT. 
Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for summary 
judgment. The court concluded that the doctrine of equitable estoppel is inapplicable to 
the facts of this case. (R. 1741, f 4.) (Petitioner had argued that Respondent and 
Intervenor were estopped from denying that he is Zachary's father.) 
"The issue of whether equitable estoppel has been proven is a classic mixed 
question of fact and law," and an "appellate court will not overturn the trial court's 
application of equitable estoppel absent an abuse of discretion." State v. Irizarry, 945 
P.2d 676, 680 (Utah 1997) (noting that appellate court grants trial courts "a fair degree of 
deference" when reviewing issues of equitable estoppel). In this case, Petitioner's 
arguments in favor of the application of equitable estoppel fail both factually and legally. 
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Utah, like many other states, has never recognized the use of this doctrine in the 
context of granting custody and visitation rights to a nonbiological parent. Additionally, 
even if equitable estoppel were legally applicable in this type of suit, the facts of this case 
do not warrant its exercise. Finally, even those states that have allowed for the 
application of equitable estoppel under similar circumstances have never done so in the 
absence of a determination of the best interests of the child. Inasmuch as the trial court 
has already determined in its discretion that it is in Zachary's best interest that his 
primary custody be awarded to Respondent, that decision should be upheld. 
As Petitioner notes, some states have utilized the doctrine of equitable estoppel in 
conjunction with state-specific statutory and common law provisions to allow visitation 
or custody rights under certain circumstances. In Utah, however, although the Utah 
appellate courts have indicated that the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be 
appropriately applied in limited circumstances to estop a nonbiological father from 
denying his own paternity in an effort to avoid child support payments, the doctrine has 
never been invoked to grant custody or visitations rights to a nonbiological parent.1 
Indeed, courts of other states have specifically held that, although the doctrine may be 
1
 Even in the child support context, Utah courts have given the doctrine only limited 
application, holding that "the use of an estoppel theory to impose a support obligation on 
a man who is not the biological father of the child involved must be applied with 
caution." Wiese v. Wiese, 699 P.2d 700, 702 (Utah 1985). Indeed, even in this context, 
attempts to apply equitable estoppel often fail. Id. at 702-03 (finding nonbiological father 
not estopped from refusing child support where mother had failed to show any 
detrimental reliance); Masters v. Worsley, 111 P.2d 499, 502-03 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
(refusing to apply equitable estoppel where father had made no wrongful or negligent 
representations). In 2000 the Utah Legislature all but completely abolished the use of 
waiver and estoppel in paternity actions where support payments are at issue. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-45a-4.5(3) (2002). 
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used for the purpose of imposing support obligations, equitable estoppel should not be 
"invoked... against a natural parent for the purpose of awarding custody and visitation to 
a nonparent." Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 2d 212, 218 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); 
see also In re the Marriage ofArenz-Roper, 2004 WL 859313, * 3 (Cal. Ct. App. April, 
24, 2004) ("[T]he courts have refused to recognize or expand the doctrine[] of... 
equitable estoppel... to grant custody rights to a nonparent who was otherwise excluded 
by law from paternity rights."); Van v. Zahorik, 575 N.W.2d 566, 572 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1998) (refusing to apply equitable estoppel "against a natural parent to allow a third party 
parental visitation rights"). In the present case, Petitioner seeks to equitably estop 
Zachary's mother and biological father from "challenging Zachary's paternity." (Brief of 
Pet. at 52.) The trial court was correct in refusing to apply the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel to the facts in this case. 
Even if equitable estoppel could be appropriately considered in this 
case, the facts presented by Petitioner do not warrant its application. 
"The elements essential to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel 
are: (1) an admission, statement or act inconsistent with the claim 
afterwards asserted, (2) action by the other party on the faith of such 
admission, statement or act, and (3) injury to such other party 
resulting from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such 
admission, statement or act." 
Irizarry, 945 P.2d at 680. 
Even those jurisdictions that recognize the doctrine of equitable estoppel in 
custody disputes generally refuse to invoke the doctrine in cases where the nonbiological 
father knew all along that he was not the father of the child. For example, in a divorce 
action in Crouse v. Crouse, 552 N.W. 2d 413 (S.D. 1996), the husband was not the father 
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of his wife's oldest child who was born six months before their marriage. The husband 
argued that the wife should be equitably estopped from denying his paternity; but the 
court disagreed. It determined that since the husband had known from the beginning that 
he was not the biological father of the child, the wife had made no "concealment or false 
representation of material facts" that the husband could have relied on to his detriment. 
Id. at 417. Moreover, the court went on to state that the wife's "conduct in authorizing 
and encouraging the development of a father-son relationship, leading [the husband] to 
believe she would not enforce her superior right to custody," was not enough to support 
the husband's equitable estoppel argument. "If we adopted this expansive rationale," the 
court explained, "almost any stepparent could acquire parenthood by estoppel. This 
theory violates traditional equitable estoppel principles and might deter parents from 
encouraging a close relationship between their children and stepparents." Id. 
Many other jurisdictions have similarly refused to apply equitable estoppel where 
the wife never represented to the husband that he was the biological father of the child. 
See CM. v. P.R., 649 N.E.2d 154, 156 (Mass. 1995); In re Multari v. Sorrell, 731 
N.Y.S.2d 238, 241 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001); see also Simmons v. Comer, 438 S.E.2d 530, 
537-38 (W. Va. 1993) (noting "common pattern" where "mother represents] to the 
putative father that he is the biological father of the child"). 
In the Petitioner's Statement of Undisputed Facts section of his memorandum filed 
in support of his motion Petitioner admits that Respondent told him in March of 1999 that 
she was pregnant and that the child was not his. (R. 1305, ^ 2.) Thus, four months prior 
to Zachary's birth Petitioner knew that he was not Zachary's biological father. Although 
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Respondent acquiesced in Petitioner's decision to assume the role of Zachary's parent, 
she never represented to him that he was Zachary's biological father. This case is much 
like Crouse, in which the wife did nothing more than "encourage[] a close relationship" 
between the child and his nonbiological father. Crouse, 552 N.W.2d at 417. This 
behavior alone is not sufficient to support Petitioner's claim for equitable estoppel. 
Finally, irrespective of whether equitable estoppel is applicable to the particular 
facts of this case, this doctrine has never been applied in contravention of the best 
interests of the child. Even those courts which apply equitable estoppel in "cases 
involving paternity, child custody, [or] visitation" hold that "the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel will be applied only where its use furthers the best interests of the child or 
children who are the subject of the controversy." Charles v. Charles, 745 N.Y.S.2d 572, 
574 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002); see also In re Shockley, 123 S.W.3d 642, 652 (Tex. App. 
2003) ("In determining whether the doctrine should be applied to a particular case, the 
child's best interests are of paramount concern."). The analysis is no different for the 
courts of states which have adopted the Uniform Parentage Act. In re Shockley, supra.2 
The trial court determined in this case that it is in the best interests of Zachary for 
primary custody to be awarded to his mother and biological father. In making its 
Section 608 of the Uniform Parentage Act provides that "[i]n a proceeding to adjudicate 
parentage... the court shall consider the best interest of the child...." Unif. Parentage Act 
§§ 608(a) and (b), 9B U.L.A. 342-343 (2001); see also Utah Uniform Parentage Act 
(codified as Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45g-101 et seq, especially § 78-45g-608(l) and (2) 
(2002), (eff. May 2, 2005) (2005 Utah Laws Ch. 150, §66) ("tribunal shall consider the 
best interest of the child" in deciding whether to permit genetic testing). 
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evaluation, the court also determined that Petitioner should have significant parent time 
withZachary. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the "trial court is afforded particularly 
broad discretion in the area of child custody." Alexander v. Alexander, 111 P. 2d 221, 
223 (Utah 1987). Further, "[a] determination of the 'best interests of the child' turns on 
factors which the trial court is best able to assess, and only when the action taken by the 
trial court is so unjust as to constitute an abuse of discretion should this Court substitute 
its own judgment." Id. 
The trial court in this case determined that equitable estoppel is inapplicable to the 
facts of this case and that it is in the best interests of Zachary that his mother and father 
be his primary physical custodians. The court acted well within the bounds of its 
discretion and its decision should be upheld. 
III. THE COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE PRINCIPLES OF 
PARENTAL PRESUMPTION AND IN LOCO PARENTIS IN AWARDING 
PRIMARY PHYSICAL CUSTODY OF ZACHARY TO RESPONDENT 
AND INTERVENOR. 
Petitioner argues that "[t]he trial court erred in applying the parental presumption 
against Petitioner in his claim for custody of Zachary." (Brief of Pet. at 52.) The so-
called "parental presumption" is a doctrine utilized in custody disputes where one 
potential custodian is a biological or natural parent and the other is not. The Utah 
Supreme Court has described the presumption thusly: 
In a controversy over custody, the paramount consideration is the 
best interest of the child, but where one party to the controversy is a 
non-parent, there is a presumption in favor of the natural parent. 
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Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 40 (Utah 1982). The presumption is also applied to 
contests over parent time. Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1978). 
The presumption is not conclusive. It can be rebutted by evidence that the parent 
has no strong mutual bond with the child, has not demonstrated a willingness to sacrifice 
his interest in welfare for the child's welfare and lacks sympathy or an understanding of 
the child. Hutchison, 649P.2dat41. 
In this case the trial court was confronted with the issue of whether the parental 
presumption should be applied as part of the process of determining who should have 
custody of Zachary. The court determined that Petitioner was not Zachary's biological 
father and that the presumption of paternity had been rebutted. (Finding no. 35, R. 2451.) 
The court also found that the parental presumption in favor of Intervenor had been 
rebutted. (Finding no. 35, R. 2452.) Thus the court further found that "petitioner and 
intervenor stand on equal footing and Zachary's custody between them is determined 
solely by the interests of the child." (Id.) As to Respondent, however, the court found 
that the parental presumption had not been rebutted. 
Respondent benefits from the Parental Presumption on her claim for 
custody of Zachary against Petitioner. Consequently, respondent 
and petitioner are not on equal footing. 
(id.) 
Petitioner seems to argue that because he was a parent acting "in loco parentis'", 
the parental presumption in favor of Respondent did not apply. (See Brief of Pet. at 58-
59.) 
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The term "in loco parentis " means "in the place of a parent". BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 317 (Pocket ed. 1996). A person in loco parentis is one who has assumed 
the status and obligations of a parent without formal adoption. Gribble, 583 P.2d at 66. 
The significance of a finding that a non-parent occupies the position of a person in loco 
parentis is that that person has standing to participate in a proceeding dealing with 
custody rights. Thus in the Schoolcraft Case, supra, the Utah Supreme Court, discussing 
the rights of Schoolcraft, the stepfather, stated, "The stepparent relationship Schoolcraft 
shares with J.W.F. is sufficient to entitle him to a hearing on custody. 799 P.2d at 716. 
The court cautioned, however, that "granting Schoolcraft a hearing on best interests does 
not mean that he has any presumption of entitlement of custody." Id. 
Petitioner's argument concerning the parental presumption is flawed because he 
mistakenly assumes that once his status as a person in loco parentis is recognized, the 
parental presumption in favor of Respondent is eliminated. That is not the case. The 
Supreme Court stated in Hutchison, supra: 
If the presumption in favor of the natural parent is rebutted, the 
contestants for custody compete on equal footing, and the custody 
award should be determined solely by reference to the best interests 
of the child. 
649 P.2d at 41 (emphasis added). Accord, Kishpaugh v. Kishpaugh, 745 P.2d 1248, 1250 
(Utah 1987). The converse to this rule must be that if the presumption is not rebutted, the 
contestants do not compete on an equal footing. See Schoolcraft, supra, 799 P.2d at 716 
(granting the stepfather a hearing concerning the best interests of the child does not mean 
that he has any presumption of entitlement of custody). 
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This is precisely the analysis applied by the trial court in this case: "Respondent 
benefits from the parental presumption on her claim for custody of Zachary against 
Petitioner. Consequently, Respondent and Petitioner are not on equal footing." (Finding 
no. 35, R. 2452 (emphasis added)). 
Finally, even if the parental presumption is completely disregarded, the fact 
remains that the court found that the best interests of Zachary would be served by 
awarding his primary physical custody to Respondent and Intervenor. Both the custody 
evaluator and the trial court addressed that issue in great detail. (Findings nos. 42, 46, R. 
2455, 2458; Exh. P-5 at 11-13.) Thus, assuming arguendo that the lower court erred in 
considering the parental presumption as one of the factors comprising the "best interests" 
analysis, it was harmless error. See Steffensen v. Smith's Mgmt. Corp., 820 P.2d 482, 489 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) (harmless error is an error that is sufficiently inconsequential that 
there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings). 
The trial court considered the parental presumption as but one of many factors 
which lead it to the conclusion that the granting of primary physical custody of Zachary 
to Respondent and Intervenor was in the child's best interest. Even if the court's 
consideration of the parental presumption were error, it is an error which would not affect 
the court's "best interest" findings. That finding is neither "clearly erroneous" nor so 
"flagrantly unjust as to be an abuse of discretion." Thomas, supra, 1999 UT App. 239, f 
6. Petitioner's attack on the court's findings concerning the parental presumption and the 
in locus parentis doctrine must, therefore, be rejected. 
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IV. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING LIMITED SUPERVISORY 
AND PARENT TIME RIGHTS FOR NICHOLAS TO INTERVENOR 
BECAUSE THESE RIGHTS ARE TO BE EXERCISED JOINTLY WITH 
RESPONDENT. 
A. Appellant's Brief Should Be Dismissed or Alternatively Point IV of 
Appellant's Brief Should Be Rejected Because It Fails to Comply with 
Rule 24(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Utah R. App. P. 24(a) requires that an appellant's brief contain "a statement of the 
issues presented for review, including for each issue: the standard of appellate review 
with supporting authority." Furthermore, an appellant's brief must include "the 
contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including 
the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). 
While Petitioner cited to authorities with respect to the proper level of review in 
the "Issues Presented for Review" section of his Brief, in Point IV Petitioner fails to cite 
to any authority or statute supporting his argument. This court dealt with a similar 
situation in Burns v. Summerhays, 927 P.2d 197,198 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), wherein the 
appellant failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. In Burns, the court found that the appellant, in addressing the 
issues before the court, failed "to provide adequate legal analysis and authority to support 
his assertions." Id. at 199. The Court, quoting an Illinois Court of Appeals, wrote, "'[A] 
reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited 
and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of 
argument and research.'" Id. (quoting Williamson v. Opsahl, 92 111. App. 3d 1087 (111. Ct. 
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App. 1981)). Ultimately, this court declined to rule on the merits in Burns, and upheld 
the trial court's ruling due to the failure of appellant's brief to meet the requirements of 
Rule 24. 
Similarly, in the present case, Petitioner failed to support his argument in Point IV 
with "adequate legal analysis and authority to support his assertions." Id. Based upon 
the foregoing, the Petitioner's brief should be dismissed or, alternatively, Point IV of 
Appellant's Brief should be rejected. 
B. Petitioner has Failed to Marshal the Evidence Pursuant to Rule 24 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure in Support of His Contention 
that the Trial Court Erred in Awarding Intervenor Custody Rights in 
Nicholas. 
The Petitioner has a duty on appeal to do more than merely reargue the same 
evidence that was brought before the trial court. See, generally, Schaumberg v. 
Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 603 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Shepherd v. Shepherd, 876 P.2d 
429, 432 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) stating, "If the appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the 
appellate court assumes that the record supports the findings of the trial court..." See, 
also, Wright v. Westside Nursery, 787 P.2d 508, 512 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1990): 
Wright beseeches us to make a thorough review of the whole record, which 
fills a box the size of an orange crate. We do not apologize for declining 
Wright's invitation. The very purpose of such devices as the 'marshaling' 
doctrine and R. Utah Ct. App. 24(a)(7), requiring that all references in 
briefs to factual matters 'be supported by citations to the record,' is to spare 
appellate courts such an onerous burden. Absent exceptional 
circumstances, our review of the record is limited to those specific portions 
of the record which have been drawn to our attention by the parties and 
which are relevant to the legal questions properly before us. 
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In the event the Court does not reject Point IV of Petitioner's Brief, based upon his 
failure to marshal the evidence, the Petitioner's argument still must fail. The trial court 
did not grant Intervenor "[cjustody rights in Nicholas..." (See Brief of Pet. at 59.) The 
court was merely providing a practical solution for vacation planning and school 
placement of both children that is in their best interests. Section 4-903(7) of the Utah 
Rules of Judicial Administration provides that a factor to be considered by a custody 
evaluator is "kinship including, in extraordinary circumstances, step-parent status." The 
trial court has some discretion in making allowances for step-parent rights and access 
and, in particular, addressing discretionary vacation or parent time which impacts the 
natural child of Intervenor. 
The Intervenor and the Respondent will be making joint travel and vacation plans 
and school placement decisions in regards to Zachary, the child with which they have 
primary physical custody. Respondent also has primary physical custody of Nicholas. 
(Finding no. 46, R. 2458.) The children will be residing in Oregon with Respondent and 
Intervenor. It naturally flows from this circumstance that Intervenor and Respondent 
would jointly make vacation and school placement decisions with both minor children. 
Intervenor is Nicholas' stepfather. This Court in Gribble v. Gribble, supra, held that a 
step parent, in certain circumstances may be granted "[t]he same rights accorded to 
natural parents." 583 P.2d at 66. The trial court has discretion to make practical orders 
which do not grant substantial rights, but allow for an equitable result. The Court, in 
awarding both Intervenor and the Respondent the ability to make vacation decisions, as 
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well as school placement decisions, (Finding no. 44, R. 2434, and Finding no. 47, 
R.2459), is merely acknowledging and clarifying a practical and natural process. 
Again, the Court did not grant Intervenor a full spectrum of custodial rights in 
Nicholas similar to those of Respondent or Petitioner, but simply made a practical 
procedure that clarifies a particular course of events to prevent future discord or 
disruption to the children. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF PRIMARY PHYSICAL CUSTODY 
OF NICHOLAS TO RESPONDENT IS SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD 
AND BY ITS FINDINGS OF FACT. 
Petitioner argues in Point V of his Brief that the Court's award of primary physical 
custody of Nicholas to Respondent was not supported by the court's findings. Although 
Petitioner characterizes his attack as being based upon legal sufficiency {see Brief of Pet. 
at 60), in reality, it is, for the most part an attack based upon the alleged absence of 
support in the record for the findings. Petitioner is mistaken. The Court's award of 
custody is supported by its findings. Moreover, as more fully described below, because 
Petitioner has failed to marshal evidence in support of the findings, this court must 
assume that the record supports them. Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 
1991). Neither has Petitioner demonstrated that the factors considered by the trial court 
in determining the best interests of Nicholas were legally impermissible. 
A. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Awarding Primary Physical 
Custody Of Nicholas To Respondent. 
Paragraph 1 of the Supplemental Decree of Divorce (R. 2504) awards joint legal 
custody of Nicholas to Petitioner and Respondent. Paragraph 3 awards joint legal 
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custody of Zachary to Intervenor and Respondent. {Id.) Paragraph 5 states, "Respondent 
is designated the primary physical custodian of Nicholas. Respondent and Intervenor are 
designated the primary physical custodians of Zachary." {Id.) Petitioner argues that the 
trial court's designation of Respondent as Nicholas' primary physical custodian 
constitutes reversible error. (Brief of Pet. at 60-61.) 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10 (1998 and 2004 Supp.) requires that a court called upon 
to determine custody "shall consider the best interests of the child...." An appellate court 
will overturn findings of fact "only if they are clearly erroneous, and '[o]nly where the 
trial court's judgment is so flagrantly unjust as to be an abuse of discretion...'" Thomas v. 
Thomas, at 606. 
In this case the trial court specifically found that "[i]t is in the best interests of 
Nicholas that Respondent be designated the primary physical custodian of Nicholas...." 
(Finding no. 46, R. 2458.) That Finding was supported by the custody evaluator's Child 
Custody Evaluation. (Petitioner's Exhibit P-5.) The court incorporated that evaluation 
into its Findings. (Finding no. 45.e., R. 2458.) 
Inasmuch as Petitioner failed to marshal all record evidence that supports the trial 
court's finding of best interest, this court must assume that the record supports that 
finding. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d at 199. See also Wright 
v. Westside Nursery, 787 P.2d at 514 (court refused to disturb jury's verdict where 
appellant failed to identify and explain any of evidence supporting verdict). 
Consistent with the report of the evaluator, the court found that if Petitioner and 
the Thanoses lived in close proximity to one another the awarding of generous parent 
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time to Petitioner would be in the best interests of the boys. (Findings nos. 45.d. and 47, 
R. 2458.) As to Nicholas, that parent time schedule creates a weekly rotation with 
Petitioner having Nicholas one week and the Thanoses having him the next. (Decree, R. 
2505, f 6.a.) If, however, Petitioner chooses to remain in Utah, he is awarded more 
limited parent time owing to the difficulty in maintaining the rotating weekly schedule 
from a distance of several hundred miles. (R. 2507-2508, Tf 7.) 
Petitioner argues that the court's designation of Respondent as the primary 
physical custodian of Nicholas is, as a matter of law, improper. He states: 
The court's designation of Respondent as "primary physical 
custodian of Nicholas" is inconsistent with its award of equal time 
with Nicholas to Petitioner and Respondent... an award of equal 
physical custody means that the child spends equal time in each 
home, and forecloses designation of a primary physical residence 
for the child. 
(Brief of Pet. at 60.) 
In support of the above proposition Petitioner cites Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.1(d) 
(1998 and 2004 Supp.). But that statute does not support Petitioner's theory. For 
starters, Petitioner's reference to subdivision (1) ("joint legal custody") is wrong because 
the issue he raises concerns physical custody. More importantly, subparagraph (2) ("joint 
physical") states just the opposite of Petitioner's assertion that the award of joint physical 
custody is inconsistent with the designation of a primary residence for the child. Utah 
Code Ann. § 30-3-10.1(2) (1998 & 2004 Supp.) states: 
(2) "Joint Physical Custody": 
(a) means the child stays with each parent overnight for more 
than 30% of the year, and both parents contribute to the expenses of 
the child in addition to paying child support; 
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(b) can mean equal or nearly equal periods of physical custody of 
and access to the child by each of the parents, as required to meet the 
best interest of the child; 
(c) may require that a primary physical residence for the child be 
designated; and 
(d) does not prohibit the court from specifying one parent as the 
primary care taker and one home as the primary residence of the 
child. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Thus, far from stating that "an award of equal physical custody forecloses 
designation of a primary physical residence for that child" (Brief of Pet. at 60), Utah 
Code Ann. § 30-3-10.1(2)(c) and (d) (1998 & 2004.)) specifically allows the court to 
designate a primary physical residence where joint physical custody has been awarded. 
Petitioner's reliance on Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 
is equally puzzling. There the trial court had awarded 57% of the parent time to the 
mother. It described her as having "primary physical custody", but did not explain what 
the significance of that designation was. Id. at 434. On appeal this Court noted that 
"[t]he c57%' visitation award to the mother provides the basis for the 'primary physical 
custody' statement." This Court did not state that the only basis for awarding primary 
physical custody is the award of a preponderance of the child's time to one parent or the 
other, as implied by Petitioner. Such a rule would stand in direct contravention of Utah 
Code Ann. § 30-3-10.1(2)(d) which states that the award of joint physical custody "does 
not prohibit the court from specifying one parent as the primary care giver and one home 
the primary residence of the child." 
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Furthermore Petitioner's argument misstates the facts. He argues that the trial 
court granted him "50/50 physical custody." (Brief of Pet. at 60.) In fact the court did no 
such thing. It granted him parent time equal to that of Respondent only if he lives in 
close proximity to the Thanoses. If he does not, his parent time will be less than that of 
Respondent. (R. 2507, ^ 7.) Under the terms of the Decree the custodial position of the 
parties is "50/50" only if they live close to one another. 
B. Findings 38, 39, 40, 41, 42 And 46 Are Not Clearly Erroneous And Are 
Legally Sufficient To Support The Award Of Primary Physical 
Custody To Respondent. 
At the time of the entry of the Decree, Petitioner was living in Utah and the 
Thanoses were living in Oregon. (R. 2533 at 519; R. 2533 at 628-629.) Recognizing that 
equal parent time would not be possible if the parties continued to live in two different 
states, the court designated Respondent as the "primary physical custodian of Nicholas." 
(R. 2504, T| 5.) The court further ordered that if Petitioner chose to remain in Utah, his 
parent-time rights would need to be adjusted to give him generous visitation time on 
weekends, holidays and in the summer. (R. 2507-2508, ^ 7.) It is the requirement that he 
must move to Oregon in order to maximize his parent-time with Nicholas to which 
Petitioner objects on a number of grounds.3 
In an apparent effort to avoid the task of marshaling all record evidence that supports 
the findings in favor of Respondent' award of primary physical custody, Petitioner 
characterizes his criticism of the award as an attack on the legal sufficiency of those 
findings. In reality, many of his arguments are based upon the alleged insufficiency of 
the evidence which supports the findings. 
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1. The Court Properly Considered The Relationship Of Nicholas 
And Zachary To Their Sister Madelaine In Awarding Primary 
Physical Custody Of Nicholas To Respondent. 
One of the factors which the trial court considered in awarding primary physical 
custody of Nicholas to Respondent and primary physical custody of Zachary to 
Intervenor and Respondent is the boys' strong attachment to their sister Madelaine, who, 
at the time of trial, was approximately nine months old. Petitioner argues that as a matter 
of law, the court should not have considered the desirability of keeping Nicholas and 
Zachary together with their sister in the awarding of physical custody. Thus, Petitioner 
states, "To the extent that the court relied on this factor to conclude that primary custody 
of Nicholas should be awarded to Respondent, and primary custody of Zachary should be 
awarded to Respondent and Intervenor, the court erred." (Brief of Pet. at 65.) In effect 
Petitioner argues that because Madelaine is Nicholas' half sister, the desirability of 
keeping them together, no matter how close their relationship, should not have been 
considered by the trial court. Petitioner's argument is fallacious and should be rejected. 
Rule 4-903 of the Rules of Judicial Administration provides that in preparing a 
custody evaluation an evaluator must consider several factors, including "the benefit of 
keeping siblings together." C.J.A. Rule 4-903(5)(B). Despite this clear mandate, 
Petitioner maintains that the relationship Nicholas and Zachary share with their sister 
Madelaine should be "given no weight," arguing that the preference for keeping siblings 
together is inapplicable "where a child is born after the marriage is dissolved, to another 
marriage." (Brief of Pet. at 64.) Petitioner asserts that the preference only "pertains to 
siblings of a marriage who have lived together and formed important sibling 
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relationships," and thus should not be applied to the boys' relationship with Madelaine, 
who was born subsequent to the divorce. Id. 
Petitioner's arguments not only contravene the plain language of C.J.A. Rule 4-
903, but also do not comport with Utah case law or the facts of this case. Rule 4-903 
states that an evaluator must consider the "benefit of keeping siblings together." By its 
plain language the rule makes no distinction between half- or step-siblings, on the one 
hand, and full-blooded siblings, on the other; nor does it specify that it applies only to 
children born during the marriage. 
Utah case law supports the view that all sibling relationships deserve preservation. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "the factors the court may consider in 
determining the child's best interests" include "keeping siblings together." Hutchison, 
649 P.2d at 41; see also Merriam v. Merriam, 799 P.2d 1172, 1178 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
("The desirability of keeping siblings together is a legitimate factor to consider in 
deciding custody."); Deeben v. Deeben, 772 P.2d 971, 973 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (quoting 
Hutchison).4 These cases do not distinguish between children born in the marriage and 
those born prior to the marriage or subsequent to divorce. For example, in Merriam, the 
court determined that even though the case involved half-siblings, custody should be 
"resolved by referring to the law regarding split custody of full siblings," since the 
4
 In an earlier case, Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, 599 P.2d 510, 512 (Utah 1979), the Utah 
Supreme Court made reference to keeping "all the children of the marriage united." 
However, as herein discussed, subsequent cases and the plain language of Rule 4-903 
make it clear that the preference for keeping siblings together applies to all siblings, not 
just children of the marriage. 
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"children had lived together since they were both very young." Merriam, 799 P.2d at 
1178; see also Bonwich v. Bonwich, 699 P.2d 760, 761 (Utah 1985) (considering 
relationship between child and his infant "brother," born out of wedlock to child's 
adoptive father, in custody determination); Nilson v. Nilson, 652 P.2d 1323, 1325 (Utah 
1982) (considering relationship of older half-sister). 
In fact, in Pennington v. Pennington, 711 P.2d 254 (Utah 1985), a case heavily 
relied upon by the Petitioner, the court declined to invoke the preference for keeping 
siblings together, not due to the fact that the younger child was born after entry of the 
divorce decree, but because "[e]xcept for brief periods of visitation, the brothers ha[d] 
never lived together" or bonded with each other. Id. at 256. This is not such a case. 
Nicholas and Zachary have spent half of their time with their mother, and thus with 
Madelaine, since Madelaine's birth approximately two years ago. The boys are very 
much attached to their little sister, thus demonstrating that the same reasons underlying 
the preference for keeping siblings together are present in this case.5 
5
 The Supreme Court of Wyoming has recently addressed this subject indicating that "the 
presumption of keeping children together has been applied by many courts in cases where 
children have only one parent in common, i.e., brothers and sisters who were born of a 
parent's prior or subsequent marriage," and holding that "the strong public policy toward 
preservation of sibling relationships [is] equally applicable whether the children are full 
sibling, half sibling, or stepsibling." Aragon v. Aragon, 104 P.3d 756, 764 (Wyo. 2005). 
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2. Findings 38, 39, 40, 41, 42 And 46 Are Not Clearly Erroneous; In 
Any Case, Petitioner Has Failed To Marshal The Record 
Evidence Which Supports Those Findings. 
Most of Petitioner's Point V.B. is devoted to a discussion of the alleged failings of 
the court's Findings nos. 38, 39, 40, 41, 42 and 46. (Brief of Pet. at 65-72.) None of 
those findings are clearly erroneous or legally insufficient. 
a. Finding No. 38. 
The court found that "maintaining extended family social and academic networks 
was of less concern than creating relationship, geographical and financial stability of the 
children." (Finding no. 38, R. 2453.) Petitioner argues that the court should have 
employed a "comparative analysis," whatever that means. (Brief of Pet. at 66, 67.) Since 
Petitioner failed to marshal any evidence, comparative or otherwise, which supports 
Finding no. 38, this court must assume that the record supports that Finding. Saunders v. 
Sharp, 806 P.2d at 199. In any case, this court has stated that the maintenance of ties 
with an extended family are on the "less significant end of the spectrum" of factors which 
a court should consider in awarding custody. Hudema v. Carpenter, 1999 UT App 290, 
989P.2d491,501. 
b. Finding No. 39. 
In Finding no. 39 the court found that Petitioner would be able to continue his 
present employment if he were to move to Oregon. As with Finding no. 38 Petitioner 
argues that the finding is flawed because "the court fails to make a comparative Finding." 
(Brief of Pet. at 67.) Again, Petitioner fails to marshal the evidence in the record which 
supports Finding no. 39. That evidence includes the testimony of Petitioner and 
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Respondent that Petitioner, since he works in his home, largely by computer, could as 
easily be employed in Oregon at the same job as in Utah. (R. 2533 at 559:19-23.) In 
addition, adopting Petitioner's "comparative" approach the evidence was that Intervenor, 
the principal wage earner for the Thanoses, would have a difficult time in Utah finding 
comparable work and, if he did, would likely take a significant pay cut. (R. 2533 at 643-
644; 2535 at 968-969.) Intervenor's present employment is secure. (R. 2533 at 646.) By 
contrast, Petitioner can just as easily perform his assigned tasks for his present employer 
in Oregon as in Utah. 
In short there is evidence in the record supporting Finding no. 39. 
c. Finding No, 40, 
The trial court found in Finding no. 40 that if the Thanoses were forced to move to 
Utah, Intervenor "would experience a significant reduction in income." Petitioner does 
not disagree with the accuracy of this finding, but argues that it is "irrelevant to the [sic] 
Nicholas's best interests...." (Brief of Pet. at 68.) 
Assuming that Intervenor would take a significant pay cut if he moved to Utah6, 
the question is whether the trial court was justified in considering a potentially significant 
loss of family income as part of the "best interest" analysis. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that the financial condition of the prospective 
custodians may be considered by a court in determining the best interests of a child. 
Hutchinson, 649 P.2d at 41. Thus, the trial court's consideration of the parties' incomes 
6
 Intervenor testified that his pay reduction might be as great as 50% or $5,900 per 
month. (Finding no. 52, R. 2460; R. 2533 at 643.) 
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and of the impact of moving on those incomes were relevant to its "best interests" 
finding. 
d. Finding No. 41. 
In this Finding the Court found that it was "not helpful to rely on historical issues 
[presumably infidelity] or to assign fault for the breakup of the Pearson marriage." 
(Finding no. 41, R. 2455.) Petitioner lists this finding as one of those to which he takes 
exception because Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10(l)(a)(i) (1998 and 2004 Supp.) directs that 
custody decisions take into account the "past conduct and demonstrated moral standards 
of each of the parties." 
While it is quite true that Utah law requires that the court consider "past conduct 
and demonstrated moral standards of each of the parties," it does not follow that the 
extramarital affair of Intervenor and Respondent would disqualify Respondent from 
being the primary physical custodian of Nicholas. Rather, Petitioner would have to show 
that Respondent's behavior had a negative impact on Nicholas. Hudema, 1999 UT App 
at Tf 35, 989 P.2d at 501. There was no finding of such adverse impact and Petitioner has 
failed to draw the court's attention to any such evidence. In any event, Petitioner admits 
that Finding no. 41 "does not weigh in favor of any of the parties." (Brief of Pet. at 69.) 
The alleged error of the trial court, even if one were made, is therefore harmless. 
e. Finding No, 42. 
The centerpiece of the trial court's "best interest" determination concerning 
physical custody is Finding no. 42 in which the court states: 
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The Respondent is pivotal in this case in that she is the 
biological mother of both boys and their sister, Madelaine. 
The Respondent has the strongest inherent responsibility for 
all three of these children. 
Based, in part, on Finding no. 42 the trial court awarded primary physical custody 
of Nicholas to Respondent and of Zachary to Respondent and Intervenor. A logical and 
necessary concomitant of that custody award was the determination that if Petitioner and 
the Thanoses chose not to live close to one another, the primary custodians, the Thanoses, 
would have more parent time with the boys than Petitioner. 
Petitioner does not, and cannot, disagree with the finding that Respondent is the 
biological mother of Nicholas, Zachary and Madelaine - that, in a sense, she is the 
common denominator for the three children, unlike their fathers. Instead, he argues that 
their biological relationship is irrelevant to the determination of who should have primary 
physical custody of the two boys. (Brief of Pet. at 69.) Petitioner's argument is 
contradicted by the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in Hutchison in which the court 
listed kinship as a factor to be considered in the determination of the best interests of a 
child. 649P.2dat41. 
Rule 4-903 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration also provides that custody 
evaluators should consider "kinship, including in extraordinary circumstances step-parent 
status...". C.J.A. Rule 4-903(5)(e)(vii). In accordance with the statutory mandate the 
custody evaluator determined that a factor to be considered in the award of physical 
custody of the boys is the fact that Respondent is their mother and the mother of their 
sister, Madelaine: 
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What remains is a logistical problem. What arrangement will 
allow Nicholas and Zachary to have a significant relationship 
with all three of their parents and allow them to develop a 
relationship with their sister, Madelaine? What arrangement 
provides that most stability over the long term? 
I am pivoting my conclusions around Kimberlee's role as the 
biological mother of both boys and their sister. She is the 
parent with the strongest inherent responsibility to all of these 
children, and it is a responsibility that she fully recognizes 
and embraces. 
I am convinced that these parents will be able to create a good 
life for themselves and their children in Oregon and urge that 
Kelly relocate to Oregon in time for Nicholas to begin the 
second half of this school year there. . . 
(Child Custody Evaluation of Dr. Jill D. Sanders, Petitioner's Exhibit P-5 at pp. 
11-12.) 
Taken together with the findings that the three children should not be separated 
(Finding no. 34.b., R. 2449), Intervenor is the biological father of Zachary and Madelaine 
(Finding no. 31, R. 2447), Petitioner had expressed a willingness to move to Oregon 
(Finding no. 45.d, R. 2457), Petitioner would suffer less a financial loss if he were to 
move to Oregon than if the Thanoses were to move to Utah (Findings nos. 39 and 40, R. 
2454) and the boys are very comfortable living in Oregon (Finding no. 42, R. 2456) and 
based also upon the evaluator's "strong recommendation" that Petitioner move to Oregon 
(Petitioner's Exhibit P-5 at 12), the trial court's ultimate finding that it would be in the 
best interest of Nicholas that Respondent be designated as the principal physical 
custodian is well-supported. The Court's findings are neither clearly erroneous nor 
lacking in relevance. 
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f. Finding No. 46. 
The Court in Finding no. 46 states that "[i]t is in the best interests of Nicholas that 
respondent be designated the primary physical custodian of Nicholas" and that "it is in 
the best interest of Zachary that respondent and intervenor be designated the primary 
physical custodians of Zachary." (Finding no. 46, R. 2458). The Court also found that 
"the evidence is undisputed that the parties will relocate and will live within 100 miles of 
one another..." (Id.) Petitioner disputes that finding, but fails to marshal the evidence 
which supports the court's statement. This court must therefore assume that the record 
supports the findings. There is, in any case, evidence which supports the Court's finding. 
As of the time of the trial Intervenor resided in Oregon with Respondent. (R. 2533 at 
628, 629.) Petitioner admitted to the evaluator that he was willing to move to Oregon. 
(R. 2534 at 720.) 
Petitioner also argues that "[i]t was improper for the court to rely on this testimony 
[that he was willing to move to Oregon] to essentially force petitioner to move or lose 
50/50 custody, after having found that the childrens' best interests required joint physical 
custody." (Brief of Pet. at 71.) In point of fact, the court did no such thing. The Decree 
does not represent an effort by the court to force Petitioner to move to Oregon. Rather, 
its provisions show a recognition by the court that an equal division of parent time with 
Nicholas would not be possible or desirable for a school-age child whose parents live in 
two different states. The choice which Petitioner is required to make flows from the 
court's designation of Respondent as the primary physical custodian of Nicholas. Indeed, 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.2(2)(e) (1998 and 2004 Supp.) dictates that the "geographical 
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proximity of the homes of the parents" be considered by the Court in deciding the best 
interest of a child. If Petitioner and the Thanoses chose to live in separate states, the trial 
court had no choice but to consider their "geographical proximity" in determining 
physical custody. 
C. The Findings Of Fact Are Legally Sufficient To Support The Court's 
Award Of Joint Legal And Primary Physical Custody Of Zachary To 
Intervenor And Respondent. 
Petitioner has failed to marshal the evidence pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure in support of his contention that the Findings of Fact are legally 
insufficient to support the court's award of joint legal and primary physical custody of 
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Petitioner also attacks the custody evaluation based upon alleged bias on the part of the 
evaluator, Dr. Jill Sanders, as revealed in her testimony at trial. According to Petitioner, 
Dr. Sanders' testimony shows bias against members of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints. Petitioner claims that Dr. Sanders concluded that "LDS culture was a 
negative factor for Zachary" and that "her biased view of the LDS culture" colored her 
recommendations to the Court. (Brief of Pet. at 72, 73.) 
Because religion and religious compatibility are not mentioned by Dr. Sanders as a 
factor upon which she based her recommendations, it is tempting to say nothing about 
Petitioner's criticism of her. However, Petitioner's allegations are so serious and have 
such a potential for damage to Dr. Sanders' practice that they should be answered. It is 
important that the Court understand the following: (1) the evaluation report makes no 
mention of the so-called "LDS culture." (2) Dr. Sanders' statement was made in 
response to a question about her deposition testimony that she had given concerning the 
possibility that Zachary, because he will grow up "having a relatively odd parent 
configuration", may find it necessary to explain "this strange arrangement." (R. 2535 at 
881.) She expressed a concern that if he is living in "a culture that is particularly 
conservative in that regard", there was a danger that he could be stigmatized. She 
hastened to add that her expression of concern was not directed at the LDS Church and 
was not "religious-specific." (Id. at 882.) (3) There is nothing in Dr. Sanders' testimony 
or in her report that remotely suggests that her recommendation that Respondent be 
designated as the primary custodial parent was based upon a bias against members of the 
LDS Church. It is an unfair and inaccurate attack on a skillful and well-respected 
professional. 
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Zachary to Intervenor and Respondent. The Petitioner has a duty on appeal to do more 
than merely reargue the same evidence that was brought before the trial court. 
Petitioner has failed to support his argument in Point V.C. with "adequate legal 
analysis and authority to support his assertions." Burns v. Summerhays, 927 P.2d at 199. 
Although Petitioner cites to the record in Point V.C. of his brief, he fails to direct the 
court's attention to any statutory or authoritative case law, leaving this court and 
Respondent and Intervenor guessing as to the basis for Petitioner's argument. Based 
upon the foregoing, Point V.C. of Appellant's Brief should be rejected. 
In any event, Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10 (1998 and 2004 Supp.) establishes the 
factors that a court must consider in making any award in custody. It indicates 
specifically that, "in determining any form of custody the court shall consider the best 
interest of the child and, among other factors, the court finds relevant, the following: (i) 
the past conduct and demonstrated moral standard that each of the parties, (ii) which 
parent is most likely to act in the best interest of the child, including allowing the child 
frequent and continuing contact with the noncustodial parent, and (iii) those factors as 
outlined in 30-3-10.2. Id. Furthermore, Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.2 sets forth additional 
factors that are to be considered: 
(a) whether the physical, psychological, and emotional needs and 
development of the child will benefit from joint legal or physical custody; 
(b) the ability of the parent to give first priority to the welfare of the child 
and reach shared decisions in the child's best interest, (c) whether each 
parent is capable of encouraging and accepting a positive relationship 
between the child and the other parent, including the sharing of love, 
affection and contact between the child and the other parent, (d) whether 
both parents participated in raising the child before the divorce, (e) the 
geographical proximity of the homes of the parent, (f) the preference of the 
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child as the child is of sufficient and capacity to reason so as to form an 
intelligent preference as to joint legal or physical custody, (g) the maturity 
of the parents and their willingness and ability to protect the child from 
conflict which may arise between the parents, (h) the past and present 
ability of the parents to cooperate and make decisions jointly, (i) any 
history of, or potential for, child abuse, spouse abuse or kidnapping, and (j) 
any other factors the court finds relevant. 
The trial court specifically addressed each of those factors in paragraphs 33 
through 44 of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 2448-2457.). Further, the 
court fully addressed the factors set forth in U.C.A. §30-3-10.3 at length, to wit: the 
benefit of keeping the siblings together; the wealth and strength of bonds between the 
parents; the impact that the parent time arrangement has had upon the children finding 
that it was had been a positive one; (implying that the physical, psychological, emotional 
needs of the children were benefited from the joint legal and physical custody 
arrangement); the moral character of all parties; the depth and desire of all parties; the 
flexibility of both parents to provide personal rather than surrogate care; the moral 
character of the parties and any issues relating to drug abuse or other impairment, the 
religious compatibility of the parties; the financial stability of the parties to support the 
children; and, the fact that there is no evidence of abuse or domestic violence involving 
the children and other factors that the court found appropriate such as, the biological 
parentage of all parties in relation to this case. (Finding no. 34, R. 2448-2450.) 
The trial court made specific findings regarding a custodial arrangement. 
(Findings of Fact, §§ 44 through 50, R. 2456 to 2460.) Furthermore, the court in Finding 
no. 47 set forth a parent time schedule for the children. (R. 2458-59, quoting Petitioner's 
Exhibit P-5, pp. 12-13, H 2.) 
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The court did conclude, based upon its Findings of Fact, that it was in the best 
interest of Zachary that Respondent and Intervenor be designated as the primary physical 
custodians of the child and that they not be required to obtain Petitioner's permission to 
move to Oregon. The court also found, however, that it was in the best interest of 
Nicholas and Zachary that there be a joint physical custody arrangement involving all 
three parties. (Finding no. 46, R. 2458.) 
The Petitioner has argued that the court made no findings to support its 
determination that the Respondent and Intervenor should be awarded primary physical 
custody of Zachary absent the parental presumption. This argument is erroneous in two 
respects: first, the court did not conclude that Petitioner was a "non-parent" of Zachary. 
Second, the court made specific findings in regard to Zachary's custody and the best 
interest of Zachary. 34-35 and 48-27. (Findings nos. 33-35, 38-47, R. 2448-2459.) 
In considering the best interests of Zachary the court read the report and heard 
testimony of Dr. Sanders. Dr. Sanders' report, on page 10, carefully analyzed each factor 
of the Rule 4-903 of the Code of Judicial Administration. Further, testimony was given at 
trial and portions of the custody evaluation were cited by the trial court in its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, attached as Exhibit A to the Brief of Petitioner. For 
example, Finding no. 19 (R. 2442-2443) states, "Dr. Sanders concluded that by age 18 
months, Zachary was firmly established in a loving, secure, and relatively predictable 
relationship with Petitioner, Respondent and Intervenor." 
In Finding no. 20 the court observed, "Again, Dr. Sanders noted that Zachary has a 
loving relationship with Petitioner and Intervenor." Id. 
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The trial court made specific findings on the pertinent facts and issues addressed 
in the custody evaluation, the factors considered in Rule 4-903, the expert qualifications 
of Dr. Sanders, factors relating to the parental presumption, as analyzed in Hutchison the 
factors related to custody and factors relating and even the testimony of the Petitioner's 
experts, who were not court appointed. (R. at 2448-2456, Findings of Fact, ffl[ 33-44). 
Petitioner alleges a complete lack of findings of fact to support an award of legal and 
primary physical custody of Zachary to Intervenor and Respondent. It is incredible that 
Petitioner wholly ignores twelve full paragraphs of findings directly on point. The 
Petitioner's analysis is neither sound nor supported by the record. The Trial Court's 
findings should be upheld as legally sufficient to support the court's award of joint legal 
and primary physical custody of Zachary to Intervenor and Respondent. 
D. The Trial Court's Findings Concerning Physical Custody Of Nicholas 
And Zachary Are Sufficient To Support Its Award Of Primary 
Physical Custody To The Thanoses, 
Petitioner's final argument concerning the trial court's Findings is that "the court 
failed to make findings on several factors mandated by the Legislature and/or of 
significance in this case." (Brief of Pet. at 74.) Of the five allegedly "mandated" 
findings, Respondent and Intervenor have been able to find only one described in any 
Utah statute: the requirement that the court consider "the past conduct and demonstrated 
moral standards of each of the parties...." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10(l)(a)(i). As to that 
requirement, the court found as follows: 
Petitioner, respondent and intervenor all are of high moral character 
and exhibit strong emotional stability. 
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(Finding no. 34.e., R. 2449.) 
In addition, the court found: 
In making a custody determination in this matter, it is appropriate to 
rely on present realities and focus on what is in the best interest of 
the children today. It is not helpful to rely on historical issues or to 
assign fault for the breakup of the Pearson marriage. 
(Finding no. 41, R. 2455.) 
The custody evaluation, which was approved and adopted by the court, states, in 
the context of the Rule 4-903 criteria, "All three parents are of high moral character and 
exhibit emotional stability." (Plaintiffs Exhibit P-5 at 10.) 
None of the other findings, which, according to Petitioner are "mandated" are, in 
fact, required by statutes or rules adopted by Utah courts. They are therefore optional 
according to the needs of the particular case. 
In a sense what a custody decision comes down to is what the trial court feels is in 
the best interests of the children. As to that determination, this Court has stated: 
We accord broad discretion to the trial court so that it may use its 
first-hand proximity to the parties to resolve the delicate and highly 
personal problems presented in custody disputes. 
Erwin v. Erwin, 773 P.2d 847, 849 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). In this case, the trial court 
permissibly exercised its discretion in what it clearly thought was a close case. The court 
did not adopt any criteria which this court has determined to be unacceptable. The trial 
court's award of primary physical custody to the Thanoses should therefore be upheld. 
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CONCLUSION 
In the last analysis what really matters in this case is that the best interests of 
Nicholas and Zachary be served. After hearing six days of evidence, including the 
recommendations of a qualified custody evaluator, the trial court found that it was in the 
best interests of the boys that Respondent be appointed primary physical custodian of 
Nicholas and that Respondent and Intervenor be appointed as primary physical 
custodians of Zachary. The relief which Respondent and Intervenor seek is that that 
decision be affirmed. 
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Tab A 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KELLY F. PEARSON, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Petitioner, : 
vs. : CASE NO. 004907881 
KIMBERLEE Y. PEARSON, : 
Respondent. : 
PETER D. THANOS, 
Intervenor. 
The above-entitled matter was tried to the Court on April 1, 
2, 5, 6, 7 and 8, 2004. Petitioner was present and represented by 
Paige Bigelow, respondent was present and represented by Steven H. 
Gunn, and intervenor was present and represented by Kellie 
Williams. The Court having heard the testimony of the witnesses, 
having considered the evidence presented and the argument of 
counsel, and being otherwise fully informed enters the following 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
To the extent any of the following Findings of Fact should be 
considered as Conclusions of Law, they shall be considered a 
Conclusion of Law. 
PEARSON V. PEARSON PAGE 2 FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Fact and Procedural History 
1. Petitioner and respondent, Kimberlee Thanos, were married 
on August 17, 1992 and were divorced on June 5, 2002 by a Decree 
which terminated their marriage, but reserved custody and 
visitation issues for later disposition. Petitioner and 
respondent, Kimberlee Thanos, conceived a child that was born on 
July 6, 1997, named Nicholas Browning Pearson. 
2. Also during their marriage, respondent, Kimberlee Thanos, 
conceived a child, Zachary Andrew Pearson ("Zachary"), who was born 
on September 14, 1999. However, approximately four months after 
respondent, Kimberlee Thanos, became pregnant with Zachary, 
respondent, Kimberlee Thanos, informed petitioner that intervenor, 
Pete Thanos, was Zachary's natural father. Approximately two weeks 
after Zachary!s birth, respondent, Kimberlee Thanos, and 
intervenor, Pete Thanos, again informed petitioner that intervenor, 
Pete Thanos, was Zachary's father. 
3. Intervenor, Pete Thanos, obtained DNA paternity test 
results which he later filed with the District Court. The 
paternity index for intervenor is 98011 and the probability of 
paternity is 99.999%. 
aMV? 
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4. Respondent, Kimberlee Thanos, filed various affidavits 
with the Court, commencing January 2 001, stating under oath that 
intervenor, Pete Thanos, was the natural father of the minor child. 
5. Petitioner and respondent, Kimberlee Thanos, separated 
when Zachary was nine months of age. In his first filed Affidavit, 
petitioner acknowledged that respondent, Kimberlee Thanos, had 
become pregnant with Zachary and disclosed to petitioner that 
Zachary was intervenor, Pete Thanos1 son and not petitioner's 
biological child. Other like statements are contained in various 
pleadings. In his Affidavit dated September 28, 2001, petitioner 
admitted that he was aware that intervenor, Pete Thanos, was the 
child's biological father, although he alleged that he was the 
child's "psychological" parent. In paragraph 15 of that affidavit, 
petitioner acknowledged that he does not advocate secrecy regarding 
the biological facts of Zachary's conception (implicitly 
acknowledging that Pete is the biological father). In paragraph 
16, page 11 of that document, petitioner states that, "I have at 
all times known that he [Zachary] was conceived of Mr. Thanos." 
6. At the time of Zachary's conception and birth, 
intervenor, Pete Thanos, was married to another woman. Intervenor, 
Pete Thanos' prior wife died from cancer in December, 2000. 
Intervenor, Pete Thanos, has set forth in his affidavits and in 
argument that he did not inform his prior wife of Zachary's birth 
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because he did not want to further damage her already fragile 
health or cause her further emotional trauma, and that he wished to 
remain with her to assist her through her final months of life. 
Based on intervener's affidavits, it appears that out of compassion 
for his then-wife, intervenor did not file a paternity action 
regarding Zachary until after her death. 
7. Petitioner and respondent, Kimberlee Thanos, separated 
and later divorced. As part of their divorce action, they 
stipulated to a temporary order which granted them joint legal 
physical custody of Zachary and his brother Nicholas. Intervenor, 
Pete Thanos, and respondent, Kimberlee Thanos, continued their 
relationship, and married on July 1, 2 002, after the Pearson 
divorce was finalized. 
8. The respondent and intervenor have since had a child as 
issue of their marriage, namely Madelaine, whose date of birth is 
July 13, 2003. Respondent and intervenor purchased a home in 
Oregon in July of 2001. Intervenor has at all times since the 
filing of his Motion for Intervention and Petition for Paternity 
been a resident of the State of Oregon. 
9. Beginning in February, 2001, intervenor, Pete Thanos, had 
ongoing contact with Zachary, which included day long visits and 
periods of vacation, although he was precluded from having 
overnight visits until he married respondent, Kimberlee Thanos. 
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The contact has been frequent and consistent since February 2001. 
As the petitioner and respondent share joint custody, the 
respondent has been traveling to Utah from Oregon for her parent 
time with Nicholas and Zachary, and has maintained a home in Utah 
for that purpose and also the children, Nicholas and Zachary, are 
transported to Oregon during the respondent's parent time. 
Madelaine typically accompanies respondent on her trips to Utah, 
petitioner has not remarried and resides in Salt Lake City. 
10. The current access schedule is one week/one week rotation 
with transitions occurring on Friday mornings. The respondent 
flies from Portland, Oregon with Madelaine and then returns to her 
home with intervenor in Oregon and, again, with Zachary and 
Nicholas as frequently as possible. 
11. As to the procedural history of this case, at the time of 
hearing before Commissioner Evans on the Motion to Intervene on 
August 30, 2001, the Commissioner analyzed the case of State of 
Utah in the Interest of J.W.F, 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990), known as 
the Schoolcraft case, and recommended that intervenor, Pete Thanos' 
Motion to Intervene be denied. The Commissioner reasoned that 
intervenor, Pete Thanos, lacked standing to challenge the 
presumption of paternity that existed in favor of petitioner, given 
the consideration that should be given to preserving the stability 
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of marriage and to ensure that the children are protected from 
disruptive and unnecessary attacks on their paternity. 
12. After briefing and argument of the case on December 3, 
2001, an Order on Objection to Recommendation was entered by this 
Court. At the time of the initial hearing, this Court found that 
the criteria outlined in the case of In re: J.W.F., 799 P.2d 710 
(Utah 1990) ("the Schoolcraft case") apply to this case and set 
forth the framework to determine whether intervenor, Pete Thanos' 
Motion to Intervene should be granted. 
13. The Court found that in order to determine whether 
intervenor, Pete Thanos, had standing to intervene to establish 
Zachary's paternity and to rebut the presumption that Zachary was 
the legitimate son of petitioner and respondent, Kimberlee Thanos, 
the Court must first consider the policies set forth in 
Schoolcraft. The two-prong analysis of Schoolcraft included (1) 
preserving the stability of the marriage and (2) protecting . 
children from disruptive and unnecessary attacks on their 
paternity. The Court found that the second of the policy 
considerations—protecting children from disruptive and unnecessary 
attacks—was most applicable in this particular case, but that the 
record was insufficient to adequately address that policy 
consideration as it applied to the circumstances in this case. 
aw 
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14. The Court found that the affidavit of Dr. Goldsmith was 
not case-specific and was of little help to the Court in this 
regard. Therefore, in order for the Court to adequately address 
the second Schoolcraft policy consideration, the Court appointed 
Dr. Jill Sanders to provide an independent "Schoolcraft" 
evaluation. Petitioner and respondent, Kimberlee Thanos, had 
previously stipulated to Dr. Sanders conducting the custody 
evaluation in this matter. The Court then reserved judgment on 
intervenor, Pete Thanos' standing in order to allow Dr. Sanders to 
conduct a separate preliminary evaluation. 
15. As proffered at the time of hearing before the 
Commissioner and stated in pleadings and as set forth in the 
affidavits of respondent and intervenor Zachary1s physical 
resemblance to intervenor was such that Zachary would soon 
recognize that intervenor was his father. Further, the biological 
relationship between Zachary and intervenor, Pete Thanos, cannot 
and should not be hidden from the child, as intervenor, Pete 
Thanos, will continue to be an integral part of Zachary's life. 
Respondent, Kimberlee Thanos, and intervenor, Pete Thanos, have an 
intact family unit to provide care and security to Zachary. 
Further, petitioner and respondent, Kimberlee Thanos, have, in one 
form or another, informed dozens of individuals in their circle of 
family, friends and acquaintances that intervenor, Pete Thanos, is 
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Zachary's biological father. It is impossible to keep the "secret" 
of Zachary's parentage hidden from him. 
16. Dr. Sanders submitted an evaluation report to the Court 
and counsel dated May 13, 2002. Dr. Sanders' summary opinion was 
that from a developmental and psychological prospective, Zachary's 
functioning was not inherently disrupted by intervenor, Pete 
Thanos1 involvement. Further, Dr. Sanders found that intervenor, 
Pete Thanos1 relationship with Zachary was not only not disruptive, 
but was necessary to Zachary's normal and positive development. 
17. In addition, Dr. Sanders noted that respondent, Kimberlee 
Thanos, and intervenor, Pete Thanos, planned to marry and that if 
they did marry, intervenor, Pete Thanos, would, at the least, have 
a role as stepfather, and that his status as Zachary's biological 
father inherently escalates the importance of the relationship 
between Zachary and intervenor. As Dr. Sanders reported, the 
relationship between parents and their biological children is 
psychologically extremely important. Dr. Sanders reported that the 
most satisfying type of relationship between a child and his 
biological parent is generally a personal one, that the 
relationship between intervenor and Zachary is essential to Zachary 
and that no one can play this role in Zachary's life except 
intervenor, Pete Thanos. Dr. Sanders also stated that, based upon 
the quality of the relationship between Zachary and intervenor and 
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the likelihood that intervenor, Pete Thanos, and Zachary would have 
continuing extensive contact, their attachment would be likely to 
deepen and become more significant over time. Dr. Sanders opined 
that if petitioner was not interested in continuing to parent 
Zachary, he would likely develop a full father/son attachment to 
intervenor, Pete Thanos, because Zachary was still young and 
because intervenor and Zachary have had contact since Zachary's 
infancy. 
18. Upon receipt of the report, petitioner did not object to 
the report, nor did he object to the Court receiving the report. 
Instead, petitioner requested further clarification with regard to 
the Schoolcraft evaluation by Dr. Sanders. Pursuant to a telephone 
conference requested by petitioner on May 28, 2002, the Court 
permitted petitioner to supplement his concerns and address the 
Court with a letter outlining his concerns and his further requests 
regarding Dr. Sanders' further analysis. Based upon petitioner's 
motion and letter, the Court directed Dr. Sanders to make further 
analysis, to-wit: the impact on the child of a disruption in 
Zachary's relationship with petitioner, and Zachary's ability to 
understand his biological relationship. 
19. In response, Dr. Sanders submitted a supplemental report 
dated August 26, 2002. Dr. Sanders found that the primary 
disruption in Zachary's relationship with petitioner occurred at 
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the parties' separation when Zachary was approximately nine months 
of age. Dr. Sanders concluded that by age 18 months Zachary was 
firmly established in a loving, secure, and relatively predictable 
relationship with petitioner, respondent and intervenor. Dr. 
Sanders indicated that there was no inherent reason why 
intervenor's presence as another loving caregiver should have any 
further disruptive impact. 
20. In addition, Dr. Sanders stated that she did not believe 
that Zachary had lost his relationship with petitioner or that 
there was a basis to believe that further disruption to the 
relationship between Zachary and petitioner was intrinsically 
linked to intervenor, Pete Thanos' presence in Zachary's life. Dr. 
Sanders found that given Zachary's cognitive ability at the age of 
3, Zachary can understand simple descriptions of biological facts 
of his parentage in the same way that a three-year-old adopted 
child can understand the biological facts of his or her parentage. 
She indicated that the emotional meaning of these relationships is 
unlikely to have much impact on Zachary for quite some time. 
Again, Dr. Sanders noted that Zachary has a loving relationship 
with petitioner and with intervenor. 
21. After considering both of Dr. Sanders' reports, the 
criteria applicable to the facts in this case, and the Schoolcraft 
criteria, the Court previously found that it was appropriate to 
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sustain intervener's objection to the recommendation of 
Commissioner Evans and grant the Motion to Intervene. The Court 
found that Dr. Sanders had very carefully articulated, to the 
Court's satisfaction, the policy considerations that the Court must 
make and find under Schoolcraft. As previously found, the first 
prong of the Schoolcraft analysis—relating to preserving the 
stability of the marriage—was not a consideration in this case, due 
to the fact that there was no marriage between petitioner and 
respondent, Kimberlee Thanos, to be preserved, and that the 
stability was shattered when the parties separated when Zachary was 
approximately nine months of age. The Court also noted that 
intervenor, Pete Thanos, and respondent, Kimberlee Thanos, are now 
married. Further, pursuant to the report of Dr. Sanders intervenor 
has established a relationship with Zachary, and there was nothing 
that would be adverse to the best interests of the child or 
disruptive to him and the Court previously found it was in the best 
interest of Zachary to allow Pete Thanos to intervene. The 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in Re: Motion for 
Intervention and Order Granting Intervention of Intervenor, Pete 
Thanos, were signed by the Court November 7, 2002. 
22. On October 10, 2002, the petitioner filed a Motion to 
Bifurcate, to Stay Proceedings, and to Set Date for Response to 
Motion for Summary Judgment. That matter came on for hearing 
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before the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley on November 1, 2 002, and an 
Order on Motion to Bifurcate and to Stay Proceedings was signed 
December 16, 2002. 
23. On November 12, 2002, the petitioner filed an Answer to 
the Intervener's Verified Petition for Paternity. 
24. The petitioner filed another Motion for Stay and For 
Expedited Disposition on or about November 20, 2002. That was 
heard by the Court on November 27, 2002, and denied by the Court 
and the Order Denying Petitioner's Motion for Stay Order was signed 
December 20, 2002. 
25. On November 15, 2 002, Pete Thanos, as intervenor in the 
divorce action, filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment with a 
supporting memorandum and Affidavit, seeking a declaration by the 
Court that intervenor, Pete Thanos, is Zachary's biological father. 
26. The petitioner filed a Motion for Stay with the Utah 
Court of Appeals on or about November 27, 2 002, requesting that the 
Court of Appeals stay the paternity and custody proceedings in the 
District Court pending resolution of the petitioner's Petition for 
Extraordinary Relief. Petitioner filed his Petition for 
Extraordinary Relief with the Utah Supreme Court on or about 
November 14, 2 002, and the matter was transferred to the Utah Court 
of Appeals by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, given the 
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misfiling. The petitioner's Motion for Stay was summarily denied 
by the Utah Court of Appeals by an Order dated December 4, 2002. 
27. The petitioner also filed an Objection to Admissibility 
of Genetic Test Results and Motion to Strike, dated November 27, 
2002. Intervenor filed his Response to Objection to Admissibility 
of Genetic Tests on December 9, 2 002, and amended the same due to 
an error in the title of said pleading on December 23, 2002. 
28. On or about December 9, 2002, the petitioner filed a 
Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Opposition to 
Intervenor's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and In Support of 
Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment. Petitioner requested in 
his Motion for Summary Judgment that he be declared the legal 
father of Zachary on the basis of his controlling presumption of 
paternity or, alternatively, on the basis of the equitable parent 
doctrine or, alternatively, barring intervenor and respondent from 
challenging Zachary's parentage on the basis of equitable estoppel. 
29. Subsequent to receiving the respondent and intervener's 
response to the Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment,' 
Petitioner filed a reply memorandum and affidavits of Douglas 
Goldsmith and Kelly Pearson. Intervenor filed motions to strike 
the affidavits and petitioner filed a responsive memorandum thereto 
to which intervenor replied. The petitioner's Objection to 
Admissibility of Genetic Test Results and Motion to Strike and the 
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intervener's motions to strike were heard simultaneous with 
intervener's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and petitioner's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
30. After hearing on intervenor's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment and petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment, this Court 
found that Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-3a-105(b), establishes 
concurrent jurisdiction between the District Court and the Juvenile 
Court in an action to establish paternity. This case is, in part, 
a paternity action. The Court found, however, that this is not a 
termination of parental rights action which precludes the District 
Court from exercising jurisdiction. 
31. Subsequent to the Court's consideration of all arguments 
made by petitioner, respondent and intervenor, an Order on Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment and Order Denying Petitioner's Motion 
for Summary Judgment was entered by the Court on May 8, 2003. 
Intervenor was declared to be the biological and natural father of 
Zachary Andrew Pearson on May 8, 2003, and the petitioner's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, dated December 9, 2 0 02, was denied. 
32. The petitioner filed a Petition for Permission to Appeal 
Interlocutory Orders on or about May 28, 2003, with the Utah Court 
of Appeals. On July 3, 2003, the Petition for Permission to Appeal 
was denied by the Utah Court of Appeals. 
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Custody Evaluation 
33. Dr. Jill Sanders completed her child custody evaluation 
and a settlement conference was held before Commissioner Michael S. 
Evans, the parties and Dr. Sanders on August 13, 2 0 03. That did 
not result in a settlement of this matter and a final report was 
issued by Dr. Sanders dated November 3, 2003. 
34. Dr. Jill Sanders is a licensed psychologist who this 
Court finds is a qualified expert in the performance of custody 
evaluations and is well respected and recognized in the community 
for that expertise. Dr. Sanders, prior to issuing her final report 
of November 3, 2003, conducted multiple interviews, a battery of 
psychological testing and reviewed documents presented to her by 
the parties and their counsel, and contacted collaterals as she 
deemed appropriate. The Court finds that Dr. Sanders' child 
custody evaluation was thoroughly performed and that the report 
issued complied with and addressed the requirements of Rule 4-903 
of the Code of Judicial Administration. Pursuant to that Rule and 
the requirements that the evaluator consider and, therefore, which 
the Court should consider, the Court finds the following: 
a. Nicholas and Zachary are too young to consider the 
child's preference. 
b. Zachary and Nicholas are very best friends and it is 
likely that their sister, Madelaine, will join their unusually 
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strong relationship. Madelaine is Nicholas1 half-sister and 
Zachary's full-sister. Those three children should not be 
separated absent some compelling circumstances not present here. 
There is a substantial benefit of keeping these siblings together. 
c. Nicholas and Zachary have excellent relationships 
with petitioner, respondent and intervenor. 
d. The petitioner and respondent have established a 
50/50 parent time arrangement with Nicholas and Zachary, which has 
worked relatively well. 
e. Petitioner, respondent and intervenor all are of 
high moral character and exhibit strong emotional stability. 
f. Petitioner, respondent and intervenor each have 
exhibited a deep desire for custody of the children. Contrary to 
the allegations and representations of the petitioner, intervenor 
has stepped in to assume the role of parent to Zachary and did so 
although delayed, given the circumstances present in this case. 
g. The intervenor is employed full-time out of the 
home. Respondent is employed in a part-time position and 
petitioner is employed full-time. Both petitioner and respondent 
can work from home, to a large degree. Their ability to provide 
personal rather than surrogate care is generally equal though the 
respondent is in a somewhat superior position to provide that 
personal care, given her current part-time position. 
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h. None of the parties exhibit significant impairment 
of ability to function as a parent due to drug abuse, excessive 
drinking or other related causes.
 l 
i. The petitioner is a practicing member of the LDS 
Church. Respondent is no longer a practicing member of the LDS 
Church. The respondent and intervenor support Nicholas and 
Zachary's participation in religious training and activities. 
Religious compatibility is not of substantial importance in this 
case. 
j. The petitioner and respondent are Nicholas' 
biological parents. The respondent and intervenor are Zachary1s 
biological parents; however, Nicholas and Zachary have a strong 
attachment to both intervenor and petitioner. 
k. All three parties have the capacity financially to 
support these children. 
1. There is no evidence of abuse of either of the 
children or of any domestic violence involving the children. 
Parental Presumption 
35. The Parental Presumption recognizes the natural right and 
authority of a parent to the child's custody where one party to the 
controversy is a non-parent. The Parental Presumption is a 
rebuttable presumption and can be rebutted by evidence establishing 
that a particular parent at a particular time generally lacked all 
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three of the characteristics that give rise to the presumption: (1) 
that no strong mutual bond exists; (2) that the parent has not 
demonstrated a willingness to sacrifice his or her own interest and 
welfare for the child; and (3) that the parent lacks the sympathy 
for and understanding of the child that is characteristic of 
parents generally. Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 
1982) . 
There is no Parental Presumption as to Nicholas because 
petitioner and respondent are both the natural parents of Nicholas. 
Therefore, a best interests analysis as to Nicholas is controlling. 
The Parental Presumption has application to petitioner's 
respondent's and intervener's claims for custody of Zachary. As to 
Zachary, between petitioner and respondent and intervenor, it has 
been established beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner is not 
the biological parent of Zachary. Consequently, the presumption of 
legitimacy regarding Zachary, who was born during the marriage of 
petitioner and respondent, has been rebutted. Based upon the 
evidence as set forth in these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, petitioner cannot and has not established that respondent at 
any time had no strong mutual bond with Zachary, that respondent at 
any time has not demonstrated a willingness to sacrifice her own 
interests and welfare for Zachary, or that at any time respondent 
lacked the sympathy for and understanding of Zachary that is 
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characteristic of parents generally. In fact, the Court finds the 
opposite to be true, that respondent and Zachary have a strong 
mutual bond, that she has sacrificed her interests and welfare for 
Zachary, and has an abundance of sympathy and understanding of 
Zachary that is characteristic of parents generally. Respondent 
benefits from the Parental Presumption on her claim for custody of 
Zachary against petitioner. Consequently, respondent and 
petitioner are not on equal footing. The Parental Presumption has 
been rebutted regarding intervener's claim for custody of Zachary. 
During approximately the first 15 months of Zachary's life, 
intervenor, with the assistance of petitioner and respondent, kept 
intervenor's parentage of Zachary a secret resulting in minimal 
contact between Zachary and intervenor during this period. During 
this critical 15 month period of time, intervenor and Zachary 
generally did not have a strong mutual bond, during this time 
intervenor generally did not demonstrate a willingness to sacrifice 
his own interests and welfare for Zachary, and generally lacked the 
sympathy for and understanding of Zachary that is characteristic of 
parents generally. Therefore, petitioner and intervenor stand on 
equal footing and Zachary's custody between them is determined 
solely by the best interests of the child. In the context of the 
Parental Presumption Analysis, it is ironic at best to conclude 
that petitioner is a non-parent of Zachary when in real terms 
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petitioner has established a strong mutual parental bond and 
relationship with Zachary, albeit in loco parentis. The Utah 
Supreme Court deemed Mr. Hutchison to be a "non-parent" in its 
analysis and Mr. Hutchison's parental relationship was of longer 
duration than petitioner's in the present case. 649 P.2d at 39. 
Consequently, following the dictates of the Hutchison case and in 
furtherance of the policies which support the Parental Presumption, 
this Court ruled accordingly. 
Petitioner"s Experts 
36. Dr. Douglas Goldsmith's testimony is of little assistance 
or weight in the Court's determination of custody. Dr. Goldsmith 
has not met with the respondent, intervenor or children nor has he 
conducted a custody evaluation. His testimony is generic and not 
case specific and the Court finds that Dr. Goldsmith misapprehends 
Dr. Sanders' opinions regarding the importance of biological 
relationships to children. In particular, Dr. Goldsmith has no 
factual basis with which to offer an opinion regarding whether Dr. 
Sanders' recommendations regarding custody of Zachary Pearson are 
potentially damaging to Zachary. 
37. The testimony of Dr. Heather Walker is of no benefit to 
the Court. The petitioner offers her as an expert in an effort to 
discredit or call into question the quality and methodology of the 
evaluation of Dr. Sanders. The Court is not persuaded by Dr. 
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Walker's testimony that Dr. Sanders' recommendations, opinions or 
conclusions are not consistent with the data or not within the 
scope of her expertise. This Court is not persuaded that Dr. 
Sanders' statements and opinions are not supported by current 
psychological literature, though the Court believes that is of 
little weight in this Court's determination of custody. The Court 
is not persuaded by Dr. Walker that Dr. Sanders' methods are not 
consistent with the guidelines for conducting custody evaluations. 
Dr. Sanders has performed ,her evaluation consistent with the 
guidelines and Rule 4-903 of the Code of Judicial Administration. 
The Court finds that Dr. Sanders has assigned appropriate weight to 
the best interests of the children in her evaluation and 
recommendations and has conducted a child-centered evaluation 
according to the guidelines and consistent with the data and 
literature. Nothing in the testimony of Dr. Walker leads this 
Court to believe that a different result, conclusion or 
recommendation would be made in the event that another evaluator 
evaluated this matter. Indeed, Dr. Sanders has a long history with 
this case, having been involved with the parties and children for 
a period of time between April, 2002 and November 3, 2003. 
Custody 
38. The Court finds that there are some benefits to the 
children remaining in Salt Lake City, due to the social, family and 
9lHSi 
PEARSON V. PEARSON PAGE 22 FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
academic networks. However, given the ages of the children and the 
other considerations, as set forth in these findings, maintaining 
extended family, social and academic networks are of less concern 
than creating relationship, geographical and financial stability of 
the children at this point in their development. Both boys are in 
a transportable stage and the Court finds that they have the 
capacity positively to adjust to a permanent move to Oregon. 
39. The Court cannot order any party to this action to 
relocate. Although the respondent's current employer is 
headquartered in Salt Lake City, she works from home and so her 
employment is portable. She works from her home in Oregon. 
Petitioner also works from his home. He is capable of continuing 
his present employment, if he were to move to Oregon. In addition, 
there are job openings in Portland for individuals who have skills' 
like those possessed by petitioner. 
40. The intervenor is the primary financial provider for the 
Thanos family. Unlike petitioner and respondent he could not 
continue to work for his present employer if he were to move to 
Salt Lake City. It is likely that if he were to move to Utah he 
would experience a significant reduction in income. It would be 
far more burdensome for respondent and intervenor to move to Salt 
Lake City, than for petitioner to move to Portland. 
PEARSON V. PEARSON PAGE 23 FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
41. In making a custody determination in this matter it is 
appropriate to rely on present realities and focus on what is in 
the best interest of the children today. It is not helpful to rely 
on historical issues or to assign fault for the breakup of the 
Pearson marriage. 
42. The respondent is pivotal in this case in that she is the 
biological mother of both boys and their sister, Madelaine. The 
respondent has the strongest inherent responsibility for all three 
of these children. At considerable inconvenience to herself and 
her husband respondent has obeyed the Court orders currently in 
place and borne the bulk of the physical, emotional and financial 
discomfort associated with it. She has performed in an exemplary 
manner in facilitating the petitioner's relationship with both 
boys. At the same time, she has established a stable home life in 
Oregon with intervenor and with their child Madelaine, which fully 
incorporates both Nicholas and Zachary. Further, intervenor has 
fully accepted and supported both boys and their relationship with 
petitioner. The respondent has chosen to establish a life for 
herself and her family in Oregon and she has done so with logic and 
reason. In order for her to increase her earning potential she 
would have to work outside the home and to hire daycare providers 
to take care of her three small children. It is not in the best 
interest of any of the children to require her to do so, the more 
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so since her present income is comparable to that of petitioner. 
The children consider Oregon to be one of their homes and are very 
comfortable in that environment. 
43. There is a sufficient level of trust between petitioner 
and the Thanoses in that all three are excellent parents which is 
a view generally shared by each party. Communications between them 
at times are tense. However, in the past and currently they have 
consistently reached a consensus concerning decisions relating to 
the upbringing of. the boys. A joint legal custody relationship 
therefore does appear to be feasible and in the best interest of 
Nicholas and Zachary as further defined below. 
44. It is in the best interests of Nicholas that joint legal 
custody of Nicolas be awarded to petitioner and respondent, and 
that joint legal custody of Zachary be awarded to respondent and 
intervenor. Joint legal custody shall be further defined as set 
forth at page 12, paragraph numbered 1, of the Child Custody 
Evaluation, as follows: 
1. Legal Custody. Kimberlee and Peter should be named 
joint legal custodians of Zachary. Kimberlee and Kelly 
should be named joint legal custodians of Nicholas. 
Kelly's special relationship with Zachary should be 
legally protected in the form of third party access with 
the responsibility to make daily decisions on Zachary's 
behalf when Zachary is in his care. Kimberlee and Peter 
will make school placement decisions for both boys if the 
children reside in Oregon. Both biological parents of 
each child must agree upon any elective medical or dental 
treatment. It would be best if decisions regarding any 
iw 
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extracurricular activities would be jointly made by all 
three parents so that the boys' schedules are manageable. 
If this is not possible, Kelly and Kimberlee will jointly 
decide on Nicholas' activities and Kimberlee and Peter 
will jointly decide on Zachary's activities. 
45. The following factors support the conclusion that joint 
legal custody of the boys divided between petitioner and respondent 
for Nicholas and between respondent and intervenor for Zachary is 
in the boys' best interest: 
a. The emotional needs of the children will be met by 
joint legal custody. A generally positive decision making process 
has always existed between the parties and they have managed quite 
well at keeping the children out of the fray. 
b. The parenting skills and abilities of all three 
parents are excellent and complimentary. 
c. All three parties have similar major values and they 
recognize the importance of each other in the children's lives. 
d. The primary physical custody of Nicholas is awarded 
to respondent. The primary physical custody of Zachary is awarded 
to respondent and intervenor. All of the evidence, including 
petitioner's testimony indicates that petitioner will move to 
Oregon. Therefore, all three parties will live in close proximity 
to one another, which makes joint legal custody workable. 
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e. This legal custody determination is consistent with 
the custody evaluation, said custody evaluation is incorporated 
herein in full by this reference. 
46. It is in the best interests of Nicholas that respondent 
be designated the primary physical custodian of Nicholas and that 
she not be required to obtain petitioner's permission to move to 
Oregon. It is in the best interest of Zachary that respondent and 
intervenor be designated the primary physical custodians of Zachary 
and that they not be required to obtain petitioner's permission to 
move to Oregon. It should be noted that while the Court cannot 
order any party to move to another state, the evidence is 
undisputed that the parties will relocate and will live within 100 
miles of one another because it is in the best interests and needs 
of Nicholas and Zachary to live in close proximity to petitioner, 
respondent and intervenor. 
47. It is in the best interests of Nicholas and Zachary that 
there be a joint physical custody arrangement. The joint physical 
custody arrangement or access schedule for Nicholas and Zachary 
shall be as described and set forth in the Access Schedule 
recommendation of Dr. Jill D. Sanders at pages 12-13, paragraphs 
numbered 2, 2a, 2b, 2c and 2d, of the Child Custody Evaluation, as 
follows: 
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2. Access schedule. Regardless of whether this 
"extended family" lives in Salt Lake City or in Oregon 
the following schedule is recommended. However, my 
strong recommendation is that Kelly relocate to Oregon so 
that Nicholas can begin the second school term in Oregon: 
a. Continuation of the present seven day/seven day 
rotation. The children have been on this schedule since 
September and appear to be able to tolerate the amount of 
time away from the other parent. 
b. During the summer months Kimberlee/Peter and 
Kelly would have the option of a ten-day period of 
uninterrupted access to both boys. Kelly will have the 
first choice of that period in even years and 
Kimberlee/Peter will have the first choice in odd years. 
These periods may not be combined with regular access to 
form a block longer than ten days. 
c. Beginning in the school year of 2004/2005 
Nicholas will continue on the weekly rotation. 
Transitions would occur Sunday evening. Zachary will 
spend five nights with Kelly and either return to 
Kimberlee/Peter for the last two nights of the seven-day 
period or remain with them for the first two nights of 
Kelly's period (rotating each time). Nicholas would join 
Zachary at Kimberlee/Peter's on Sunday for his continuous 
seven-day period in that home. This arrangement keeps 
the boys on a highly predictable schedule, allows them to 
spend the vast majority of their time together, allows 
each of them some time alone with their biological 
fathers, and coincides with Peter's greater availability 
on the weekends. 
d. Holidays may be rotated according to Utah 
guidelines, or according to mutual agreement, with only 
major holidays being included (i.e. UEA, Thanksgiving, 
Christmas, Spring Break, July 4th) . 
48. For purposes of transportation, each party should be 
responsible for picking up the children at the beginning of that 
parent's access 
49. It is reasonable and in the best interest of Zachary that 
his surname be changed to "Thanos." It is reasonable that an 
QiM'tt 
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explanation regarding the circumstances of each child's conception, 
birth and circumstances be crafted with the help of Dr. Jay Thomas 
and that it be provided to the boys in a unified manner. It is in 
their best interest that the boys hear a consistent presentation 
regarding these issues. 
50. It is reasonable that the petitioner, respondent and 
intervenor be able to attend events for both boys and any of the 
three parties should be permitted to perform volunteer work in 
either of the boys' school classrooms. 
51. In the event that the parties are unable to facilitate a 
parenting plan or in the event that petitioner and Thanoses reach 
an impasse regarding major issues concerning the boys, it is 
reasonable that a parenting coordinator be utilized to facilitate 
resolution of parenting disagreements. Each party should pay one-
half of the cost of that coordinator. 
Child Support 
52. The intervener's income is approximately $11,747 gross 
per month. Petitioner's gross monthly income is $7,750 per month. 
Respondent's monthly gross income is $7,440. The combined adjusted 
gross incomes of petitioner and respondent exceeds the guidelines, 
therefore, the amount of child support is determined on a case by 
case basis and the Court must determine what is reasonable. 
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53. The current gross monthly incomes of petitioner and 
respondent are substantially the same. The standard of living 
currently enjoyed by petitioner and respondent is consistent with 
that which was enjoyed during the course of petitioner's and 
respondent's marriage, except currently respondent benefits from 
the income and earning capacity of intervenor. Petitioner and 
respondent's earning capacity is similar based upon their 
education, training and work experience. There is a seven year age 
difference between petitioner and respondent which does not impact 
their respective incomes or earning capacity. Based upon the joint 
physical custody arrangement or access schedule as to Nicholas, 
petitioner will have 182 overnights and respondent will have 183 
overnights, or vice versa. Based upon the foregoing, both 
petitioner and respondent each have adequate resources to 
adequately support Nicholas without child support from the other. 
Therefore, zero child support is awarded for either petitioner or 
respondent regarding Nicholas, which is reasonable under the facts 
set forth hereinbefore. Respondent and intervenor have agreed or 
the Court finds that petitioner should not be required to pay child 
support for Zachary. Petitioner's claim for retroactive child 
support is denied. 
3W 
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Medical, Dental Insurance/Daycare 
54. Through their employment the Thanoses are capable of 
obtaining medical and dental insurance for Nicholas and Zachary. 
They should be required to obtain such insurance. The Thanoses 
have agreed to pay all insurance expenses for Zachary. Petitioner 
should be ordered to reimburse them for one-half of the cost of 
obtaining such medical and dental insurance for Nicholas. The 
Thanoses should be ordered to provide petitioner with documentary 
proof that they have obtained medical and dental insurance coverage 
for Nicholas. Petitioner should be ordered to pay his one-half 
share of the premium for Nicholas' medical and dental insurance on 
the 5th day of each month beginning with the first month following 
his receipt from Thanoses of confirmation of the said medical and 
dental insurance coverage. 
55. Neither petitioner nor the Thanoses should be required to 
pay any daycare expenses incurred by the other party in the 
providing of care for the boys. 
56. Petitioner should be required to pay one-half of all 
medical or dental insurance co-pays or deductibles and one-half of 
all dental and medical expenses incurred by either petitioner or 
the Thanoses on behalf of or for the benefit of Nicholas. The 
Thanoses have agreed to pay all such expenses and all school 
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expenses incurred on behalf or for the benefit of Zachary. It is 
reasonable that they be required to pay all of such expenses. 
Alimony 
57. For the following reasons neither petitioner or 
respondent should be awarded alimony: 
a. The financial conditions of petitioner and 
respondent are similar. The standards of living of petitioner and 
respondent as of the date of their separation has not changed 
significantly. Neither will be required to accept a lower standard 
of living if he or she does not receive alimony from the other. 
b. The incomes of petitioner and respondent are nearly 
identical. Each has the ability to produce significant income in 
the future. 
c. Neither petitioner nor respondent directly 
contributed to any increase in the skill or earning capacity of the 
other during their marriage. 
d. Although respondent's affair with intervenor was a 
contributing cause of the disintegration of the marriage of 
petitioner and respondent, the ultimate cause of the termination of 
their marriage was their irreconcilable differences. The parties 
made a good faith effort to reconcile after respondent's affair 
with intervenor became known to petitioner. The Court is therefore 
of the view that fault should not be considered in the awarding of 
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alimony. As is often the case in marital relationships, the Court 
finds petitioner and respondent both responsible for the 
irreconcilable differences that ended their marriage. 
58. Petitioner and respondent have executed and filed with 
this Court a Stipulation which resolves all remaining differences 
between them concerning the division of their marital property. 
The Stipulation is reasonable and should be incorporated into this 
Court's Decree of Divorce. 
Contempt/Work-Related Child Care Expenses 
59. By a motion for an Order to Show Cause dated November 13, 
2003, petitioner asked this Court to hold respondent in contempt 
for her failure to reimburse him for certain expenses which he had 
incurred on behalf of Nicholas and Zachary. The motion was based 
upon an interim order entered by this Court on March 28, 2001, 
which required the parties equally to divide expenses related to 
the rearing of the boys. Following a hearing before Commissioner 
Michael S. Evans on January 22, 2004, the Commissioner recommended 
that respondent be held in contempt for her failure to reimburse 
petitioner and that this Court enter a judgment against respondent 
in the approximate sum of $12,000. Respondent objected to that 
recommendation. This Court determined that respondent's objection 
to the Commissioner's recommendation be heard at the trial of this 
matter. 
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60. At the time of trial petitioner and respondent informed 
the Court that they had reached an agreement with regard to the 
sums which each had paid before the trial for medical insurance and 
uninsured medical expenses. The parties stipulated that in the 
Decree the Court should award petitioner the sum of $1,911.41 
representing net expenditures by petitioner for medical insurance 
premiums and uninsured medical expenses after offsetting payments 
made by respondent for those categories of expenses. 
61. Petitioner and respondent were unable to reach an 
agreement concerning work-related childcare expenses incurred by 
each of them. The Court received evidence concerning those 
expenses and determined that prior to trial petitioner had incurred 
work-related childcare expenses of $8,811.20 and respondent had 
incurred work-related childcare expenses of $2,315.00. The net 
amount owing to petitioner is therefore $6,496.20. The Decree of 
Divorce should award petitioner that amount for pretrial work-
related childcare expenses. 
62. There is no evidence that respondent deliberately 
violated the interim order. At the time the Order to Show Cause 
was issued petitioner and respondent were communicating about the 
sums which each had expended for the boys. Respondent had 
requested additional financial information which petitioner had not 
provided. Respondent had potential offsets which she had not yet 
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computed or documented. Under the circumstances, holding 
respondent in contempt would be inappropriate. 
Attorney's Fees 
63. The attorney fees incurred by petitioner, respondent and 
intervenor are substantial and comparable in amount. Each party 
has the ability to pay their respective attorney fees based upon 
their annual incomes. Additionally, in a case of this nature and 
complexity, determining who is the prevailing party is next to 
impossible. Therefore, each party is required to assume 
responsibility for their respective attorney fees without 
contribution. 
Transition 
64. The fifty/fifty shared temporary custody arrangement 
shall continue until petitioner's anticipated relocation to Oregon. 
It is in the best interests of the minor children that petitioner, 
respondent and intervenor relocate to Oregon simultaneously in 
order to reduce any period of separation necessitated by the 
transition. In any event, respondent and intervenorfs relocation 
to Oregon must occur prior to Nicholas starting the school term in 
Oregon. 
Based upon the preceding Findings of Fact, the Court now 
enters its: 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Petitioner and respondent are awarded joint legal custody 
of Nicholas. Respondent and intervenor are awarded joint legal 
custody of Zachary as further described in the Court's Findings. 
2. Respondent is designated the primary physical custodian 
of Nicholas. Respondent and intervenor are designated the primary 
physical custodians of Zachary. 
3. Petitioner should be awarded joint physical custody time 
with Nicholas and Zachary in the manner described in the Court's 
Findings. 
4. Petitioner and respondent should be ordered each to pay 
one-half of Nicholas1 uninsured medical and dental insurance 
premiums, co-pays and deductibles and one-half of the cost of 
health and dental insurance for him. Respondent and intervenor 
should be ordered to pay all such expenses of Zachary. 
5. None of the parties should be ordered to pay alimony or 
for the cost of work-related childcare. 
6. Respondent should be ordered to pay petitioner the sum of 
$6,4 96.2 0 as reimbursement for expenses incurred by him on behalf 
of Nicholas and Zachary for work-related childcare prior to the 
date of trial. 
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7. The property of petitioner and respondent should be 
divided according to the division described in their Stipulation 
for Property Division dated December 10, 2003. 
8. Respondent should not be held in contempt for failure to 
reimburse petitioner for childcare and medical expenses he incurred 
prior to November 13, 2003. 
9. The parties are ordered to share in thirds equally the 
costs of Dr. Sanders' custody evaluation. 
10. Counsel for respondent and intervenor are instructed to 
submit a Decree consistent with the Court's Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Rule 7, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Dated this / / day of May, 2 0( 
TYRONE 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
^ w 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the 
following, this (( day of May, 2004: 
Paige Bigelow— fWctald w W / ^ c c M Vif U| fYV^ ctfSr*? 
Attorney for Petitioner 
50 West Broadway, 8th Floor 
P.O. Box 45561 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0561 
Steven H. Gunn 
Attorney for Respondent 
36 S. State Street, Suite 1400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Kellie F. Williams 
Attorney for Intervenor 
808 E. South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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Steven H. Gunn (A1272) 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
P.O. Box45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801)532-1500 
Facsimile: (801)532-7543 
Attorneys for Respondent 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, DIVISION I, STATE OF UTAH 
KELLY F. PEARSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
KIMBERLEE Y. PEARSON, 
Respondent. 
PETER D. THANOS, 
Intervenor. 
SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE 
OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 004907881 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
Commissioner Michael S. Evans 
The above-captioned case was tried to the Court on April 1, 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8, 2004. 
Petitioner was present and was represented by Paige Bigelow; Respondent was present and 
represented by Steven H. Gunn; and Intervenor was present and represented by Kellie F. 
Williams. The Court having heard the testimony of the witnesses, having considered the 
evidence presented and the arguments of counsel, having considered the Stipulation of the 
parties relating to certain property division issues, having previously entered its Decree of 
Divorce Terminating Marriage and having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
Supplemental Decree of Divorce @J 
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1. Petitioner Kelly F. Pearson and Respondent, Kimberlee Y. Thanos (f/k/a 
Kimberlee Y. Pearson) are awarded joint legal custody of the minor child Nicholas Browning 
Pearson ("Nicholas"). 
2. Respondent and Intervenor (sometimes referred to herein collectively as 
"Thanoses") shall make school placement decisions for Nicholas if he resides in Oregon. 
Petitioner and Respondent must agree upon any elective medical or dental treatment for 
Nicholas. Petitioner, Respondent and Intervenor shall make decisions concerning Nicholas' 
extracurricular activities and shall be guided by the principle of manageability of that schedule. 
If Petitioner, Respondent and Intervenor cannot agree upon Nicholas' extracurricular activities, 
Petitioner and Respondent shall make such decisions. 
3. Joint legal custody of the minor child Zachary Andrew Pearson is awarded to 
Respondent and Intervenor. 
4. Petitioner's special relationship with Zachary should be protected by means of 
third party access. Petitioner is awarded the responsibility and right to make daily decisions on 
Zachary's behalf when Zachary is in Petitioner's care. Respondent and Intervenor shall have 
the responsibility and right to make daily decisions for Zachary when he is in their care. 
Respondent and Intervenor shall make school placement decisions for Zachary if he resides in 
Oregon. The Thanoses shall have the right to make decisions concerning the elective medical 
or dental treatment of Zachary. Decisions concerning Zachary's extracurricular activities shall 
be made jointly by Petitioner, Respondent and Intervenor and shall be guided by the principle of 
manageability of that schedule. If Petitioner, Respondent and Intervenor cannot agree upon 
Zachary's extracurricular activities, the Thanoses shall make such decisions. 
5. Respondent is designated the primary physical custodian of Nicholas. 
Respondent and Intervenor are designated the primary physical custodians of Zachary. 
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6. If the parties live in close proximity to one another, the parties shall observe the 
following joint physical custody arrangement: until the beginning of the 2004/2005 school year 
the seven-day rotation described in this Court's Order on Motion for Order to Show Cause, 
Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint for Divorce, and Motion for Temporary Relief dated 
March 28, 2001 ("Interim Order") shall apply: 
a. Beginning with the 2004-2005 school year Nicholas will continue on the 
weekly rotation. Transitions shall occur Sunday evening. Zachary will spend five nights 
with Petitioner and either return to Respondent and Intervenor for the last two nights of 
the seven-day period or remain with them for the first two nights of Petitioner's period 
(rotating each time). Nicholas will join Zachary at the home of Respondent and 
Intervenor on Sunday for his continuous seven-day period in their home. 
b. During the summer months the Thanoses and Petitioner shall have the 
option of a ten-day period of uninterrupted access to both boys. Petitioner will have the 
first choice of that period in even years and the Thanoses will have the first choice in odd 
years. These periods of uninterrupted access may not be combined with regular access 
to form a block of time longer than ten days. 
c. Respondent and Intervenor shall be entitled to the following holidays in 
years ending in an even number, and Petitioner shall be entitled to the following holidays 
in years ending in an odd number: 
(1) The children's birthdays on the day before or after the actual 
birthday beginning at 3:00 p.m. until 9.00 p.m.; 
(2) Martin Luther King, Jr. Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. on Friday until 
Monday at 7:00 p.m.; 
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(3) Spring Break or Easter holiday beginning at 6:00 p.m. on the day 
school lets out for the holiday until 7:00 p.m. on the day before school resumes; 
(4) Memorial Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 
7:00 p.m.; 
(5) July 24th beginning at 6:00 p.m. on the day before the holiday 
until 11:00 p.m. on the holiday; 
(6) Veterans Day holiday beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the 
holiday until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday; and 
(7) The first portion of the Christmas school vacation (defined as the 
time period beginning on the evening school lets out for the Christmas school 
break until the evening before school resumes, except for Christmas Eve and 
Christmas Day), plus Christmas Eve and Christmas Day until 1:00 p.m. 
d. Respondent and Intervenor shall be entitled to the following holidays in 
years ending in an odd number, and petitioner shall be entitled to the following holidays 
in years ending in an even number: 
(1) The children's birthdays on the actual birthday beginning at 3:00 
p.m. until 9:00 p.m.; 
(2) Washington and Lincoln Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. on Friday 
until 7:00 p.m. on Monday; 
(3) July 4th beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the holiday until 
11:00 p.m. on the holiday; 
(4) Labor Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7:00 
p.m. on Monday; 
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(5) Fall Break, if applicable, beginning at 6:00 p.m. on the day school 
lets out for the holiday until 7:00 p.m. on the day before school resumes; 
(6) Columbus Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the holiday 
until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday; 
(7) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday at 7:00 p.m. until 
Sunday at 7:00 p.m.; 
(8) The second portion of the Christmas school vacation, including 
New Year's Day, (defined as the time period beginning on the evening school 
lets out for the Christmas school break until the evening before school resumes, 
except for Christmas Eve and Christmas Day) plus Christmas Day beginning at 
1:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m. 
e. Unless otherwise agreed to in writing by the parties, Nicholas shall spend 
Father's Day with Petitioner and Zachary shall spend Father's Day with Intervenor. The 
parenting time on Father's Day shall be 9:00 a.m. until 7:00 p.m. 
f. Each parent shall be responsible for picking up the children at the 
beginning of that parent's access time. 
7. If Petitioner does not move to Oregon, he is awarded the following monthly 
access to both boys: 
a. The Petitioner should have monthly parent time for a period of five days 
of which no more than one day should be a day when the child is, or would otherwise be, 
in school. 
b. Petitioner is awarded the Thanksgiving holiday and school spring break in 
even-numbered years and the entire Christmas school break in odd-numbered years. 
He is awarded the fall school break, if such a break is taken in Oregon. Further, 
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Petitioner is awarded parent time each year on Columbus Day, Memorial Day, Martin 
Luther King Day and Presidents Day each year to maximize long weekends. 
c. The Petitioner is awarded summer parenting time with Zachary for a 
period of six weeks each summer coincident with the exercise of parenting time with 
Nicholas. Such parenting time will be divided into three 2-week blocks of time which are 
separated by at least seven days. Only one of three 2-week blocks of parenting time will 
be uninterrupted. 
8. Petitioner and the Thanoses shall be entitled to call the children once a day when 
the children are residing in the other party's or parties' household. Phone calls initiated by the 
children to the other household shall be unlimited and neither Petitioner nor the Thanoses shall 
take steps to restrict such child-initiated calls. 
9. At the discretion of Respondent and Intervenor Zachary's surname may be 
changed to "Thanos". Any of the parties may disclose to the children the circumstances of 
either child's conception and birth; however, such explanation shall be made consistent with the 
recommendations of Dr. Jay Thomas and in a manner that is consistent between the parties. 
10. Petitioner and the Thanoses may, if they desire, attend events for both boys and 
each shall be permitted to perform volunteer work in either of the boys' school classrooms. 
11. In the event that the parties are unable to facilitate a parenting plan or in the 
event that Petitioner and Mr. and Mrs. Thanos reach an impasse regarding major issues 
concerning the boys, a parenting coordinator shall be utilized to facilitate resolution of such 
disagreements. In the event that the use of a parenting coordinator becomes necessary, 
Petitioner shall pay one-half of the costs of retaining that coordinator and Mr. and Mrs. Thanos 
shall pay the other half. 
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12. Neither Petitioner nor Respondent is awarded child support for Nicholas. 
Petitioner shall not be required to pay child support for Zachary. 
13. Respondent and Intervenor shall purchase and maintain appropriate health, 
hospital and dental care insurance for Nicholas and Zachary. Petitioner shall reimburse them 
for one-half the cost of obtaining and maintaining such insurance for Nicholas. Nicholas' share 
of the insurance will be a per capita share of the premium actually paid. Respondent and 
Intervenor shall provide Petitioner with documentary proof that they have obtained health, 
hospital and dental care insurance for Nicholas. Petitioner shall pay his one-half share of the 
insurance costs on the fifth day of each month beginning with the first month following his 
receipt from Respondent and Intervenor of confirmation of said insurance. 
14. Neither Petitioner nor Mr. and Mrs. Thanos are required to pay any daycare 
expenses incurred by the other party in the providing of care for Nicholas and Zachary. 
15. Petitioner shall pay one-half and Respondent shall pay one-half of all reasonable 
and necessary uninsured medical expenses, including deductibles and co-payments, incurred 
on behalf, or for the benefit, of Nicholas. Petitioner is not required to pay such expenses for 
Zachary. The parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide written verification of the cost 
and payment of those expenses to the other parent within thirty days of payment. A parent 
failing to provide written verification may be denied the right to recover the other parent's share 
of the expenses. 
16. The ultimate cause of the termination of the marriage of Petitioner and 
Respondent was their irreconcilable differences. Petitioner and Respondent are both 
responsible for those irreconcilable differences. Neither Petitioner nor Respondent is awarded 
alimony. 
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17. Petitioner and Respondent are awarded marital property in accordance with their 
Stipulation for Property Division dated November 24, 2003. In particular the following division of 
property is ordered: 
a. Each of the parties is awarded the personal property in his or her 
possession as of November 24, 2003. 
b. Petitioner is awarded the marital residence located at 1988 South 1800 East 
in Salt Lake City. Petitioner is ordered to pay or satisfy all obligations, payment of which is 
secured by any lien, mortgage or trust deed on the said property. 
c. Petitioner is awarded ownership of the 1997 Ford Taurus and the 1993 
Mazda MX6 automobiles. Respondent is awarded ownership of the 1997 Ford Explorer 
and the 1999 SeaRay ski boat. The party to whom a motor vehicle or boat is awarded shall 
be responsible for paying any obligation secured by a security interest in that vehicle or 
boat and shall hold the other party harmless from any loss or damages with which he or 
she may incur as a result of the failure of the responsible party to pay one of the debts 
described in this paragraph. 
d. Each party is awarded all funds currently held in his or her Agilent 
Technologies Defined Benefit Plan account. 
e. Each party is awarded all cash in his or her possession as of November 24, 
2003, including all cash which is part of the marital estate. 
f. Respondent is awarded all assets contained in her 401 (k) account, as well 
as $10,000 in value of assets held in Petitioner's 401 (k) account. The Court shall enter a 
Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) ordering that Petitioner's 401 (k) account be 
divided as stated above. 
g. The securities owned by the parties are divided as follows: 
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(1) Petitioner is awarded 10,277 shares and Respondent 10,278 shares 
of the Campus Pipeline stock which on November 24, 2003 was controlled or 
owned by Respondent. 
(2) Petitioner is awarded 25 shares and Respondent is awarded 25 
shares of the Agilent Technologies, Inc. stock which, as of November 24, 2003, was 
owned or controlled by Petitioner. 
(3) Petitioner is awarded 32 shares and Respondent is awarded 32 
shares of Hewlett-Packard Company stock which, as of November 24, 2003, was in 
the control or ownership of Petitioner in a Charles Schwab account. 
(4) Petitioner is awarded 207 and Respondent 206 stock options in 
Agilent Technologies, Inc., which, as of November 24, 2003, were in the control of 
or owned by Petitioner. 
h. The following guidelines shall apply to the division of the stock and of the 
options: 
(1) Upon entry of this Decree of Divorce, the Hewlett-Packard and 
Agilent Technologies stock shall be withdrawn from the Charles Schwab joint 
account and distributed to the parties. If any fees or costs are owed to Charles 
Schwab the Petitioner and Respondent shall equally divide and pay those fees and 
costs. 
(2) The division of stock ordered by this Decree shall take into account 
differences in the tax basis of particular blocks of stock. The division shall be 
carried out in such a manner as to equalize the potential capital gains tax treatment 
of the stock awarded to each party. 
(3) All taxable losses and cash proceeds from the sale of Campus 
Pipeline stock shall be distributed evenly between Petitioner and Respondent. 
(4) The division of stock options shall be made in a manner which will 
equalize the potential capital gains tax obligations of Petitioner and Respondent. 
i. Any securities or options obtained by either party after May 1, 2000 are 
awarded to that party. 
j . Within a reasonable time Petitioner and Respondent shall each pay $6,500 
to Glen and Joan Young as repayment of the $13,000 loan which Mr. and Mrs. Young 
made to the parties during their marriage. 
k. Petitioner and Respondent shall execute and deliver to one another such 
documents, including deeds and certificates of title, as shall be necessary to effectuate the 
terms of the property division described in this Decree. 
18. Within a reasonable length of time after the entry of this Decree Respondent shall 
pay Petitioner the sum of $1,911.41 which represents the net amount Respondent owes Petitioner, 
after offsets, for her one-half share of the medical insurance premiums and uninsured medical 
expenses paid or incurred by Petitioner for Nicholas and Zachary through March 30, 2004. Within 
a reasonable length of time after entry of this Decree Respondent shall pay Petitioner the sum of 
$7,653.70 which represents the net amount Respondent owes Petitioner, after offsets, for her one-
half share of the work-related childcare expenses paid or incurred by Petitioner for Nicholas and 
Zachary through March 30, 2004. 
19. Petitioner's motion seeking to have Respondent held in contempt for violation of the 
Interim Order is denied. 
20. Petitioner is awarded the right to claim Nicholas as a dependent on his state and 
federal income tax returns in odd-numbered tax years. The Thanoses are awarded the right to 
10 
claim Nicholas as a dependent in even-numbered years. The Thanoses are awarded the right to 
claim Zachary as a dependent. 
21 . Each party is required to assume responsibility for the fees of that party's attorney. 
Neither party is awarded court costs incurred by that party. 
22. Petitioner, Respondent and Intervenor shall each pay one-third of all fees and 
costs of the custody evaluator, Dr. Jill Sanders, including Dr. Sanders' fees arising from her 
testimony at trial. 
DATED this (^ day of July, 2004. 
BYTHE COURT 
Tyrone/E. Medley 
District Court Judge 
JfiKfrSSS* 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on the 2nd day of July, 2004 a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE OF DIVORCE was mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Paige Bigelow 
Kruse, Landa & Maycock, L.L.C. 
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
PO Box 45561 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0561 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
Kellie Williams 
CORPORON& WILLIAMS 
808 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorneys for Intervenor 
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EVALUATION REPORT - Pearson v, Pearson/Thanos 
Schoolcraft (State of Utah, Supreme Court Case No. 890001) Policy Considerations 
IDENTIFYING INTORMATION: 
Kelly F. Pearson (Petitioner) vs. Kimberlee Y. Pearson (Respondent)/ 
Peter D. Thanos (Intervenor) 
Case No 004907881 
Judge Tyrone Medley 
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
Child in Question: Zachary Pearson (DOB: 9-14-99) 
Attorneys: Paige Bigelow (Petitioner), Steven H. Gunn (Respondent), Kellie F. Williams 
(Intervenor) 
Evaluator; Jill D. Sanders, Ph,D.r Clinical Psychologist 
Dates of Evaluation: 4-9-02,4-12-02. 5-6-02, 5-10-02 
Date of Report: May 13, 2002 
REASON FOR REFERRAL: 
Judge Medley has requested me to provide information and opinions to assist the Court in 
ruling on Mr. Thanos3 intervention to establish paternity. Specifically, the Court has 
determined that the criteria outlined in State of Utah in the Interest of J.W.F.. a person 
under eighteen years of age, Winfield D. Schoolcraft are applicable to this case. 
The Court has requested an evaluation (independent of the previously ordered custody 
evaluation involving these parties) related to the Schoolcraft policy of "protecting 
children from disruptive and unnecessary attacks on their paternity". 
METHODS OF EVALUATION: 
Kelly Pearson and Peter Thanos were interviewed in person on one occasion. They were 
each observed in the presence of Zachary on one occasion. Two telephone interviews 
were conducted with Kimberlee Pearson, Ail three parties were fully informed as to the 
limits of confidentiality associated with court-ordered evaluations, as well as payment 
obligations, and indicated their informed consent by signing a Forensic Warning and a 
Payment Agreement. Stormie Tisdale (Zachary's nanny) was interviewed by telephone. 
Documents submitted by all three parties were reviewed. The following Court 
documents were reviewed: Order on Objection to Recommendation (March 7, 2001), 
Supreme Court of Utah Opinion No. 890001, Affidavit of Denise R Goldsmith, Ph.D. 
(August 28,2001) and Transcript of Hearing (January 10, 2002). 
Jill D. Sanders, Ph.D. 
Clinical Psychologist 
7138 South 2000 Ease, Suite 105 • Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 • Phone (801) 944-3312 • Fax (801) 947-0017 
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CASE SUMMARY: 
Kelly and Kimberlee Pearson married in August 1992, Their first child, Nicholas, was 
bom in July 1997. Peter Thanos and Kimberlee met in December 1996 and began a 
romantic relationship in February 1998. In April 1999 Kimberlee told Kelly that she was 
pregnant with Peter's child and requested a divorce, The Pearsons separated in May 
2000. Since that time Nicholas and Zachary have spent equal amounts of time with Kelly 
and Kimberlee. Since Kimberlee's separation from Kelly, Peter has visited Kimberlee, 
Nicholas and Zachary in Utah and they have traveled to visit Peter in Oregon numerous 
times. 
CHILD IN QUESTION: 
Zachary is a normal, high functioning three-year-old boy. No developmental delays or 
physical or emotional handicaps were observed. He has no known need for special care 
of any type. There is no indication that Zachary has a less than normal capacity for 
adjustment to novel places or persons. Zachary is an active, articulate three-year-old who 
is initially shy with strangers. He is very competent at gaining comfort from his 
caregivers. His attachments to Kelly Pearson and Kimberlee Pearson, who have 
functioned as his primary caregivers since birth, appear secure, strong and healthy. His 
attachment to Peter Thanos is also secure and healthy. Zachary has a strong bond with his 
brother, Nicholas. Zachary's nanny reported that she believes the current access schedule 
and the continuing conflict between Kelly and Kimberlee are negatively affecting 
Zachary and his brother in terms of emotional stability though both boys are currently 
functioning well within the normal range in all areas. 
INFORMATION RELATED TO THE SCHOOLCRAFT ISSUES: 
1. Protecting children from disruption: 
For the past two years of Zachary's life he has enjoyed consistent primary caregiving by 
Kimberlee and Kelly Pearson, as well as consistent daycare provided by Stormie Tisdale. 
The basic routines in both households are relatively similar. Both parents work outside 
the home, though currently Kimberlee does not work outside the home while the children 
are in her care. During his first year of life Zachary had limited contact (approximately 
four visits) with Peter. Since January 2001 Zachary and Peter have seen each other once 
or twice each month for periods ranging from one to four days per visit. Kimberlee 
typically travels to Peter's home in Oregon once a month with the children. To some 
degree this disrupts their normal schedules, however, this travel pattern has been in place 
for almost one year and is part of their typical routine. In August 2001 Peter and 
Kimberlee selected a home together in Oregon and the children reside in this home 
during their visits there. 
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Zachary and his brother are accustomed to a frequently changing schedule. Since May 
2000 they typically transfer between their parents' homes twice a week. They spend 
equal amounts of time with both parents. Some holidays are always spent with one 
parent and some holidays are rotated. Peter's contact with Zachary does not significantly 
add to or subtract from the disruption associated with the current arrangement. 
2. Unnecessary attacks on paternity: 
Kelly Pearson functioned as Zachary's father prior to and following his birth in 
September 1999. Since the Pearsons separated in May 2000, Zachary and his brother 
have spent equal amounts of time with both parents. Kelly employs a nanny but is 
completely involved in Zachary's daily care during his periods of access. Zachary 
identifies Kelly as his father and their attachment is secure, strong and healthy. 
Peter Thanos is Zachary5 s biological father. His contact with Zachary during Zachary's 
first year of life was minimal due to various circumstances including the fact that the 
Pearsons continued to reside together until May 2000, Peter works and resides in Oregon, 
and Peter cared for his wife until her death in December 2000. Since January of 2001 
Peter has seen Zachary at least once a month, more typically twice a month for periods 
lasting between one and four days. Zachary identifies Peter as "Peter", Observation of 
their interaction suggests thai Zachary has a healthy, positive attachment to Peter. 
Zachary perceives Peter to be a familiar, competent and comforting caregiver. The 
biological relationship between Peier and Zachary is obvious in terms of appearance, 
temperament and mannerisms. 
CONCLUSIONS: 
The Court must determine "whether Mr, Thanos has standing to intervene to establish 
paternity of Zachary Pearson and to rebut the .presumption that Zachary Pearson is the 
legitimate son of Mr, and Mrs. Pearson'7, The Court has ordered this evaluator to gather 
and report information related to the policies set forth in Schoolcraft, primarily the policy 
related to protecting children from disruptive and unnecessary attacks on their paternity, 
and to offer opinions based on. the infonnation gained. 
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Disruption: 
Peter Thanos has gradually developed a relationship with Zachary over the past three 
years. Since January 2001 he has had contact with Zachary an average of twice a month. 
Since January 2002 they have had contact an average of three times per month. 
Observation suggests that Peter and Zachary have a positive, loving relationship. 
Zachary is relaxed in Peter's presence, allows Peter to comfort him, and easily engages in 
activities with Peter, including play and routine care. I found no information to suggest 
that Peter's involvement in Zachary's life is a disruption to Zachary's normal and 
positive development. Peter has no history of substance abuse, criminal behavior or 
abusive behavior that would suggest that he poses a current or future risk to Zachary's 
emotional or physical health. Kimberlee and Peter plan to marry as soon her divorce 
from Kelly is final. Based on the relatively long and evolving relationship between Peter 
and Zachary, the level of disruption related to Peter's intervention in this case is minimal. 
Unnecessary attacks on Paternity: 
Peter Thanos is Zachary's biological father. Kimberlee and Peter plan to marry as soon 
as possible. If they do marry Peter will have no less than the role of a stepfather. 
However, his status as Zachary's biological father inherently escalates the importance of 
their relationship. Peter is committed to a positive and significant relationship with 
Zachary regardless of his marital relationship to Kimberlee. Peter claims that he 
recognizes Kelly's importance to Zachary and intends to support their relationship. 
Kelly Pearson has functioned as Zachary's father since his birth. Despite Zachary's 
paternity, Kelly is committed to raising Zachary as his son. Zachary recognizes Kelly as 
his father and their attachment is secure and healthy, Kelly does not believe Peter's 
relationship with Zachary is beneficial or significant. If Peter were not interested in a 
relationship with Zachary, Zachary would function well in the parent-child relationship 
he has with Kelly. In regard to basic care and general well being, establishing Peter as a 
father to Zachary is unnecessary. 
However, the relationship between parents and their biological children is 
psychologically extremely important. Most adopted children spend considerable time 
and energy thinking about their biological parents, if not actively seeking to locate them. 
Psychologically speaking, some relationship between a biological parent and their child is 
necessary for the child's normal development. Sometimes this relationship can only 
occur through fantasy, sometimes only through information. But the most satisfying type 
of relationship between a child and their biological parent is generally a personal one. In 
this sense, the relationship between Peter and Zachary is essential. No one can play this 
role in Zachary's life but Peter. 
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Based on the quality of their current relationship and the likelihood that Zachary and 
Peter will have extensive contact in the future, their attachment is likely to deepen and 
become more significant over time. If Kelly were not interested in continuing to parent 
Zachary, Zachary would likely develop a full father-son attachment to Peter because 
Zachary is so young and because they have had contact since infancy. 
Zachary has the opportunity to experience two positive, important relationships with the 
two fathers in his life. Zachary has already established a meaningful relationship with 
both men. It is yet to be seen whether his fathers can establish a tolerant relationship with 
each other and allow Zachary to benefit from both relationships. There is no research 
that I am aware of that suggests having two positive father figures has a detrimental 
impact on a child. 
But the outcome is in the hands of Kelly and Peter. If they can support Zachary* s need to 
participate in both relationships, there will be little if any disruption for Zachary. If Kelly 
and Peter are in constant conflict the potential for damage to Zachaiy is considerable. 
SUMMARY OPINION: 
From a developmental and psychological perspective, Zachary's functioning is not 
inherently disrupted by Peter's involvement and Peter's relationship with Zachary is 
necessary to Zachary's normal and positive development. 
JjH b , Sancters, Ph,D 
Olinical Psychologist 
ijfiy 13, 2002 
TabD 
August 26, 2002 
The Honorable Tyrone E. Medley 
Third Judicial District Court 
450 South State Street 
SaltLake City, UT 84111 
Re: Pearson v. Pearson, 1 i *.i • i =• • 
Case No 004907881 
Your clerk has informed me that you wish me to address the issues raised by 
Ms. Bigelow in her letter dated June 13, 2002. To the best of my knowledge there are 
two specific issues that she felt should have been covered in my original evaluation report 
dated May 13, 2002. The first issue is the impact of a disruption in Zachary's 
relationship with Mr. Pearson. The second issue is Zachary's ability to understand his 
biological relationship to these parties. 
As I stated in my letter to the Court dated July 22, 2002, these issues will be explored in 
more depth in my remaining interviews with the parties and will bear significantly on the 
parenting plan I develop. However, I can offer preliminary opinions on these two issues 
based on the interviews and observations I have conducted to date. 
1- impact of Disruption in Zachary' s Relationship with Mi Pearson. 
The primary disruption in Zachary's relationship with Mr. Pearson occurred when 
Mr. and Mrs. Pearson separated. The separation reduced Zachary's exposure to Mr. 
Pearson by half. At that point in time, Zachary surely experienced some sense of loss and 
upheaval though it is highly unlikely that he has any verbal memory of those sensations. 
Zachary was nine months old at the time. He is now almost three years old. It is unlikely 
that Zachary has cognitively registered any further sense of disruption in his relationship 
with Mr. Pearson though he surely experiences the normal emotional difficulties and 
inconveniences that any child of divorce experiences. For more than two years Zachary 
has lived within the current parenting arrangement. His time with Mr. Pearson is not 
interrupted by the presence of Mr. Thanos. It is probable that Zachary experiences this 
schedule and the division of caretaking between parents as "normal"; it is really the only 
life he has ever known 
Referring to Dr. Denise Goldsmith's Affidavit dated August 28th 2001,1 agree with her 
general comments about the importance of the first three years of life related to 
establishing psychological security through secure parent-child relationships. I 
particularly agree with her opinion that the period between eighteen and thirty-six months 
is critical to mastering the balance between emotional independence and dependence. 
jiil D. Sanders, Ph.D. 
Clinical Psychologist 
~VJ.S South 2000 East. Suite 105 w Salt Lake Citv, Urah 843 21 » Phone (8011 °44- l5!2 " Fax -Si.)]) c:>47-0017 
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Zachary and Mr. Pearson's primary disruption occurred at nine months. By eighteen 
months Zachary was firmly established in a loving, secure and relatively predictable 
relationship with Mr. Pearson, Mrs. Pearson and Mr. Thanos. Dr. Goldsmith states, "In 
order to successfully move through this developmental phase, it is imperative that the 
child be with trusted caregivers with whom they have already developed a close 
attachment." My observation of Zachary with Mr. Pearson and with Mr. Thanos leads 
me to conclude that Zachary enjoys close, though not necessarily equal, attachments with 
both men which were in place throughout the crucial eighteen to thirty-six month 
developmental phase. 
There is no inherent reason why the presence of Mr. Thanos as another loving caretaker 
should have any further disruptive impact on Zachary's relationship with Mr. Pearson. 
Further disruption could occur under two conditions: 1) if any of these parents choose not 
to support Zachary's relationship with the other parties. A detrimental effect is created 
when and if caregivers compete with each other for the child's attention, affection and 
allegiance. Under those conditions Zachary's relationship with all three parties will be 
seriously disrupted; and 2) if Zachary's time with Mr. Pearson is drastically reduced. 
Zachary's emotional security would likely be significantly disrupted in the case of 
severely limited or complete loss of contact with Mr, Pearson 
Children's reactions to severely restricted or complete loss of contact with a loved and 
trusted caregiver vary dramatically from child to child. It is impossible to predict any 
child's specific response to such a disruption. Reactions may range from mild and 
transient symptoms of grief or depression to severe mood and behavior disruption 
including self-destructive behaviors. Obviously the way to protect Zachary from 
additional disruption is to maintain his relationship with Mr. Pearson. How much time is 
required to maintain the relationship is unknown. I am aware of no research that 
demonstrates some finite amount of time as necessary to maintain a significant 
relationship with a father figure. The requirements are idiosyncratic to each specific 
child and parent. Zachary's needs in this regard will be carefully considered as a part of 
the formal custody evaluation. 
Based on the interviews I have conducted all three parties are dedicated to maintaining 
Zachary's relationship with the other parties. Whether or not they are able to behave 
according to their intentions is yet to be seen. 
In summary, I do not believe Zachary has "lost" his relationship with Mr. Pearson, 
the contrary, their relationship is a strong and positive parent-child attachment. Mr. 
Pearson's actual time with Zachary was disrupted by the separation but has been stable 
and significant for more than two years. There is no basis to believe that further 
disruption to the relationship between Zachary and Mr, Pearson is intrinsically linked to 
Pearson v. Pearson. Thanos 
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Mr. Thanos' presence in Zachary7 s life. Further disruption could occur if Mr. Pearson, 
Mr. Thanos and Mrs. Pearson choose to compete with each other for Zachary 5s affection 
and fail to provide Zachary with genuine permission to have a full and loving relationship 
with all parties, or if Zachary's time with Mr. Pearson is drastically reduced. 
2. Zachary's Ability to Understand His Relationship With the Parties. 
Zachary's cognitive ability at the age of three to understand the complexities of his 
parents' relationships is extremely limited. He can understand simple descriptions of the 
biological facts of his parentage in the same way that a three year old adopted child can 
understand the biological facts of his/her parentage. However, the emotional meaning of 
these relationships is unlikely to have much impact on Zachary for a quite some time. 
What Zachary currently understands is that he has a loving relationship with Mr. Pearson, 
whom he considers his father and a loving relationship with Mr. Thanos, whom he 
considers an additional caregiver. Whether or not Mr. Thanos' presence becomes a 
"replacement" or an "addition" depends entirely upon the parties' attitudes and behaviors 
towards each other and the natural evolution of Zachary's attachment to both men. 
It is my hope that these parties handle Zachary's intellectual understanding of these 
relationships in the same way that parents who adopt handle the explanation of an 
adopted child's circumstances. It is never too soon to be open about the facts of the 
relationship, the child's questions must be openly and objectively addressed as they arise, 
and the child must be given permission to explore all parental relationships to their fullest 
conclusion without competition between the parents. 
Respectfully, 
hmdJUA 
JJll D a n d e r s , Ph.D. 
linical Psychologist 
cc: 
Paige Bigelow 
Kruse, Landa & Maycock 
8th Floor, Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
P.O. Box 45561 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0461 
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cc Continued: 
Steven H. Gunn 
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker 
400 Deseret Building 
79 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Kellie F. Williams 
Corporon & Williams 
808 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8 4 " ^ 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
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Kimberlee Y. Pearson 
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and 
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CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATION 
IDENTIFYING INFORMATION: 
Pearson v. Pearson and Thanos 
Case No. 004907881 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
Commissioner Michael S. Evans 
Evaluator: Jill D. Sanders, Ph.D. 
Date of Settlement Conference: August 13, 2003 
Date of Final Report: November 3, 2003 
REASON FOR EVALUATION: 
Kelly Pearson, Kimberlee Thanos (formerly Pearson) and Peter Thanos have been 
unable to come to agreement regarding a parenting plan for Nicholas and 
Zachary Pearson. Nicholas is Kimberlee and Kelly's biological child. Zachary is 
Peter and Kimberiee's biological child, born during her marriage to Kelly Pearson. 
Kimberlee and Peter Thanos are now married, reside in Oregon, and have an 
infant daughter together. Kelly is unmarried and resides in Utah. Nicholas and 
Zachary have shared equal time with Kelly and Kimberlee since the Pearsons 
separated in May 2000. 
METHODS OF EVALUATION: 
Multiple individual interviews were conducted with Nicholas and Zachary's 
biological mother, Kimberlee; Nicholas' biological father, Kelly; and Zachary's 
biological father, Peter. The children were observed in the presence of each 
parent and in the presence of Peter and Kimberlee jointly. The boys were 
interviewed individually on two separate dates, once accompanied by Kelly and 
once by Kimberlee. Each parent completed psychological testing including the 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory I I , the Beck Depression Inventory, 
the Sentence Completion and a parenting questionnaire. The following collateral 
sources were contacted: Stormie Tisdale (former nanny), Sonja Traub, Ph.D. 
(Peter's therapist), Christopher Thanos (Peter's adult son), Vanessa Tomazini 
(nanny), Wendy Boyle (friend of Kimberlee and Kelly), Kristina Farrar (friend of 
Kimberlee and Kelly), and Jay Thomas, Ph.D. (consulting psychologist). Multiple 
court and personal documents were reviewed, including email between the 
parties. All documents were provided to counsel in October 2003 per a 
Subpoena Duces Tecum from Kelly's attorney, Paige Bigelow. 
JiilD. Sanders. Ph.D. 
CIinic.il Psychologist 
5353 South 960 East. Suite 230 • Murray. Utah 84117 . Phone (801) 263-3335 • Fax (SOU 263-2S45 
CASE BACKGROUND: 
Kelly and Kimberiee began dating in May 1992 and married three months later. 
From Kelly's perspective the first two or three years of the marriage were very 
good as both partners focused on career development. He believes tension 
began to build as his desire to begin a family clashed with her career plans. 
According to Kelly, Kimberiee never truly focused on their relationship. From 
Kimberlee's perspective the marriage was difficult to begin with due to Kelly's 
controlling and angry demeanor in combination with her passive style. In 1995 
Kimberiee developed a strong friendship with her co-worker, Peter Thanos. 
Because they were both married they attempted to limit their relationship in 
various ways and were committed to remaining married to their spouses. Peter's 
wife was diagnosed with cancer in 1996, which further complicated his decision 
making regarding Kimberiee. Kimberiee and Kelly had Nicholas in 1997. The 
relationship between Peter and Kimberiee grew and they started a sexual 
relationship in early 1998. In April 1999 Kimberiee told Kelly that she was 
pregnant with Peter's child and requested a divorce. Peter's wife was in the final 
stages of cancer and despite his desire to be with Kimberiee and Zachary he did 
not leave Sharlene during her final months. Zachary was born in September 1999 
the Pearsons separated in May 2000 and Sharlene Thanos died in December 
2000. Nicholas and Zachary have spent equal amounts of time with Kimberiee 
and Kelly since the separation. In July 2002 Kimberiee and Peter Thanos 
married and purchased a home in Oregon. Their daughter, Madelaine, was born 
July 13, 2003. Kimberiee has been returning to Utah from Oregon for her parent 
time with Nicholas and Zachary, maintaining a home in Utah for that purpose. 
Whenever possible she travels home to Oregon with the boys. Madelaine 
currently accompanies Kimberiee on her trips to Utah. Kelly has not remarried 
and resides in Salt Lake City. 
The current access schedule is a one week/one week rotation with transitions 
occurring on Friday afternoons. Kimberiee flies from Portland, Oregon with her 
infant daughter, Madelaine, and lives in Salt Lake City during her access periods. 
She returns to her home with Peter in Oregon with the boys as much as possible. 
The boys are very comfortable in all three homes but this arrangement has no 
future. Nicholas and Zachary are fast approaching the time when geographical 
stability will be necessary for their normal development. Madelaine will soon 
reach the age when so much travel is disruptive to her need for routine and 
security of environment. 
Kelly continues to live in the marital home in Salt Lake City. He has not 
remarried but retains a nanny when the boys are with him. He lives alone when 
Nicholas and Zachary are not in Utah. Kimberiee and Peter live in Portland, 
Oregon with Madelaine and the boys visit that home as often as possible. 
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CLINICAL SUMMARIES: 
Kelly Pearson is forty-two years old. He comes from a close, supportive family. 
He gained an MBA from Brigham Young University in 1993 and has been steadily 
employed since that time. Presently he is a computer systems consultant for 
Agilent and works from home. Kelly has no history of psychiatric, legal or 
substance abuse problems. He had a limited relationship history before meeting 
and marrying Kimberlee. Despite the knowledge of Kimberlee's relationship with 
Peter Thanos, Kelly persisted in believing that the marriage would survive. He 
was willing to remain married and raise both Nicholas and Zachary. Kimberlee 
pursued the divorce. Kelly has not remarried. Kelly was an involved parent with 
Nicholas and earnestly assumed the role of father to Zachary. Psychological 
testing was within normal limits, suggesting that Kelly does not experience 
psychological or psychiatric problems that interfere with his overall ability to 
function. 
Kimberlee Thanos is thirty-six years old. She maintains good relationships with 
her diverse family members. Since gaining an MBA from Brigham Young 
University in 1993, Kimberlee has been steadily employed as a computer systems 
consultant. Presently she works part time from home for a Utah based company. 
Kimberlee has no history of legal or substance abuse problems. She was treated 
for Generalized Anxiety Disorder by Lynda Steele, LCSW beginning in 1999 but 
has never been medicated for this or any other psychiatric disorder. According 
to Ms. Steele, Kimberlee's symptoms were primarily related to marital distress, 
the stress of having two very young children and occupational stress. 
Kimberlee's relationship with Kelly was her first significant relationship. She 
reported being unhappy very early in the marriage. Her relationship with a co-
worker, Peter Thanos, evolved over a period of six years and they are now 
happily married. Kimberlee has consistently been a primary parent to Nicholas, 
Zachary and now Madelaine, age four months. Psychological testing was within 
normal limits, suggesting that Kimberlee does not experience psychological or 
psychiatric problems that interfere with her overall ability to function. 
Peter Thanos is fifty-three years old. He maintains close relationships with his 
mother and sister, his father is deceased. Peter attended college but did not 
complete a degree. He was employed by HP/Agilent for twenty-four years and is 
now the Director of Operations for Cascade Microtech/Pyramid Probe Division. 
Peter had two serious relationships, including one brief marriage, before 
marrying Sharlene Gordon when he was twenty-three years old. Their twenty-
five year marriage ended when Sharlene died of cancer in December 2000. 
Their one child, Christopher, is twenty-eight years old, married, and recently 
completed a Ph.D. from Brown University. Christopher described Peter as a very 
loving, involved and supportive father. Peter is eager and willing to parent 
Nicholas as well as his two biological children with Kimberlee, Zachary and 
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Madelaine. Psychological testing was within normal limits, suggesting that Peter 
does not experience psychological or psychiatric problems that interfere with his 
overall ability to function. 
CHILDREN AT ISSUE: 
Nicholas Pearson, age six, DOB: 7/6/97: 
Nicholas is a bright, articulate and socially outgoing six-year-old boy. He is 
sensitive, vigilant and somewhat anxious, but he typically externalizes these 
characteristics rather than becoming withdrawn. He is a very good, curious and 
compliant student and is well liked by his peers. Organization and information 
help him feel in control so he actively seeks to gain and/or provoke information 
from others. He can become irritable and whiny or sad when his attempts to 
manage his environment and other people are thwarted. Nicholas will do well 
academically and socially. He responds very well to structure and reasoning and 
is highly unlikely to become a behavior problem. Nicholas' most significant 
needs fall in the emotional category. He is worried and confused about the 
future. I suspect that he often feels on the verge of chaos. He wonders if he will 
be able to manage all these relationships in his life and feels responsible for 
making his loved ones happy. 
Nicholas requires some emotional supports which are easy to identify and not so 
easy to deliver: 
• He needs consistent and predictable access to the important people in his life. 
He is a "counter" - he emotionally tracks the amount of time he spends with 
people and comes to internal conclusions as to whether he and they "got 
enough". 
• Nicholas does not perceive flexibility of schedule or plan as a good thing. He 
needs consistency and predictability. He needs information and he needs to 
know when the information he has becomes obsolete. 
• Nicholas worries about the people he loves. He needs to be told where 
people stand with each other and he needs to observe people acting in 
accordance with their words. He is very busy trying to figure out how to 
keep people happy and make these complex relationships work. He may 
actually be working harder at this than anyone else. He needs help from his 
parents through their role modeling of positive relationships and productive 
problem solving. 
• Nicholas needs stable and consistent daily routines as a foundation for a less 
anxious view of the world. 
• Nicholas' attachment to Kimberlee is very strong and his time with her should 
not be reduced below present levels. 
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Zachary Pearson, age four, DOB: 9/14/99: 
Zachary is an active, curious, loving four-year-old boy. He is inquisitive, but 
somewhat reserved. He likes to take stock of situations before he dives in. He 
interacts with the world in a very physical manner, a characteristic that he will 
need to learn to manage. Based on his current developmental path it is unlikely 
that Zachary will have academic, social or behavioral problems. He is less 
guarded emotionally than Nicholas and seems less worried. The current 
situation does not appear to confuse Zachary; he treats all three parents as 
loved and trusted caregivers. He is a physical child and requires physical 
attention, play and nurturing to feel secure. Zachary also requires consistent 
attention to his skin condition. He will thrive under a high level of intellectual 
and physical stimulation. His attachment to Kelly is very strong and he would be 
traumatized if that relationship were to suddenly change. Kelly is clearly 
Zachary's psychological father at present and Peter is clearly his biological father 
and growing in importance. Zachary's relationship with Kelly must continue and 
his relationship with Peter must grow. 
These boys have an exceptional sibling relationship. They are best friends. They 
need to reside together. They also now have an infant sister to whom they will 
no doubt become much attached. Separating these three siblings is not an 
option. 
They are also developing a need for a well-coordinated explanation of their 
circumstance that is not contaminated by judgment and resentment. Failure to 
provide this will leave both boys on shaky ground in terms of their sense of 
origin, belonging and most importantly, their sense of being wanted, loved and 
accepted. 
PARENTING INFORMATION: 
Parenting Strengths - Kimberlee's parenting skills are excellent. She is very 
loving, well organized, and invested in education - even at home. When 
communicating with her children she uses clear, age appropriate language and is 
able to guide their behavior very effectively without becoming negative. Her 
parenting style is responsible and responsive. She recognizes the uniqueness of 
each child and understands her children's strengths and weaknesses. 
Kelly's parenting skills are also excellent. He is highly involved with the children 
in all areas. He emphasizes play and companionship, along with education. He 
also communicates very clearly with the children and has no need or desire to be 
authoritarian in his attempts to manage their behavior. His love and devotion to 
both children is tangible and authentic. He is attuned to the boys' emotional 
needs and they sense his unconditional love. 
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Peter is the third excellent parent in this case. His gentle, calm demeanor makes 
him instantly available to the boys, both emotionally and physically. He is funny, 
creative and enjoys physical play. Under these unusual circumstances he has 
shown much patience and an understanding of the complex emotional 
environment the boys live in. His discipline style is slightly more authoritarian 
than Kimberlee or Kelly's style but this is a benefit to the boys under the 
circumstances. Peter has the advantage of having successfully raised another 
child to adulthood. 
Parenting Weaknesses -
It is nearly impossible to talk about parenting weaknesses related to these three 
parents. The deficits are very minor in all three cases. 
Kimberlee's primary weakness is probably her natural desire to do everything too 
well, sometimes failing to set reasonable limits for herself and thereby reducing 
her accessibility to others, including her children. As she overextends herself her 
preoccupation, irritability and stress increases. 
Kelly's primary weakness is a tendency to overindulge the boys at times. He 
may give in too often to the demands of these children. He needs to be more 
diligent at controlling Zachary's eczema through daily treatment. 
Peter's primary weakness may be his tendency to underestimate his own impact. 
Any firmness of tone of voice or angry body posture is so in contrast with Peter's 
general demeanor that the boys will take even the slightest negativity and 
exaggerate it in their own minds. Peter must be aware of his impact on the 
children and factor it into his behavior, especially when disciplining the children. 
The greatest difficulty in this case lies not in the individual parenting deficits of 
these people, but in the complicated and tension filled interaction between the 
three of them. Kim experiences Kelly as controlling and emotionally abusive; 
Kelly experiences Kim as manipulative and insincere; Peter experiences Kelly as 
possessive and inattentive; and Kelly experiences Peter as angry and aloof. 
Despite the negative tone of this triangular interaction, a generally positive 
decision making process has always existed between them, and they have 
managed quite well at keeping the children out of the fray. Nevertheless, the 
suspiciousness and sense of disapproval between Kelly and Kimberlee and Peter 
is high and the children sense it and react to i t The damage to the children will 
become more pronounced if these conflicts are not resolved. 
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Impairment - None of these parents has a history of impairment that impacts 
parenting. 
Availability - Kelly currently works full time from home with limited business 
travel. Kimberlee currently works part time from home with very limited travel. 
Peter works full time outside the home with limited travel. 
Facilitating a Relationship With the Other Parent - Kimberlee, Kelly and 
Peter have done an excellent job of maintaining the children's relationships with 
the other parents. There has been relatively little negative talk in front of the 
children. Kelly has a tendency to ask too many questions of the boys regarding 
Kimberlee and Peter. Peter and Kimberlee have the tendency to proceed with 
their parenting agenda, sometimes without fully considering Kelly's position. 
However, compared to other cases all three parents have done an exceptional 
job of promoting the worth of all relationships for the boys. 
Unique Fit Between Child's Needs and Parents7 Capacities -Individually, 
or in pairs, these three parents have the capacity to effectively parent Nicholas 
and Zachary. Each has minor weaknesses that scarcely dent the strong 
resources they have to offer these children. Their parenting styles are 
complimentary. They have similar major values and they recognize the 
importance of each other in the children's lives. Kimberlee and Peter offer the 
benefit of a parenting team, but it is likely that Kelly will remarry in the near 
future and offer a similar benefit to the boys. 
Parents' Perception of Issues -
Kelly: 
In an email dated July 31, 2003 Kelly wrote, "My concern since litigation began 
has always been that Peter and Kimberlee want to define my relationship with 
Zachary as one that is not a father son relationship when it clearly currently is a 
father son relationship." Kelly maintains that he is Nicholas and Zachary's real 
father despite the fact that Peter Thanos is Zachary's biological father. Kelly 
points to his hands on, fifty percent parenting of Zachary since Zachary's birth. 
He maintains that Peter's relationship with Zachary was slow in developing and 
that he has been the most consistent father. While he recognizes Peter's 
importance to both boys, he believes their best interests will be served by his 
being allowed to be their legal and joint custodial father. He worries that his 
relationship with Zachary will be diminished if Peter is allowed legal custody of 
Zachary. Kelly stresses Peter's unwillingness to forge a relationship with him, and 
sees that as a huge impediment to co-parenting. He worries that if his time with 
either child is reduced below fifty percent that he will lose his emotional and 
psychological place in their lives. Kelly worries that Peter and Kimberlee are 
sabotaging his relationship with Zachary by emphasizing the importance of the 
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biological relationship between Zachary and Peter. Though Kelly has offered at 
various times to move to Oregon to facilitate a joint access schedule, he is 
worried that he will not find suitable employment or potential marital partners 
there and worries about the lack of support from his extended family in Utah. 
Peter: 
In an email dated July 24, 2003 Peter wrote, "...the current roles that Kim and 
Kelly occupy exclude me from parenting Zacky, except for what time I get during 
Kim's time with the boys" and wrote on May 2, 2003, "I just can't understand 
how Zacky's natural parents, who are married, shouldn't have primary care of 
their son." Peter is worried that his limited time with Zachary will prevent the 
development of a healthy, normal father-son relationship. He is concerned that 
though Zachary is his biological child, his influence over Zachary and his right to 
make decisions will be severely limited. Peter wonders about the negative effect 
of Kelly's rigid ideas and positions on the boys' ability to establish relationships 
with each parent as they see fit. Peter is stumped by Kelly's unwillingness to 
recognize the importance of the biological bond between him and Zachary. He 
does not perceive Kelly as having attempted to establish any real relationship 
with him, and does not believe that Kelly is sincere in his protestations to the 
contrary. Peter sees Kelly as working harder to maintain his relationship with 
Zachary than with Nicholas; an effort that strikes Peter as misguided, unrealistic 
and unfair to Nicholas. He is also concerned about what he perceives as 
parenting deficits on Kelly's part - primarily related to health care and supervision 
issues. Peter is very concerned about his ability to gain equivalent employment 
in Utah if he is forced to relocate. He is very worried about his precarious 
financial position that is a result of supporting two homes in two different states 
as well as the ongoing costs of travel and litigation. 
Kimberlee: 
Kimberlee maintains that she has gone to great lengths to recognize, support 
and accommodate Kelly's position with the children. She feels she has been 
more willing to compromise from the very beginning than has Kelly. Kimberlee 
struggles with what she perceives to be Kelly's negative and intimidating attitude 
toward her and worries about the effect of this attitude on the children. 
Kimberlee points to her complete compliance with the court order regarding joint 
custody as evidence of her willingness to co-parent but stresses the extreme 
emotional and financial hardships that this places on her. Kimberlee worries 
about Kelly's ability to supervise the boys, his ability to manage Zachary's skin 
condition, his inability to isolate his anger and his "rigid" decision making process 
and its effect on Nicolas and Zachary. On January 21, 2003 Kimberlee stated "I 
think he (Kelly) legitimately hates me and Peter" and worries about the impact of 
his negative talk on the boys and their relationships with her and Peter. 
Kimberlee is concerned about the impact of time spent away from Oregon on 
both their marriage and Peter's relationship with Madelaine. She is concerned 
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that the lack of a stable, productive routine in one place will rob the boys of the 
stability they need and deserve. But more than anything, Kimberlee is concerned 
about Nicholas. She stated "I'm not worried about Zacky. The person who's 
losing in all this in Nicky" because Nicholas "has to pretend he doesn't like 
Peter". She perceives Nicholas as emotionally vulnerable because "Kelly's a 
better Dad to Zach than he ever was to Nick" and sees Nicholas as getting a 
lesser share of Kelly's attention and effort. She is also worried about the 
financial impact of continued travel and litigation. 
Looking Ahead - The current access plan which requires Kimberlee to travel 
between Utah and Oregon is not sustainable on any level for anyone. The 
financial, emotional and physical costs are too high. Nicholas and Zachary have 
only a few more years where they are socially and academically "portable" and 
need to be established in one primary community soon. By fourth grade 
Nicholas will be making friends that could transition with him into junior high 
school. Both boys will be expanding their extracurricular activities and making 
long term activity commitments. Their exceptional relationship with each other 
will become even more important and their relationship with their sister will have 
an significant influence on their development as boys. Their relationships with 
each of their three parents will grow and evolve to suit their individual needs. 
RULE 4-903: 
1. Child's preference: Nicholas and Zachary are too young to assess their 
custodial options. 
2. Benefit of keeping siblings together: These children are very best friends 
and it is likely that their sister will join their unusually strong relationship. 
They should not be separated. 
3. Relative strength of the child's bond with one or both of the prospective 
custodians: Nicholas and Zachary have excellent relationships with all 
three parents. 
4. General interest in continuing previously determined custody 
arrangements where the child is happy and well adjusted: Kelly and 
Kimberlee established a 50-50 parenting time arrangement that has 
worked relatively well but is not feasible over the long term if all parties 
do not reside in the same area. 
5. Factors relating to the prospective custodians' character or status or their 
capacity or willingness to function as parents, including: 
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i. Moral character and emotional stability: All three parents are of 
high moral character and exhibit emotional stability. 
ii. Duration and depth of desire for custody: Equal 
.ill. Ability to provide personal rather than surrogate care: Generally 
equal 
iv. Significant impairment of ability to function as a parent through 
drug abuse, excessive drinking or other causes: None 
v. Reasons for having relinquished custody in the past: Not applicable 
vi. Religious compatibility with the child: Kelly is a practicing Mormon; 
Kimberlee no longer practices the Mormon religion; Kimberlee and 
Peter support the boys' participation in religious training and 
activities. 
vii. Kinship, including, in extraordinary circumstances, stepparent 
status: Peter and Kimberlee are Zachary's biological parents. Kelly 
and Kimberlee are Nicholas' biological parents. Kelly is Zachary's 
psychological father at present. Nicholas and Zachary have a very 
strong attachment to Peter. 
viii. Financial condition: All parties have the capacity to support these 
children. 
ix. Evidence of abuse of the subject child, another child, or spouse: 
None 
F. Special Considerations/Recommendations: 
Proximity to Parents: Zachary and Nicholas need to live in close proximity to 
Kimberlee, Kelly and Peter. This requires that either Kelly relocates to Oregon or 
Peter, Kimberlee and their infant daughter relocate to Salt Lake City. The 
benefits to the children remaining in Salt Lake City include stability of social, 
family and academic networks. Kimberiee's current job is headquartered in Salt 
Lake City though she works from home. The disadvantage is that Peter does not 
have adequate employment opportunities in Salt Lake City and he is the primary 
financial provider for their family. Additionally, Kelly's Salt Lake employment 
status could change in the very near future, requiring him to relocate. Being 
single, Kelly is more transportable and during negotiations, he offered to move to 
Oregon. Maintaining extended family, social and academic networks are of less 
concern than creating geographical and financial stability for the children at this 
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point in their development. Developmental^ speaking, both boys are in a 
transportable stage. They have the capacity to positively adjust to a permanent 
move to Oregon. 
If these parents can not make a realistic assessment of the options and come to 
a mutual decision an independent vocational advisor could assess the 
employment options in both locations for Peter and Kelly and choose which 
location offers the best options for both. Kelly has consistently made offers to 
move to Portland to maintain his relationship with the Nicholas and Zachary. 
CONCLUSIONS: 
This complicated case has no simple solution. As in all complicated cases it is 
tempting to focus on the provocative, and often times, negative aspects of a 
case and link recommendations to those high profile issues. In this case the 
provocative issues include a long term affair, a father eager to raise a son 
fathered by another man, a man unable to leave a dying wife to the detriment of 
his true love and new baby, and a mother reduced to making the very best of 
bad choices. These issues are part of the history of these children, but they 
have very little to do with their future and consequently, should have little 
bearing on a plan that takes Nicholas and Zachary forward from here. 
Instead of relying on historical issues, these recommendations focus on present 
realities. Like all parents, these three have strengths and they have weaknesses. 
Like all parents, they could each improve. But any attempt to magnify their 
small personal foibles or minor parenting missteps into major differences is 
stretching far beyond the data. Worse, it would leave a legacy of misinformation 
for Nicholas and Zachary. Kelly Pearson, Kimberlee Thanos and Peter Thanos 
are fine people and excellent parents. Period. 
What remains is a logistical problem. What arrangement will allow Nicholas and 
Zachary to have a significant relationship with ail three of their parents and allow 
them to develop a relationship with their sister, Madelaine? What arrangement 
provides the most stability over the long term? 
I am pivoting my conclusions around Kimberlee's role as the biological mother of 
both boys and their sister. She is the parent with the strongest inherent 
responsibility to ail of these children, and it is a responsibility that she fully 
recognizes and embraces. She has honored the Court Order currently in place 
and bears the bulk of the physical, emotional and financial discomfort associated 
with it. She has done an exemplary job of facilitating Kelly's relationship with 
both boys. Meanwhile she has established a life in Oregon with Peter and 
Madelaine that fully incorporates Nicholas and Zachary. 
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Given her unequalled role in the lives of these children I recommend that the 
solution be centered on allowing Kimberlee to parent in an optimum manner 
She has chosen to establish a life for herself and her family in Oregon. This 
choice did not diminish her earning potential and maintains Peter's employment. 
It is a location familiar to Kelly and an area with probable strong employment 
options for him. The children consider Oregon to be one of their homes and are 
very comfortable in that environment. Currently single and working from his 
home, Kelly is the most portable of the three parents. 
I am convinced that these parents will be able to create a good life for 
themselves and their children in Oregon and urge that Kelly relocate to Oregon 
in time for Nicholas to begin the second half of this school year there. Specific 
recommendations regarding legal responsibilities and access schedules are 
detailed in the following section. 
RECOMMENDATIONS: 
1. Legal custody. Kimberlee and Peter should be named joint legal custodians 
of Zachary. Kimberlee and Kelly should be named joint legal custodians of 
Nicholas. (During the Settlement Conference, Kimberlee and Peter proposed 
a three-way joint legal custody of Zachary. I am not opposed to this option 
as it ultimately gives Kimberlee and Peter a majority position). Kelly's special 
relationship with Zachary should be legally protected in the form of third 
party access with the responsibility to make daily decisions on Zachary's 
behalf when Zachary is in his care. Kimberlee and Peter will make school 
placement decisions for both boys if the children reside in Oregon. The 
choice of Utah school should be based on a comparison of test scores for 
each parent's neighborhood school. Both biological parents of each child 
must agree upon any elective medical or dental treatment. It would be best 
if decisions regarding any extracurricular activities would be jointly made by 
all three parents so that the boys' schedules are manageable. If this is not 
possible, Kelly and Kimberlee will jointly decide on Nicholas' activities and 
Kimberlee and Peter will jointly decide on Zachary's activities. 
2. Access schedule. Regardless of whether this "extended family" lives in Salt 
Lake City or in Oregon the following schedule is recommended. However, my 
strong recommendation is that Kelly relocate to Oregon so that Nicholas can 
begin the second school term in Oregon: 
a. Continuation of the present seven day/seven day rotation. The 
children have been on this schedule since September and appear to 
be able to tolerate the amount of time away from the other parent. 
b. During the summer months Kimberlee/Peter and Kelly would have 
the option of a ten-day period of uninterrupted access to both 
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boys. Kelly will have first choice of that period in even years and 
Kimberlee/Peter will have the first choice in odd years. These 
periods may not be combined with regular access to form a block 
longer than ten days. 
c. Beginning in the school year of 2004/2005 Nicholas will continue on 
the weekly rotation. Transitions would occur Sunday evening. 
Zachary will spend five nights with Kelly and either return to 
Kimberlee/Peter for the last two nights of the seven-day period or 
remain with them for the first two nights of Kelly's period (rotating 
each time). Nicholas would join Zachary at KImberlee/Peter's on 
Sunday for his continuous seven-day period in that home. This 
arrangement keeps the boys on a highly predictable schedule, 
allows them to spend the vast majority of their time together, 
allows each of them some time alone with their biological fathers, 
and coincides with Peter's greater availability on the weekends. 
d. Holidays may be rotated according to Utah guidelines, or according 
to mutual agreement, with only major holidays being included (i.e. 
UEA, Thanksgiving, Christmas, Spring Break, July 4th). 
3. Transportation. Each parent will be responsible for picking up the children at 
the beginning of that parent's access period. 
4. Review. This schedule will be reviewed in August 2005 and a revised 
schedule may be recommended at that time based on current circumstances. 
5. Relocation. Once the decision is made to have the children reside in Oregon 
or Utah, which ever parent chooses to relocate there after agrees to not 
attempt to relocate the children but will propose a reasonable long-distance 
access plan. 
6. Renaming. Zachary's first name should not be altered; his last name may be 
changed to reflect his biological parentage. 
7. Religion. Both children may participate in religious activities as any of the 
three parties chooses during their access time. However, Zachary should not 
be confirmed or baptized or prepared for such events without the complete 
agreement of Peter and Kimberlee. 
8. Attendance at school and extracurricular events. To whatever extent possible 
all three parents should be welcomed to attend all events for both children. 
If this becomes problematic, rather than expose the boys to toxic conflict, 
Kimberlee will develop an attendance rotation reflecting 50% attendance at 
all events for Kelly. Any or all three parents may volunteer in either boy's 
classroom. 
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9. Parenting Coordinator. Sandra Foster, LCSW, is recommended as a parenting 
coordinator to facilitate the relationship between Peter and Kelly and serve as 
an advisor for any parenting disagreements. If the parties reside in Oregon a 
similar professional should be identified to assist these parties. 
10. Explanation. It is important that an explanation regarding the circumstances 
of each child's conception, birth and circumstances be crafted with the help of 
a child psychologist and provided to the boys in a united manner. Nicholas 
and Zachary need to hear a consistent presentation regarding these issues. 
11. Phone access. Each parent may call the children once a day while they are in 
the other parents' care but phone calls initiated by the children should be 
unlimited. 
JiH p. Sanders, Ph.D. 
Clinfcal Psychologist 
November 3, 2003 
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UTAH CODE SECTION 30-3-10 
30-3-10. Custody of children in case of separation or divorce — Custody consideration. 
(1) If a husband and wife having minor children are separated, or their marriage is declared 
void or dissolved, the court shall make an order for the future care and custody of the minor 
children as it considers appropriate. 
(a) In determining any form of custody, the court shall consider the best interests of the child 
and, among other factors the court finds relevant, the following: 
(i) the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of the parties; 
(ii) which parent is most likely to act in the best interest of the child, including allowing the 
child frequent and continuing contact with the noncustodial parent; and 
(hi) those factors outlined in Section 30-3-10.2. 
(b) The court shall, in every case, consider joint custody but may award any form of custody 
which is determined to be in the best interest of the child. 
(c) The children may not be required by either party to testify unless the trier of fact 
determines that extenuating circumstances exist that would necessitate the testimony of the 
children be heard and there is no other reasonable method to present their testimony. 
(d) The court may inquire of the children and take into consideration the children's desires 
regarding future custody or parent-time schedules, but the expressed desires are not controlling 
and the court may determine the children's custody or parent-time otherwise. The desires of a 
child 16 years of age or older shall be given added weight, but is not the single controlling factor. 
(e) If interviews with the children are conducted by the court pursuant to Subsection (l)(d), 
they shall be conducted by the judge in camera. The prior consent of the parties may be obtained 
but is not necessary if the court finds that an interview with the children is the only method to 
ascertain the child's desires regarding custody. 
(2) In awarding custody, the court shall consider, among other factors the court finds relevant, 
which parent is most likely to act in the best interests of the child, including allowing the child 
frequent and continuing contact with the noncustodial parent as the court finds appropriate. 
(3) If the court finds that one parent does not desire custody of the child, or has attempted to 
permanently relinquish custody to a third party, it shall take that evidence into consideration in 
determining whether to award custody to the other parent. 
(4) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(b), a court may not discriminate against a parent 
due to a disability, as defined in Section 57-21-2, in awarding custody or determining whether a 
substantial change has occurred for the purpose of modifying an award of custody. 
(b) If a court takes a parent's disability into account in awarding custody or determining 
whether a substantial change has occurred for the purpose of modifying an award of custody, the 
parent with a disability may rebut any evidence, presumption, or inference arising from the 
disability by showing that: 
(i) the disability does not significantly or substantially inhibit the parent's ability to provide 
for the physical and emotional needs of the child at issue; or 
(ii) the parent with a disability has sufficient human, monetary, or other resources available to 
supplement the parent's ability to provide for the physical and emotional needs of the child at 
issue. 
(c) Nothing in this section may be construed to apply to adoption proceedings under Title 
78, Chapter 30, Adoption. 
(5) This section establishes neither a preference nor a presumption for or against joint legal 
custody, joint physical custody, or sole custody, but allows the court and the family the widest 
discretion to choose a parenting plan that is in the best interest of the child. 
Amended by Chapter 356, 2004 General Session 
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UTAH CODE SECTION 30-3-10.1 
30-3-10.1. Definitions — Joint legal custody — Joint physical custody. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Joint legal custody": 
(a) means the sharing of the rights, privileges, duties, and powers of a parent by both parents, 
where specified; 
(b) may include an award of exclusive authority by the court to one parent to make specific 
decisions; 
(c) does not affect the physical custody of the child except as specified in the order of joint 
legal custody; 
(d) is not based on awarding equal or nearly equal periods of physical custody of and access 
to the child to each of the parents, as the best interest of the child often requires that a primary 
physical residence for the child be designated; and 
(e) does not prohibit the court from specifying one parent as the primary caretaker and one 
home as the primary residence of the child. 
(2) "Joint physical custody": 
(a) means the child stays with each parent overnight for more than 30% of the year, and both 
parents contribute to the expenses of the child in addition to paying child support; 
(b) can mean equal or nearly equal periods of physical custody of and access to the child by 
each of the parents, as required to meet the best interest of the child; 
(c) may require that a primary physical residence for the child be designated; and 
(d) does not prohibit the court from specifying one parent as the primary caretaker and one 
home as the primary residence of the child. 
Amended by Chapter 269, 2003 General Session 
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UTAH CODE SECTION 30-3-10.2 
30-3-10.2. Joint custody order - Factors for court determination — Public assistance. 
(1) The court may order joint legal custody or joint physical custody or both if the parents 
have filed a parenting plan in accordance with Section 30-3-10.8 and it determines that joint 
legal custody or joint physical custody or both is in the best interest of the child. 
(2) In determining whether the best interest of a child will be served by ordering joint legal or 
physical custody, the court shall consider the following factors: 
(a) whether the physical, psychological, and emotional needs and development of the child 
will benefit from joint legal or physical custody; 
(b) the ability of the parents to give first priority to the welfare of the child and reach shared 
decisions in the childfs best interest; 
(c) whether each parent is capable of encouraging and accepting a positive relationship 
between the child and the other parent, including the sharing of love, affection, and contact 
between the child and the other parent; 
(d) whether both parents participated in raising the child before the divorce; 
(e) the geographical proximity of the homes of the parents; 
(f) the preference of the child if the child is of sufficient age and capacity to reason so as to 
form an intelligent preference as to joint legal or physical custody; 
(g) the maturity of the parents and their willingness and ability to protect the child from 
conflict that may arise between the parents; 
(h) the past and present ability of the parents to cooperate with each other and make decisions 
jointly; 
(i) any history of, or potential for, child abuse, spouse abuse, or kidnaping; and 
(j) any other factors the court finds relevant. 
(3) The determination of the best interest of the child shall be by a preponderance of the 
evidence. 
(4) The court shall inform both parties that an order for joint physical custody may preclude 
eligibility for cash assistance provided under Title 35A, Chapter 3, Employment Support Act. 
(5) The court may order that where possible the parties attempt to settle future disputes by a 
dispute resolution method before seeking enforcement or modification of the terms and 
conditions of the order of joint legal custody or joint physical custody through litigation, except 
in emergency situations requiring ex parte orders to protect the child. 
Amended by Chapter 176, 2003 General Session 
Amended by Chapter 269, 2003 General Session 
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UTAH CODE SECTION 30-3-10.3 
30-3-10.3. Terms of joint legal custody order. 
(1) Unless the court orders otherwise, before a final order of joint legal custody is entered 
both parties shall attend the mandatory course for divorcing parents, as provided in Section 30-3-
11.3, and present a certificate of completion from the course to the court. 
(2) An order of joint legal custody shall provide terms the court determines appropriate, 
which may include specifying: 
(a) either the county of residence of the child, until altered by further order of the court, or the 
custodian who has the sole legal right to determine the residence of the child; 
(b) that the parents shall exchange information concerning the health, education, and welfare 
of the child, and where possible, confer before making decisions concerning any of these areas; 
(c) the rights and duties of each parent regarding the child's present and future physical care, 
support, and education; 
(d) provisions to minimize disruption of the child's attendance at school and other activities, 
his daily routine, and his association with friends; and 
(e) as necessary, the remaining parental rights, privileges, duties, and powers to be exercised 
by the parents solely, concurrently, or jointly. 
(3) The court shall, where possible, include in the order the terms of the parenting plan 
provided in accordance with Section 30-3-10.8. 
(4) Any parental rights not specifically addressed by the court order may be exercised by the 
parent having physical custody of the child the majority of the time. 
(5) (a) The appointment of joint legal custodians does not impair or limit the authority of the 
court to order support of the child, including payments by one custodian to the other. 
(b) An order of joint legal custody, in itself, is not grounds for modifying a support order. 
(c) The agreement shall contain a dispute resolution procedure the parties agree to use before 
seeking enforcement or modification of the terms and conditions of the order of joint legal 
custody through litigation, except in emergency situations requiring ex parte orders to protect the 
child. 
Amended by Chapter 126, 2001 General Session 
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UTAH CODE SECTION 78-45a-10 
78-45a-10. Effect of genetic test results. 
(1) Genetic test results shall be admissible as evidence of paternity without the need for 
foundation testimony or other proof of authenticity or accuracy if: 
(a) of a type generally acknowledged as reliable by accreditation bodies designated by the 
federal Secretary of Health and Human Services; 
(b) performed by a laboratory approved by such an accreditation body; and 
(c) not objected to with particularity and in writing within 15 days after the written test results 
being sent to the parties. 
(2) (a) Upon a motion of a party, a court may receive testimony from genetic testing experts 
and others involved in conducting the genetic tests if the testimony: 
(i) is based on a genetic test performed in accordance with Subsection 78-45a-7(3)(a) or 78-
45a-7(4); and 
(ii) is useful to the court in determining paternity. 
(b) Unless a party objects with particularity and in writing within 15 days after the written test 
results are sent to the last-known address of that party on file under Section 78-45a-2, testimony 
received under Subsection (2)(a) shall be in affidavit form. 
(3) (a) A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if genetic testing results in a 
paternity index of at least 150. 
(b) A presumption under Subsection (3)(a) may only be rebutted by a second genetic test: 
(i) that complies with Subsection 78-45a-7(4); and 
(ii) results in an exclusion. 
(4) If a presumption of paternity established under Subsection (1) is not rebutted by a second 
genetic test under Subsection (2), the court shall issue an order establishing paternity. 
(5) Bills for pregnancy, childbirth, and genetic testing are admissible as evidence without 
requiring third-party foundation testimony and shall constitute prima facie evidence of amounts 
incurred for such services or for testing on behalf of the child. 
Repealed and Re-enacted by Chapter 232, 1997 General Session 
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UTAH CODE SECTION 78-45a-10.5 
78-45a-10.5. Parent-time rights of father. 
(1) If the court determines that the alleged father is the father, it may upon its own motion or 
upon motion of the father, order parent-time rights in accordance with Sections 30-3-32 through 
30-3-37 as it considers appropriate under the circumstances. 
(2) Parent-time rights may not be granted to a father if the child has been subsequently 
adopted. 
Amended by Chapter 255, 2001 General Session 
